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I. INTRODUCTION'
The struggle against the African continent's commonplace disease
of military coups 2 has caused The Gambia and Senegal to administer
an uncommon but potentially long-term cure. These two West African
nations, so intertwined geographically3 that The Gambia has been de-
scribed as a "finger in the belly"" of Senegal, have sought a similarly
close political and economic union in the Senegambian Confederation
in response to the attempted coup in The Gambia 5 on July 30, 1981.'
While the hope is that these neighboring countries have integrated
their governmental, defense and other policies 7 for the welfare of both,
the fear is that The Gambia has become the victim of hegemony. The
initial attitude of many observers towards the Confederation had been
one of relief for the preservation of democratic stability and peaceful
* The author was the recipient of the Ernst C. Stiefel Award for the most accom-
plished paper in the field of comparative, common and civil law.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of several colleagues in completing
this note. William J.H. Hough III initiated my curiosity in Senegambia through his
knowledge of the region and its history. Andrew Varady scrutinized every draft of this
note and significantly improved upon each. C. Joseph Wysocki offered valuable advice
which I readily incorporated into my final draft and Bruce A. Thomas provided needed
criticisms which were welcomed.
1. Principal source materials devoting a rare section or chapter to the Senegambian
Confederation are, "The Senegambian Case," U. EZENWE, ECOWAS AND THE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION OF WEST AFRICA (1983); and "Senegambia: Economic and Monetary Union,"
P. ROBSON, INTEGRATION, DETELOPMENT AND EQUITY (1983). Periodicals supplying current
information on developments in the Confederation include AFRICA; AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL;
AFRICA REP; NEW AFRICAN and W. AFRICA.
2. "Over the past two decades, a sizeable portion of the Sub-Saharan region was the
scene of political and military conflict . . . . In the wake of independence, violent inter-
nal conflict burst forth in many of the new nations, stemming from the pluralism of
African societies and the difficulties of postcolonial political consolidation." THE WORLD
BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 10 (1983). Of the 41 Sub-
Saharan African countries, 17 are governed by the military, 17 are one party states and 7
are multiparty states. The Gambia and Senegal fall into the last category. A Continent
Gone Wrong, TIME, Jan. 16, 1984, at 26, 32 (map and table).
3. "Lying as it does, deep in the belly of Senegal, it is more than certain that should
the Gambia experience convulsion Senegal would suffer from stomach-ache." A Small
Nation With Big Dreams, AFRICA, Sept. 1981, at 18, 18.
4. Each still itself, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1982, at 26, 29. A map of the region will
indicate quickly why The Gambia "points like a finger into Senegal's belly." Id. "Sur-
rounded on three sides by Senegal, The Gambia consists of a 200 mile strip, seven to
fifteen miles wide, on each bank of the river for which it is named." Welch, Prospects for
"Senegambia," AFRICA REP., Jan. 1963 at 21, 21.
5. Restabilizing The Gambia, W. AFRICA. Aug. 10, 1981, at 1805, 1805.
6. See infra notes 68-99 and accompanying text.
7. In addition to defense and security the two countries declared their intention to
seek monetary and economic unity. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1981, at AS, col. 2.
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change for two nations long in need of a closer association. This relief,
however, was soon changed to an attitude of concern for the existence
of The Gambia as an independent, sovereign country. This note will
address this concern and respond to the principal question surrounding
the Confederation: Has the sovereignty of The Gambia, a former Brit-
ish colony, tiny in area and strength,8 been usurped9 by Senegal, a for-
mer French colony, which is much larger in all respects? 0 An analysis
of the structure of the Confederation and the history of the region will
be combined to consider the prospects for the evolution of the supra-
national relationship of Senegambia into a Federation.
IT. THE SHADOW OF CONFEDERATION"
A. Debate on the Merits of a Union: 1960-81
The product of colonial rivalries between Britain and France in
the "scramble for Africa,' 2 The Gambia has been described as forming
8. The Gambia has an area of 4,005 square miles. In 1980, 600,000 people comprised
the population, making the country the world's 137th most populous. DEADLINE DATA ON
WORLD AFFAIRS, GAMBIA 1 (1982). The Gambia had a 500-man "field force" at the time of
the coup attempt. Restabilizing The Gambia, supra note 5, at 1805.
9. S. GELLAR, SENEGAL: AN AFRICAN NATION BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE WEST 74 (1982).
10. Senegal has an area of 76,104 square miles. In 1980, the population totalled 5.66
million people, making the country the world's 82nd most populous. DEADLINE DATA ON
WORLD AFFAIRS, SENEGAL 1 (1982). Senegal has a total active armed force of 10,000 per-
sons. Id. at 3.
11. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 5. In presenting the story of economic integration
among African states, which is described as a story of disintegration, the author states
that "[iln spite of the present state of affairs, there is almost a staggering unanimity in
principle among African governments, as exemplified in speeches, conferences and reso-
lutions, on the urgent need for some form of close economic co-operation. However, that
has been shadow rather than substance." Id. (emphasis added).
12. H.A. GMLEY, A HISTORY OF THE GAMatA 96 (1965). In using the phrase "scramble
for Africa" to describe the diplomacy of European expansion in Africa by the British and
French colonial powers, the author explains that "[in this period Africa was seized terri-
torially by the great powers and arbitrarily parcelled out by a series of agreements which
betrayed little knowledge of the African environment." Id. In the late nineteenth cen-
tury, French traders, government officials and troops began to enter the region previ-
ously under British control along the coast of the Gambia river. These expansionary
moves into West Africa, propelled by France's "wounded pride" over her defeat in the
Franco-Prussian War and her inability to become the dominant power in Europe, evi-
denced the beginning of France's need for guaranteed markets and raw materials. Id. at
97-98.
After realizing the inevitable clash of British and French interests in the region,
Britain pressed for conferences to resolve the issue of possession of the territory along
the Gambia river, which it saw as "worthless except for bargaining purposes." Id. at 101-
02. The Conference of 1859 saw the French determined to maintain a strong presence in
West Africa and the British satisfied to continue viewing the land around the Gambia
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"ludicrous boundaries"' 3 which result in an "irrational intrusion"' 4 into
river as a valuable bargaining chip:
The French, negotiating from a position of strength, showed no intention of
retreating from the coastal.and hinterland areas occupied since 1882. This forced
a change in the direction of British policy concerning West Africa. The change of
attitude was in line with [Chief of British Military Intelligence] General Brack-
enbury's advice that he would not "recommend the surrender of the Gambia
• . . unless it were accompanied by the surrender by the French of their Gold
and Slave Coast possessions." He advised that if no suitable general division
could be obtained, the Commissioners [at the Conference] should try to secure
the best boundaries possible, particularly in the vicinity of Sierra Leone.
Id. at 103.
The French refusal to remove themselves from the region forced the British to seek,
successfully, an admission from the French that the Gambia river was within the sphere
of the British. "The French delegates admitted in principle that the Gambia was a Brit-
ish river and that a certain control of the riverine territory was necessary to maintain
this." Id. This admission by the French so elated the British that they did not press for
an expansion of the territory under their control around the river. Id. "The description
of the agreed boundaries was almost the same as that of the final convention [signed
August 10, 18891 which constrained British occupation rights to ten kilometers north and
south as far up river as Yarbutenda." Id. at 103-04. This Convention was the basis for
later agreements which finalized the boundaries of British control along the Gambia
river. Subsequent proposals by the French "for a direct exchange of the Gambia for
other territories or the abandonment by France of treaty rights in other areas" were
never seriously considered by the British. Id. at 109. Eventually, in the early part of this
century, France abandoned its interest in obtaining The Gambia. The principal reason
for the change in French attitude was that
Britain was no longer a colonial rival or potential enemy. Larger political
considerations dictated that no unnecessary strains should be placed upon the
newly built entente. The First World War, the building of the Dakar-Kayes-
Bamako Railway and the concentration of new capital in secondary ports such as
Kaolack and Ziganchour made the possession of The Gambia less important to
France.
Id. at 110. All diplomatic moves between Britain and France came to a halt after 1918.
The boundaries for The Gambia established in the Convention of 1889, seen at the time
as "a temporary expedient became a permanent political reality." Id. At the conclusion
of World War I and for decades to come, "The Gambia remained a tiny, poor, non-viable
area, a charge upon the British government who could do little because of the imposition
of unrealistic boundaries." Id. Thus, the "scramble for Africa" with the resulting ludi-
crous boundaries "attest to the passivity of the British and the activity of the French,
not only in the field, but also at the conference table." Id.
13. Id. at 96. The boundaries of The Gambia represent "a classic case of the unreality
of European diplomacy in the last quarter of the nineteenth century." Id. at 110. See
generally supra note 12, for the reasons motivating the colonial powers to ignore the
reality of the homogeneity of the area.
14. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 111. Writing on the economic aspects of the Senegam-
bian Confederation, the author points out that "[b]ecause of the Gambia's strange geo-
graphical position [in relation to Senegall, some form of integration with Senegal has
often been suggested as its natural destiny." Id. A map will show how The Gambia
nearly cuts Senegal into two areas, isolating the Senegalese province of Casamance from
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the geography of Senegal. The history of this region called Senegam-
bia,' 5 with the division of land features and human communities' 6 be-
tween The Gambia and Senegal, evoked the following response by a
Gambian Minister to the question of whether Britain, the former colo-
nizer, has a moral obligation to aid The Gambia:
Of course they [the British] have a moral obligation. Look
what they have done to us. They are responsible for our pov-
erty. There should be only one country here-either Gambia or
Senegal. The British are the ones who made us this small.
There were opportunities when they could have made an ar-
rangement with the French, but the negotiations always failed.
What did they ever do to develop our economy? Before they
came here we were self-sufficient. Now we are completely de-
pendent on outside influences. It vexes me, honestly it does!'7
the northern part of the country. See supra note 4.
15. The name "Senegambia" is not the product of the colonial period but comes from
the names of the rivers Senegal and Gambia in the region. P.D. CURTIN, ECONOMIC
CHANGE IN PRECOLONIAL AFRICA 6 (1975). In a report prepared for Senegal and The Gam-
bia before the latter gained independence from Britain, the authors commented that
Senegambia is "[a] name devised for the case of an association which would merge the
two countries into a larger international unit, however constructed, which would proba-
bly be accepted for that eventuality, though not without some regret on the side of Sene-
gal." Report on the Alternatives for Association Between The Gambia and Senegal,
TAO/Gambia/Senegal (Prepared for The Governments of The Gambia and Senegal)
Ch.I.A. at 5 n.3 (1964) [hereinafter Report on Alternatives for Association]. For the com-
plete text of this report, see Appendix F.
16. RoBsON, supra note 1, at 124. After describing the formation of The Gambia,
whose borders around the Gambia river cut through "natural features" of the region, the
author continued, "wholly surrounded by Senegal, except on its seaward margin, The
Gambia largely isolates the southern region of Casamance from the rest of Senegal. Eth-
nically, the peoples of the two countries are of similar stock." Id.
17. B. RICE, ENTER GAMBIA 368 (1967) (quoting Sherif Dibba, Gambian Minister of
Local Government). For a discussion of British as well as French responsibility for the
peculiar geographical boundaries of The Gambia, see supra note 12. The poverty of The
Gambia, both in terms of the wholly inadequate economic system and political institu-
tions, is the result of Britain's unwillingness to recognize her responsibilities towards the
region and its inhabitants:
The [British] Colonial Office. . .did not become reconciled to keeping the
Colony and Protectorate until after World War 1. Therefore the political institu-
tions and economic policies were framed as temporary measures. The nineteenth
century standard that colonies should not cost money was held to be even more
applicable for an area which had been considered worthless. Any proposed polit-
ical system for keeping law and order in the Protectorate would be constrained
to meet this qualification of thrift first. Thus the establishment of British au-
thority saw the imposition of indirect rule in the Protectorate. Circumstances
conspired to keep this system alive long after its usefulness was at an end, and
tended to nullify any bold economic or political plans for the Gambia.
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This vexation, commonly experienced by Gambians, steadily increased
over time as the obstacles to a union created by the respective British
and French colonial systems of The Gambia and Senegal were recog-
nized. The differences inherited from colonial rule remained in each
country's administrative, cultural, economic and monetary systems,"5
even after independence. Given these ever-present problems to a closer
association, it is not surprising to hear the Senegalese describe their
relationship with The Gambia by the phrase "condemned to live
together."'"
Despite this popular pessimism, many African scholars have been
able to echo the words of one writer that "on both ethnic and economic
grounds The Gambia could so tidily, easily and logically be absorbed
[into Senegal]. 120 This academic observation has been repeated in the
common Gambian expression that "every Gambian has a Senegalese
cousin.1 2 The unquestionable ties between the peoples of the two
countries could not help but foster discussion of some type of formal
union, and in fact, such discussion took place in earnest beginning with
the period of independence from colonial rule.
22
Both countries agreed in 1961 to form a committee consisting of
ministers from The Gambia and Senegal.23 This inter-ministerial com-
mittee conducted discussions seeking common grounds of association.2 '
GAILEY, supra note 12, at 110.
18. ROBSON, supra note 1, at 124. During the period from 1765 to 1783, most of what
now comprises The Gambia and Senegal was under British rule. After this period of
"Senegambia," the influences of separate British and French colonial rule were estab-
lished. Id. See infra note 61.
19. W. SKURNIK, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SENEGAL 145 (1972).
20. J. PRICE, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF WEST AFRICA 173 (1968). For a discussion of
the ethnic similarities of the two peoples, see infra note 21.
21. C. WELCH, JR., DREAM OF UNITY 250 (1966). "Ethnically the indigenous popula-
tions of The Gambia and Senegal are identical; the same groups with the same languages
and social structures live on both sides of the border." Report on Alternatives for Associ-
ation, supra note 15, ch.I.A., at 4. A feeling of amity prevails in the region. The people
"have relatives in the neighbor country; they inter-marry and have social contacts with-
out difficulty." Id. The irrational division of human communities, see supra note 16 and
accompanying text, is particularly evident when it is realized that "[d]aily life is very
much the same in the rural areas of Senegal and The Gambia, centering [on] the same
types of production in similar houses and with the same customs and family organiza-
tion." Id.
22. The Gambia gained its independence from Britain on February 18, 1965. Hughes,
The Gambia: Recent History, in AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 1983-84, at 381 (1983).
Senegal gained its independence from France on June 20, 1960. Synge, Senegal: Recent
History, in AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 1983-84, at 687 (1983).
23. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 113. The committee still exists, but it "has not achieved




The principal outcome of this dialogue was a consensus that a basis for
formal cooperation between Senegal and The Gambia could be possible
once independence came to the latter.b Two years later, in anticipa-
tion of Gambian independence, both countries requested that a study
be authorized under the United Nations on alternative forms of coop-
eration and association.2 6 The United Nations Technical Assistance
Programme appointed a group of experts27 who completed their inves-
tigation and submitted a report, "On The Alternatives For Associa-
tion," in 1964.28
Recognizing the obstacles29 facing the formation of a union, the
report set forth three alternatives to joint political association. These
alternatives would parallel the proposals for economic and monetary
association."0 The "simplest solution" to the problem of a union would
involve The Gambia's complete integration as a political unit into
Senegal."' The tiny country would become another Senegalese prov-
25. Other concerns discussed by the committee included "cooperation and posts, tele-
communications and feeder roads." ROBSON, supra note 1, at 125.
26. WELCH, supra note 21, at 282. The premier of The Gambia proposed to the Sene-
galese in 1962 that help from the United Nations should be sought. Id. Help was sought
because of the lack of expertise on the inter-ministerial committee necessary to reach a
conclusion on the effects of Senegambian Union on The Gambia. Id.
27. The experts and their area of specialty on the United Nation's appointed mission
were "Mr. Hubertus Johannes van Mook (the Netherlands), chief of mission and public
administration expert; Dr. Max Graessli (Switzerland), expert in economics; Dr. Henri
Monfrini (Switzerland), expert in constitutional law and Mr. Hendrik Weisfelt (the
Netherlands), fiscal and financial expert." Report on Alternatives for Association, supra
note 15, (preface) at 1-2.
28. The report is dated March 16, 1964. Id.
29. The report's proposals were drafted within the bounds of six constraints: first, the
insistence of Senegal that the minimum association imaginable would have to combine
defense and foreign affairs; second, the severe hesitancy of The Gambia to form any
union with Senegal on a political level unless substantial guarantees of autonomy were
provided; third, the ignorance of both countries as to the effects of a union, creating
particularly in The Gambia apprehension towards closer association; fourth, the adminis-
trative, fiscal, legal and political differences between the two countries carried over from
the colonial period; fifth, the uncertainty within both countries of the value of a union;
and finally, as a culmination of the other concerns, an understandable lack of political
pressure for an association or union to be developed. WELCH, supra note 21, at 286.
30. The commission had recommended the integration of import and customs poli-
cies through "a gradual process to be undertaken from both sides and accompanied by a
careful observation of its effects." Report on Alternatives for Association, supra note 15,
ch. VII., at 81. This was similar to its recommendation that the two countries adopt the
concept of a federation, in which the degree of powers possessed by the central govern-
ment would increase over time. In other words, a gradual process, just as with the eco-
nomic sphere, would be undertaken. Id.
31. Id. ch. II. C. at 25.
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ince.3 1 A second alternative would involve the two neighbors establish-
ing a "Senegambian federation."3 The central governmental authority
would possess powers limited to such areas as defense and diplomatic
representation, while The Gambia and Senegal would remain autono-
mous in "their own institutions and even their [own] political sys-
tem." 4 The report viewed the then existing Cameroon Federation"5 as
embodying many aspects of a future Senegambian federation. The pro-
posal for a "Senegambian entente" was the third and final alterna-
tive. 6 Interstate agreements and treaties would be established covering
areas of mutual interest.3 7 These bilateral agreements would create a
foundation for future cooperation on a greater level."
The report recommended the second alternative.3 9 The "most logi-
cal and effective goal as a first stage,"4 wrote the experts, would be a
federation. Although initially limited, the federal government's powers
could gradually increase as desired by both countries through the
"habit of co-operation.' 1 Similarly, in keeping with the concept of
gradual assimilation of the two nations' political systems, the report
urged a similar process to achieve an economic and monetary union."'
32. If this occurred The Gambia would be the eighth province of Senegal. The pres-
ent regions are Cap Vert, Thies, Diourbel, Fleuve, Senegal Oriental (or Eastern Senegal),
Sine-Saloum and Casamance. The Republic of Senegal, INT'L BULL., Apr. 1963, at 63, 67.
33. Report on Alternatives for Association, supra note 15, ch.II.C. at 24.
34. Id. at 25.
35. The Cameroon Federation came into existence in 1961. It was composed of the
former French Cameroon, named East Cameroon, and the southern, English region of
Cameroon, known as West Cameroon. The principle upon which the two regions united
was that "the two federated States retain their autonomy in all matters not expressly
reserved to the federal authority and that even in the matters so reserved they will retain
their autonomy for so long as the federal authority does not exercise the powers vested in
it by the Constitution." Id. The Commission found that the Cameroon Federation of-
fered some useful guidance to Senegal and The Gambia because problems of colonial
systems inherited from the past remained in Cameroon and were similar to those of a
"Senegambia." Id. at 26. The interests in defense, and the problems of their economies,
were almost the same. Id.
36. Id. at 29.
37. Id. The Commission had suggested that two areas which could encompass the
first of such agreements would be diplomatic representation and defense. Id. at 30.
38. Id. at 29. "It would in any case be for the two States concerned, and for them
alone, to decide whether to continue the co-operation in the manner described [gradual
intensification of the reciprocal relationship] . . . , notwithstanding the possible estab-
lishment of a much closer relationship between them [such as a federation]." Id. at 29-
30.
39. Id. at 81.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 30. "It was thought that a developing economic association would
help to promote a gradual rapprochement in the political sphere as well." EZENWR, supra
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Areas of common agreement would be unified first with an eye toward
complete integration of the economic systems and currencies.4
The Senegalese and Gambian Governments discussed the report's
proposals and recommendation in May, 1964, two months after the na-
tions received the report." The Gambia proposed a confederal system
in which the joint central government would have authority over mat-
ters of defense, foreign affairs and diplomatic representation.45 This
proposal was similar to the report's recommendation and in keeping
with a statement made by The Gambia before the report was issued."
Senegal, however, sought a greater concentration of power in the cen-
tral government with the prospect of eventual integration of The Gam-
bia into Senegal.'7 The preference of Senegal was similar to the first
alternative explored by the report. Given the divergent views of The
Gambia and Senegal on the type of association most desirable, the
third alternative of the report was adopted.48 Agreements of coopera-
tion were negotiated involving defense, security and foreign policy.'
The preambles to these treaties of entente, as echoed in subsequent
agreements, declared the intention of the two nations to have an in-
creased level of cooperation "pending the institution of a closer associ-
ation between The Gambia and Senegal . . . . ,
Those who argue in favor of a formal union beyond a mere entente
emphasize that the region should not remain divided geographically;'
note 1, at 114.
43. Id.
44. WELCH, supra note 21, at 289.
45. Id. The Gambia especially desired to maintain its "special relationship" with the
British Commonwealth. Id. The maintenance of this relationship was stressed in a Gam-
bian statement made before the commission began work on its report. Report on Alter-
natives for Association, supra note 15, Annex 11, at 87 ("Statement by the Government
of The Gambia on the Joint Communique Issued by the Government of the Republic of
Senegal and the Government of The Gambia").
46. See infra notes 364-69 and accompanying text.
47. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 116. The Senegalese preference was rejected by the
Gambian representatives as "beyond what we felt public opinion in The Gambia would
accept, and ... not in the best interests of The Gambia." WELCH, supra note 21, at 290
(quoting Gambia News Bull., July 9, 1964, Supp., at 3).
48. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
49. WELCH, supra note 21, at 290.
50. Id. In a later agreement, the two governments confirmed their determination "to
further the fruitful cooperation within the framework of a policy of close association."
Treaty of Association Between The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal, Apr. 19, 1967,
The Gambia-Senegal, 640 U.N.T.S. 101, at 102. The same theme is expressed in the first
article of the agreement. "The purpose of the treaty association between The Gambia
and Senegal is to promote and expand the coordination and cooperation between the two
countries in all areas." Id.
51. See supra notes 2-3.
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the cultural and social affinities of the two peoples should not be sepa-
rated by borders; 2 and the governmental systems of The Gambia and
Senegal, both among the most democratic53 on the African continent,
should be united in spirit and practice." Proponents of a union also
stress the problems of a nation as small as The Gambia: the potential
for internal disorder given the absence of a strong military force;5 5 the
52. See supra notes 20-21.
53. Sklar, Democracy in Africa, 26 AFRICAN STUD. REV. 11, 12 (1983). Placing both
The Gambia and Senegal within the category of liberal democracies, the author defines a
liberal democracy as one where "the powers of government are limited by law and citi-
zens enjoy freedom of association to compete for office in free elections at regular inter-
vals." Id. In May 1982, Gambian national elections were held to fill the office of the
president and the 48 member House of Representatives. The incumbents won the presi-
dency and 27 seats in the House. The opposition party won three seats and independent
candidates won five seats. The remaining 13 seats were nominated by the president. The
term of office for all elected positions is five years. A New Mandate, AFRICA, June 1982,
at 20, 20. The democratic electoral system in The Gambia, tailored to that or any other
country with a high illiteracy rate, was described two weeks after the 1977 national
elections:
Today when a Gambian goes to the polls he is handed a marble. Inside the vot-
ing booth he finds two or three 50 gallon drums, each bearing the photograph of
a candidate and the colors of his political party. The voter inserts the marble
into a plastic tube leading to the drum of his choice, and as it posses through it
strikes a loud bell. One clang, one vote.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1977, at A3, col. 3.
In Senegal, elections were held in February 1983. The incumbent and four challeng-
ers contested the office of president. The incumbent was reelected, with one challenger
receiving 13 percent of the vote. In the Senegalese national assembly, the incumbent
party won 109 of 120 seats. Two opposition parties gained seats. Celebration for Many
Parties, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 1983, at 33. A 16th political party, which claims to be na-
tionalist, progressive and socialist, has requested recognition with the Ministry of the
Interior. Update: Senegal, W. AFRICA, Mar. 4, 1985, at 442, 442. The new party has been
named the "Senegalese Democratic Union" (UDS). Id.
54. The spirit for unifying the two countries has a long history. The goal of African
unity has been stressed by both Senegal and The Gambia since independence. In a joint
communique issued after the United Nations had agreed to appoint a team of experts in
1962 to study alternative methods of association for The Gambia and Senegal, the two
governments expressed the hope that such an association would "make an important
contribution . . . to the cause of African unity." Report on Alternatives for Association,
supra note 15, Annex I, at 85. The Senegambian agreement of 1981 takes into considera-
tion "the many past and present experiments made with a view to rapprochement, soli-
darity and sub-regional and regional cooperation." Foundation Document, infra note
101, at 260 (preamble). In a 1982 interview, The Gambian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
explained that the Confederation was formed "to wipe out the evils inherited from the
colonialists. We ask the Almighty Allah to direct and guard us so that the confederation
is successful. If we are successful in this, by Allah's will, we are confident that other
African states will wish to join the confederation .... " Gambia News Bull., Mar. 10,
1982, at 3.
55. See supra note 8.
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fear in Senegal that The Gambia could pose a threat to security if it
succumbed to unfriendly forces either domestic or foreign;56 and the
questionable ability of the small Gambian economy to satisfy the needs
of its people.5 7 Other reasons cited for a union include the abolishment
of smuggling cheap Gambian goods into the higher priced Senegalese
markets58 and the opportunity for the Senegalese economy to make full
use of the Gambian river.5 9 In addition, one scholar has suggested that
English-speaking Gambian politicians should not fear domestic politi-
cal domination of their English-speaking constituents by French-
speaking Senegalese politicians in a Senegambian union.60
Opponents of a union beyond a cooperative relationship point first
to the differences between the two countries which were created by the
remnants of a British and French colonial system.6 ' The most often
expressed argument against a union has been The Gambia's fear of be-
ing swallowed up by the political, economic and monetary systems of
Senegal." Other reasons for opposing a union include the potential for
56. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 112-13. The Gambia also recognized its vulnerability to
attack. Id. at 113. "The political history of many nations, not only those of recent birth,
has known cases of subversion or rebellion organized by political refugees of one country
who had a fond [sic] assylum [sic] in a neighbouring one. Of course neither the people in
Senegal nor those in The Gambia can be blind to the hypothetical possibility that a
completely separate and unfriendly Gambia or Senegal could be such a refuge." Report
on Alternatives for Association, supra note 15, ch.I.A., at 6.
57. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 111-12. "[The] Gambia is a tiny and poor country by
any standards. At present Britain provides more than 60 percent of its development
budget finance, and this financial dependence for development expenditure is likely to
continue." Id. see infra note 58 for gross national product per capita.
58. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 112. The smuggling trade is described as the "economic
life-blood" for The Gambia. Id. While beneficial to certain interests within The Gambia,
the illegal trade has become a constant "source of irritation and friction between the two
countries." Id. An estimated ten million dollars in Gambian goods are smuggled annually
into Senegal to fetch higher prices. Nordlinger, Africa's Senegambia: A Confederation
More oj Form Than Substance, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 1983, at 13, col. 4.
The contrast between the two economies and why some Gambians find it profitable to
smuggle goods into Senegal, is illustrated by the gross national product in 1979 dollars.
In The Gambia, the gross national product per capita was $250, while in Senegal, it was
$430. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2, at 143.
59. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 112.
60. W.J. FOLTZ, FROM FRENCH WEST AFRICA TO THE MALI FEDERATION 194 (1965).
61. One of the principal remnants of the French and British colonial powers has been
their respective administrative systems. The difference between the Senegalese and The
Gambian administrations has been described as "considerable." Report on Alternatives
for Association, supra note 15, ch.III. at 35. For a description of contrasts between the
administrations of the two countries, see generally id. ch.III at 35-42.
62. Fears of this eventuality have been expressed many times by Gambians. For ex-
ample, take the following:
There is nothing preventing Gambia being overrun by its neighbors in the fore-
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the financial dependence of The Gambia shifting from Britain to Sene-
gal,63 the financial loss to The Gambian smuggling trade resulting from
economic integration with Senegal6 4 and Senegal's concern that if The
Gambia were integrated into Senegal with a degree of autonomygreater than that of other Senegalese provinces," those other provinces
might demand a similar status."
B. Midwife to Confederation:67 1981 Coup Attempt in The Gambia
The "naked Swedes on the beaches"68 of The Gambia traveled to
that country for more than the warm climate and baking sun. Europe-
ans, like most tourists to Africa, sought a nation offering security from
violent strife and political upheavel. The Gambia, since independence,
had succeeded in guaranteeing such security."9
During several days in July and August of 1981, that guarantee of
security was abruptly withdrawn. On July 30, while Gambian Presi-
dent, Sir Dawda Jawara, was in London for the wedding of Prince
seeable future. Senegal seemed envious of the advantageous location of our air-
port and the navigability of our river. The Senegalese are prepared to go to any
length, either by persuasion or the use of force, to attain complete domination of
our territory .... I wonder if we shall be so willing to surrender our hard won
freedom from the British to an ever-lasting period of slavery under the Senegal.
WELCH, supra note 21, at 283-84 (quoting an article published in GAMBIA OUTLOOK, Jan.
13, 1962).
63. GAILEY, supra note 12, at 208.
64. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 112.
65. See supra note 32. "Since Gambians are not likely to accept any option to be-
come a simple province of Senegal, Senegal is also apprehensive of the possible repercus-
sions on Casamance of an arrangement allowing The Gambia more autonomy than parts
of Senegal were the two states to agree to some type of political integration." SKURNIK,
supra note 19, at 146.
66. Id.
67. ECONOMIST, supra note 4, at 29. "The rebellion was midwife to the confederation
with Senegal, which still has to overcome a number of difficulties." Id.
68. Gambia: Popular Plots, AFRICA CONFIDENrTIAL, Aug. 19, 1981, at 5, 6. The amount
of- government revenue spent on the tourism industry, as illustrated by the "naked
Swedes on the beaches," results, according to one argument, in a "clash of cultures and
increased delinquency and prostitution among young Gambians." Id.
69. Coups Can Be Defeated, W. AFRICA, Aug. 10, 1981, at 1803, 1803. "The Gambia
was famous as a quiet and stable corner of West Africa, which had a commercial value as
it allowed tourists to think they could safely sun themselves on the beaches." Id. An
atypical disturbance in 1980, however, proved to be a harbinger for events in late July of
the following year. A Gambian field force commander was assassinated. The killing, ap-
parently over a personal dispute, was followed by "a handful of militant left-wingers who
started to call for the overthrow of the Gambian government." Wiseman, Revolt In The
Gambia: A Pointless Tragedy, THE ROUND TABLE, Oct. 1981, at 373, 374. Senegalese
troops were invited by The Gambia into the country to strengthen the government. Id.
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Charles and Lady Diana Spencer, 0 a segment of The Gambia's 500-
man field force,' led by a little-known politician, 72 took over the offices
of Radio Gambia and announced an end to the Jawara Government.73
The leader of the coup, charging the overthrown government with
"corruption and economic mismanagement and of causing unemploy-
ment and injustice, 7 4 abolished all elements of democracy in The
Gambia.7 5
In contact with memben of his government by telephone ftom
London,76 President Jawara, before his immediate return,7 7 directed
his vice-president to invoke a mutual defense treaty with Senegal.7 8 As
a result, 2,700 Senegalese troops, ' together with Gambian field forces
loyal to the president,80 put an end to the coup in early August. 8' A
precarious hostage situation, involving, among others, one of the wives
of Sir Dawda, '8 2 was concluded several days later s with the help of
British Special Air Service counterterrorist experts.84 Suspicions of
Russian and Libyan involvement in the coup attempt85 could do noth-
70. Restabilizing The Gambia, supra note 5, at 1805, 1805.
71. Id.
72. Battle for Banjul, AFRICA, Sept. 1981, at 14, 15. The 28 year old politician, Kekoi
Samba Sanyang, began the coup in the early hours of July 30. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The coup leader, Kekoi Samba Sanyang, announced the suspension of the consti-
tution and judiciary, and the banning of all political parties. Id. Other actions included
the closing of all banks and the denunciation of "imperialism and neocolonialism." Id.
76. Restabilizing The Gambia, supra note 5, at 1805, 1805.
77. Battle for Banjul, supra note 72, at 14, 15. Within 24 hours of learning of the
coup, President Dawda Jawara returned to The Gambia by way of Dakar, Senegal, in a
plane provided by Senegal. Id.
78. Restabilizing The Gambia, supra note 5, at 1805, 1805.
79. DEADLINE DATA ON WORLD AFFAIRS, SENEGAL, supra note 10, at 5.
80. Restabilizing The Gambia, supra note 5, at 1805, 1805.
81. Id. In a broadcast from the capital of Senegal, President Jawara claimed the coup
had been crushed on August 1. At the time of the broadcast, the coup participants still
had control of Gambian radio and continued to hold hostages. Id. The coup attempt was
completely put down several days after August 1, so that there was a total of one week of
violence. African Update, AFRICA REP., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 23, 26.
82. Restabilizing The Gambia, supra note 5, at 1805, 1805. More than 130 hostages
were held, including some government ministers and the executive secretary of the Gam-
bian Cooperation Commission. AFRICA, supra note 72, at 14, 16.
83. They Dared and Won Discreetly, ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1981, at 32, 32.
84. Id.
85. In an interview after the coup attempt, President Jawara responded to the ques-
tion of whether he had any evidence of outside involvement in the coup: "There is ample
evidence to show that those who staged the coup had extensive training outside this
country and that they had advice, equipment, armourment and ammunition to carry out
their plot. But I am not in a position to name any country." We Have Learnt a Useful
19861
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
ing but divert attention from the results of the violence: 800 people
dead, mostly civilians;86 a heavily damaged capital city of Banju 87 and
a severely damaged image of The Gambia as the bedrock of peaceful
political change in Africa."'
Speculation varied as to the domestic causes of the coup attempt,
but all revolved around a perceived "crisis of expectations."" Presi-
dent Jawara had been in office for nineteen years, and Gambians may
not have been satisfied with the level of economic improvements at-
tained since independence. 09 Ostentatious displays of wealth in a poor
Lesson, AFRICA, Sept. 1981, at 16, 17. Soviet cars had been used by the rebels and accusa-
tions were made against the Kremlin. But the vehicles used had actually been part of a
business deal arranged by a private citizen before the coup attempt. ECONOMIST, supra
note 83, at 32. "Although the Jawara government has been critical of the Soviet Union,
bitterly so over the latter's invasion of Afghanistan, the Russians would clearly stand to
lose much more than they could hope to gain by assisting a coup in The Gambia and for
practical diplomatic reasons their direct involvement would seem most unlikely." Revolt
in The Gambia supra note 69, at 373, 378. Libyan involvement seemed far more proba-
ble. "There is no doubt that [Libyan President] Gadafi has been supporting destabilizing
tendencies in West Africa as a whole part of his dream for a trans-Saharan Islamic state
under his leadership. Many West African states including The Gambia have in the past
couple of years expelled the Libyans for the support and training the latter would have
undoubtedly given to subversive groups in many states."Id.
86. Battle for Banjul, supra note 72, at 14, 16.
87. "Marks of destruction are everywhere visible in the capital's shopping centre.
Whole streets are littered with discarded wrappings of goods looted by the rebels and
their supporters. One of the rebels' first acts was to throw open the doors of Banjul
prison, and hardened criminals led the two-day orgy of looting." Thank You and Good-
bye-I hope, ECONOMIST, Aug, 8, 1981, at 27, 27. Bathurst, the colonial capital of The
Gambia, was renamed Banjul after independence. F. PEDLER, MAIN CURRENTS OF WEST
AFRICAN HISTORY 1940-1978, at 43 (1979).
88. The damaged image ostensibly continued with the imposition by The Gambia a
short time after the coup attempt of a state of emergency on August 14, 1981. No Easy
Promises, W. AFRICA, Feb. 18, 1985, at 297, 298. The state of emergency was lifted in
early February 1985. Id. President Jawara said the state of emergency had not been
imposed for security reasons. "Its maintenance for over three years was due to what
[Jawara] described as juridicial reasons linked to the trials which ended last year [1984]
of Gambians allegedly involved in the coup bid." Sorting Out the Dowry, AFRICA, May
1985, at 32, 33. Even though the state of emergency has been lifted, the desire for in-
creased security is no doubt responsible for the issuing of identity cards for all Gambi-
ans. Identity Cards for All, W. AFRICA, Feb. 11, 1985, at 289. Gambian officials have told
the citizenry "to view the national identity card (ID) scheme as a birthright and to co-
operate fully with . . . (the government) to prove their patriotism." Id. Aside from pub-
lic security, the government has also claimed that creation of the ID cards is for "medical
and welfare schemes, accidents, banking and other official transactions." Id.
89. Gambia: Popular Plots, supra note 68, at 5.
90. Id. In describing the coup attempt, which brought out the social discontent hid-
ing behind a facade of peace and tranquility, it was said that "apparently, the govern-
ment's much-admired adherence to the rule of law was a vastly inadequate substitute for
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country,"' rampant corruption 2 and an overexpenditure of public
funds on investment in the tourist industry" were all presented as rea-
sons for the attempted overthrow.
While speculation varied as to the causes of the violence, no guess-
work was needed to explain the swift response by Senegalese forces in
crushing the coup. "I will spare no effort nor retreat from any danger
to safeguard Senegal's interests,"' said President Abdou Diouf of
Senegal in a national address, directing his remarks to opposition lead-
a tangible improvement in the welfare of the people. The finer points of democracy are
seldom appreciated on an empty stomach." Battle for Banjul, supra note 72, at 14, 16-
17. See also Few Options for Gambia as World Bank Gives Details of a Failing Econ-
omy, NEw AFRICAN, June 1981, at 28, 28 (this article, published one month before the
coup attempt, discusses the various problems of the Gambian economy as identified by
The World Bank). The Senegalese province of Casamance, see supra note 14, had sym-
pathized with the coup attempt in The Gambia. Secessionist Agitation Grows in
Casamance Region of Senegal, AFRICA REP., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 28, 29. The province
hoped to be integrated into The Gambia, thus ending the geographic isolation felt by the
inhabitants. Id.
91. Revolt in The Gambia, supra note 69, at 376. In exploring the causes of the coup
attempt, the writer discussed the economic problems facing The Gambia as a factor con-
tributing to the violence of July 30, 1981. "The Gambian economy has always been poor
but has recently come up against some exceptional problems. The country has been ad-
versely affected by the more general world recession but starting from a low level means
that it has little to fall back on. A series of inadequate rainy seasons had severely
strained the predominantly agrarian economic base." Id. The government had unveiled
an austerity budget, involving increases in direct and indirect taxation, several weeks
before the coup attempt. "The general principle that economic malaise threatens politi-
cal stability may well have some bearing on events in The Gambia although it should be
remembered that those staging the coup (Field Force members on a steady wage) were
not the most directly affected by it and that those most directly affected by it (the rural
peasant masses) did not support the coup." Id. at 376-77.
92. Battle for Banjul, supra note 72, at 17. The increasing dissatisfaction with the
state of The Gambia's economy was "compounded by the Government's inability, or un-
willingness, to clamp down on those who had quite evidently enriched themselves at the
public expense." Id. The writer quoted one Gambian civil servant in Banjul: "If the
President had made a firm attempt to stamp out corruption, even if only to placate the
public, the recent tragic events may never have occurred." Id. After the coup attempt,
President Jawara instituted the "Evaluation of Assets and Properties and Prevention of
Corrupt Practices Act." The Gambia: Death Sentences, AFRICA REP., July-Aug. 1984, at
37, 38. A committee possessing investigative powers was established. Id. President
Jawara, however, must approve any findings of the committee before they are made pub-
lic. Id.
93. Gambia: Popular Plots, supra note 68, at 5, 6. "Inevitably, The Gambia will have
to give a closer scrutiny to its bid to become a tourist haven for expatriates in search of
the sun and fun and decide whether the huge amounts being spent on building luxury
hotels would not be better utilized in diversifying the economy and improving the wel-
fare of its own people." Battle for Banjul, supra note 72, at 14, 17.
94. Restabilizing the Gambia, supra note 5, at 1805, 1806.
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ers opposed to the use of troops in The Gambia." The President knew
what the consequence would be if an unfriendly government were to be
established in The Gambia: the stability of the Senegalese governmen-
tal and economic system would be threatened. "You just have to look
at a map to be aware that both countries are very entangled,"9 6 said
President Diouf. In an interview after the coup attempt, President
Jawara echoed Senegal's concerns and subsequent motivation for send-
ing troops to his aid by pointing out that "if things in The Gambia are
chaotic Senegal will not escape the repercussions.
9 7
Senegal was not the only country to learn from the coup attempt.
The Gambia also took a worthwhile lesson from the experience. In an
August, 1981 interview, President Jawara was asked if the violence
might result in closer ties between Senegal and The Gambia, such as in
the form of a federation. He responded:
It is very difficult to say at this stage. I have given it as my
view that it was time we looked at the possibility of integrating
our security services. The matter has still to be discussed fur-
ther but that is my unilateral view. I hope that in this area
something can be done quickly. As far as other areas of closer
co-operation and closer association are concerned, I cannot
pronounce on this at this stage. Only time will tell."
Only a short period was needed before time would respond to
President Jawara. Just three weeks after the coup attempt, Presidents
Diouf and Jawara, during a joint press conference, announced plans to
establish a confederation." The details of the union, to be discussed
below, were negotiated by the Senegalese and Gambians and incorpo-
rated into the present confederation agreements.
95. Senegal: Party Games, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Sept. 2, 1981, at 3, 5. Although the
opposition parties criticized President Diouf for intervening militarily in the coup at-
tempt in The Gambia, the opposition leader, Sherif Dibba, said in an interview that he
disapproved of the July 30 attempted overthrow. "My main objections to the coup at-
tempt were first that it was a coup against the constitution and government of the day
and second that they tried to impose a Marxist-Leninist system on the Gambian people
which would certainly destroy our democratic institutions and liberty. My own party
stands for democratic socialism." My conscience is clear, AFRIcA, Sept. 1981, at 18, 19.
96. African Update, AFRICA REP., Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 25. See also We have Learnt a
Useful Lesson, supra note 85, at 16, 17.
97. We Have Learnt a Useful Lesson, supra note 85, at 17.
98. What Next for The Gambia,? W. AFRICA, Aug. 17, 1981, at 1869, 1869.
99. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1981, at AS, col. 5.
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III. THE SUBSTANCE OF CONFEDERATION' °0
A. Introduction to the Foundation Document and Protocols
An understanding of the fundamental principles and structures of
the Senegambian Confederation requires an analysis of four docu-
ments. The principal document is entitled, "Agreement Between the
Republic of The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal Concerning the
Establishment of a Senegambian Confederation" [Foundation Docu-
ment).1"1 Three protocol agreements, cited in the Foundation Docu-
ment, are entitled "Protocol on the Institutions of The Confedera-
tion" 102 [Protocol on the Institutions], "Protocol on the Financial
Regulations of the Confederation"10 1 [Protocol on the Financial Regu-
lations], and "Protocol on Co-ordination of Policy in the Field of Ex-
ternal Relations"10 [Protocol on External Relations]. The three proto-
col agreements, as they relate to particular clauses of the Foundation
Document,08 will be discussed under separate sections later in this
note. Five additional protocol agreements serving to complement the
four basic documents cover defense,osa security,osb telecommunica-
100. See supra note 11.
101. Agreement Between the Republic of The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal
Concerning the Establishment of a Senegambian Confederation, Dec. 17, 1981, The
Gambia-Senegal. 22 I.L.M. 260 (1983) [hereinafter Foundation Document].
102. Protocol on the Institutions of the Confederation, July 2, 1982, The Gambia-
Senegal, 22 I.L.M. 266 (1983) [hereinafter the Protocol on the Institutions]. The use of
the term "Agreement" in all subsequent protocols refers to the Foundation Document.
103. Protocol on the Financial Regulations of the Confederation, July 2, 1982, The
Gambia-Senegal, 22 I.L.M. 276 (1983) [hereinafter the Protocol on the Financial
Regulations].
104. Protocol on Co-ordination of Policy in the Field of External Relations, July 2,
1982, The Gambia-Senegal, 22 1.L.M. 283 (1983) [hereinafter the Protocol on External
Relations].
105. The Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, relates to cis. 3, 5, 13, 15, 17
and 22 of the Foundation Document, supra note 101. The Protocol on the Financial
Regulations, supra note 103, relates to cls. 2, 3, 5, 15 and 16 of the Foundation Docu-
ment, supra note 101. The Protocol on External Relations, supra note 104, relates to cls.
5, 15, 17 and 22 of the Foundation Document, supra note 101.
105a
. Protocol on Confederal Defence and the Integration of the Armed Forces of
The Republic of The Gambia and The Republic of Senegal for the Establishment of the
Armed Forces of The Senegambia Confederation, Jan. 12, 1983, The Gambia-Senegal.
This protocol is not included in the United Nations Treaty Series nor has it been pub-
lished in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS. A copy of the protocol was provided to the
author by the Permanent Mission of The Gambia to the United Nations, New York,
New York. The preamble to this protocol emphasizes the three overriding purposes for
the integration of the armed forces of The Gambia and Senegal in the Confederation:
defense of the "sovereignty, integrity and independence of the two confederated states."
Id. The Confederal Armed Forces are initially defined as the army, navy, air force and
gendarmerie, id. pt. 1, art. 1, para. 1, but the gendarmerie is later described as a distinct
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tions,'0  transportation' 7 and information.10 8
military unit under separate command from the army, navy and air force. Id. pt. 2, art.
3, para. 5. Both the Armed Forces and the gendarmerie will be under the authority of a
"single high ranking military commander" as appointed by the President of the Confed-
eration in "time of war and in other circumstances." Id. See infra note 147 for informa-
tion on the gendarmerie in The Gambia. The composition of the Armed Forces consists
of "military staff, equipment and facilities" from both The Gambia and Senegal. Id. pt.
2, art. 2, para. 1. The duty of the Armed Forces in the Confederation is to "defend the
sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the independence of the two confederated states
against all forms of external agression and internal subversion." Id. pt. 1, art. 1, para. 1.
Although the President of the Confederation commands the Armed Forces, id. pt. 2, art.
3, para. 1, their "deployment and movement" can be accomplished only after "consulta-
tion" with the Vice-President of the Confederation. Id. pt. 2, art. 3, pars. 2. Additional
discussion of the defense of the Confederation will be found in ch. III.B. of this note. For
the complete text of this protocol, see Appendix D.
1 0 5 b
. Protocol on Confederal Security and the Integration of the Security Forces of
The Republic of The Gambia and The Republic of Senegal for the Establishment of the
Security Forces of the Senegambia Confederation, Jan. 12, 1983, The Gambia-Senegal.
This protocol is not included in the United Nations Treaty Series nor has it been pub-
lished in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS. A copy of the protocol was provided to the
author by the Permanent Mission of The Gambia to the United Nations, New York,
New York. The defense of the "sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the
two confederated states" is the purpose stated in the protocol's preamble for the integra-
tion of the Security Forces of The Gambia and Senegal. Id. Unspecified "part[s] of the
security staff, equipment and Police and Gendarmerie facilities belonging to the Security
Forces" of the two member nations will be brought together to form the Confederal Se-
curity Forces. Id. pt. III, art. 3, para. 1. Under the command of the Confederal President,
id. pt. I, art. 1, the role of the Security Forces is to "ensure public security and prevent
internal and external subversion." Id. pt. II., art. 2, para. 1. This role is to be fulfilled "in
collaboration with the Security Forces of the confederated states ... " Id. A "Confed-
eral Minister of Security" is created, to whom the Confederal President "may delegate
part of the powers conferred on him by the Agreement and this Protocol . I..." d  pt. I,
art. 1. The prescribed duties of the Confederal Minister of Security include responsibility
for "public security and the prevention of internal and external subversion." Id. pt. III,
art. 4, para. 1. See infra ch. III.B. of this note for more discussion of the security of the
Confederation. For the complete text of this protocol, see Appendix E.
106. Protocol on Coordination of Policy in the Field of Telecommunications, July 28,
1983, The Gambia-Senegal. This protocol is not included in the United Nations Treaty
Series nor has it been published in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS. A copy of the pro-
tocol was provided to the author by the Embassy of The Gambia, Washington, D.C. The
protocol in its preamble cites state security and strengthening of relations as reasons for
coordinating telecommunications. Id. A "Confederal Telecommunications Commission"
is established "for the planning of the development of telecommunications networks
within the Confederation. ... Id. pt. I, art. 3. The object of this planning is to im-
prove the use of telecommunications between the two countries "for greater economic
and social benefits." Id. pt. II, art. 11. For the complete text of this protocol, see Appen-
dix A.
107. Protocol for the Coordination of Policy in the Field of Transportation, July 28,
1983, The Gambia-Senegal. This protocol is not included in the United Nations Treaty
Series nor has it been published in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS. A copy of the pro-
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Signed by Presidents Diouf of Senegal and Jawara of The Gambia,
dated "At Dakar on 17th December 1981,""0B the Foundation Docu-
ment contains eight sections. The first section, untitled, is the pream-
ble to the document.110 It briefly declares the similarities between the
two nations that would justify a union: "the geographical fact of their
ties"'' is mentioned, as are "historical, moral and material impera-
tives." 12 The preamble also states that the intention of the two repub-
lics in establishing the confederation is to "strengthen the unity of
their defence and their economics and co-ordination of their policies in
other fields .... ,,11
Following the preamble are six sections, designated by roman
numerals. Section I is entitled "Principles.' Important to note here
are two underlined passages which emphasize a crucial aspect of the
tocol was provided to the author by the Embassy of The Gambia, Washington, D.C. The
protocol deals with air, river, maritime and surface transport. Id. pt. I, art. 1. The goal of
the protocol is to establish cooperation between the two countries so as to permit free
passage by one country over the air, water or land of the other. For the complete text of
this protocol, see Appendix B.
MQ. Pyotocol on Couidination of Policy in the Field df liIomatizu, .Iuby 29, 19K,
The Gambia-Senegal. This protocol is not included in the United Nations Treaty Series
nor has it been published in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATzRALS. A copy of the protocol
was provided to the author by the Embassy of The Gambia, Washington, D.C. The two
goals sought by the protocol are the preservation of the cultural identity of the countries
and the development of better understanding between their peoples. Id. A "Confederal
Information Commission" seeks to assist "the Confederal authorities in the formulation
of confederal policy in the field of Information." Id. pt. I, art. 4. Part 11 of the protocol
could have serious implications for freedom of speech within both countries. It is repro-
duced below in full:
The President of the Confederation, in agreement with the Vice-President
shall define:
(a) the conditions governing the publication of national news;
(b) the conditions governing the publication of foreign news;
(c) the conditions governing the dissemination of propoganda material
of foreign origin;
(d) the conditions governing the practice of journalism by nationals
and foreigners.
Id., pt. II, art. 5. The suspicion that the coup attempt may have been led by foreign
powers, see supra note 85, could be the reason for inclusion of this provision. Finally, the
protocol seeks "coordination of the activities of the Senegalese Press Agency and The
Gambia Information News Services." Protocol on Coordination of Policy in the Field of
Information, supra pt. IV, art. 8. For the complete text of this protocol, see Appendix C.
109. Foundation Document, supra note 101, cl. 24, at 266.
110. Id. at 260-61 (preamble).
111. Id. at 260.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. § I, at 261.
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association of The Gambia and Senegal."5 Both passages are contained
in clause two of Section I:
Each State maintaining its independence and sovereignty."
6
The Confederation shall be based on:
the integration of the armed forces and of the security forces
of the Republic of The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal,
to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and inde-
pendence . .. .
The next section of the document is entitled "The President And Vice-
President Of The Confederation.""0 Section II establishes the offices
of President and Vice-President and the roles they are assigned in the
area of confederal policies, especially that of defense and security." 9
Section III, "The Council Of Ministers,"' 20 describes the body com-
posed of the President and Vice-President, with an undetermined
number of ministers' 2' to be appointed upon agreement of the Presi-
dent and Vice-President.'2 2 "The Confederal Parliament" 22 is de-
scribed in Section IV. The allocation of parliamentary seats is set for
each country.' 2' The procedure regulating who can initiate a proposal
in the parliament is also stated.' Provision is made in Section V for
the "Settlement Of Differences."' 2 6 A system of arbitration is set in
motion when a disagreement arises over the interpretation of the docu-
ments or their implementation.'27 The mechanics for adopting "Inter-
national Treaties And Agreements"' 28 is contained in Section VI. The
final section of the Foundation Document,1 29 untitled and not clearly
distinguished from Section VI except by its subject matter, 31 includes
115. Id.
116. Id. cl. 2.
117. Id.
118. Id. § II, at 262.
119. Id.
120. Id. § III.
121. Id. cl. 10. See infra note 250.
122. Id.
123. Id. § IV, at 263.
124. Id. cl. 11. See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
125. Id. cl. 13.
126. Id. § V, at 264.
127. Id. cl. 15.
128. Id. § VI.
129. Id. cls. 18-24, at 264-66.
130. Id. This final section of the Foundation Document, supra note 101, encompasses
clauses 18 to 24, titled, respectively: "Ratification," "Entry into Force," "Amendment,"
"Review," (clause 22 is untitled, but is intended to make clear that the Foundation Doc-
ument and the protocols are to be considered as one document), "Depositories," and
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two provisions of preliminary interest. The Confederal Parliament is
required to convene every two years'' and to "prepare a Report on the
functioning of the Confederation"; 2 and the agreement is to be made
available in French and English'8 3 (which, in addition to designated
African languages, are the official languages of the Confederation, as
provided in Section I).134
B. Defense of the Confederation and Security of Member States
Two distinct protective services are provided by the Confedera-
tion. They are defense and security. The preamble to the Foundation
Document speaks of the two countries' intention of strengthening "the
unity of their defence." 38 This term is expanded in Section I by refer-
ring to the "integration of the armed forces and of the security forces
... ,, 1' Two different concepts, as described in the Protocol on
Confederal Defence and the Protocol on Confederal Security, are in-
volved. "Armed forces" designates military power to be used to repel
attacks directed against the Confederation and its individual or collec-
tive member states from outside Senegal and The Gambia. An example
would be a foreign power sending troops across the border of one or
both of the Confederal nations. "Security forces" signifies military
power to be used for the internal protection or public security of the
two countries. Disturbances originating within the borders of Senegal
"Authentic Texts."
131. Id. cl. 21 at 265.
132. Id.
133. Id. cl. 24. The illiteracy rate will preclude most people from reading the docu-
ments of Senegambia in either French or English. "At present [1964] . . . illiteracy is
still over 50 percent in the towns and mostly more than 90 percent in the rural areas.
People with a good command of either English or French are relatively rare and those
who can use both languages sufficiently well in a conversation on legal, administrative,
economic or technical subjects as they present themselves to the contemporary states-
man, politician, administrator, judge, teacher, manager or engineer are as yet excep-
tional." Report on Alternatives for Association, supra note 15, ch. I.B., at 7. Today, the
problem appears to be unchanged. In The Gambia, the illiteracy rate is about 90 percent.
DEADLINE DATA ON WORLD AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 2. In Senegal, the illiteracy rate is
about 95 percent. DEADLINE DATA ON WORLD AFFAIRS, SENEGAL, supra note 10, at 2. Even
in 1964, the problems created by a lack of individuals fluent in the "official languages"
was envisioned. "One cannot pass over the question of how Gambians, even if well
grounded in English, and Senegalese with fluent French are going to discuss modes and
forms of association, and work together in common institutions and services under cer-
tain rules, perhaps, of common legislation." Report on Alternatives for Association,
supra note 15, ch. I.B. at 7.
134. Foundation Document, supra note 101, at 261, cl. 4.
135. Id. at 260 (preamble).
136. Id. § I, cl. 2, at 261.
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or The Gambia, such as a military coup, would be an example. It ap-
pears that the armed and security forces will constitute two separate
fighting groups.1
37
The President of Senegal and the President of The Gambia are,
respectively, the President and Vice-President of the Confederation.'3 8
Several reasons explain this allocation of the two highest Confederal
offices. The obvious explanation is the contrast in size and population
between the two countries.'3 0 A more important reason is the role and
definition of the level of involvement of the two offices in the area of
defense and security. As will be explained below, the allocation of the
responsibilities of president and vice-president reflects the difference
in the degree of contribution to the areas of defense and security.
Senegal has an armed force numbering in the thousands, while The
Gambia has traditionally had only a field force of several hundred
which does not pretend to act as a full-fledged, professional military
unit.1"'
The Confederal President has the responsibility for the defense
and security of the Confederation."" The explicit guarantee in the
Foundation Document of each country's individual sovereignty de-
mands the use of confederal forces should Senegal and The Gambia be
137. Indications of the form which the armed and security forces have taken were
first revealed through remarks made by President Jawara of The Gambia on the occasion
of the farewell parade by the Senegalese intervention force. "Sir Dawda told the Senega-
lese troops some of whom will be returning with their commander ... that their role as
intervention force has now ceased, and that they should assume their new role under the
Senegambian Confederation." Gambia News Bull., Feb. 3, 1982, at 1. This "new role"
will find the Senegalese troops, together with troops from The Gambia, in either the
Armed Forces or the Security Forces of the Confederation. See supra notes 105a and
105b for a description of the Armed Forces and the Security Forces of the Confederation.
The Armed Forces are to "defend ... against all forms of external agression and inter-
nal subversion." Protocol on Confederal Defence, supra note 105a, pt. 1, art. 1, para. 1
(emphasis added). The Security Forces are to "ensure public security" as well as "pre-
vent internal and external subversion." Protocol on Confederal Security, supra note
105b, pt. III, art. 4, para. I (emphasis added). The distinction, if any, between "defend-
ing" and "preventing" subversion is not clear. Also to be noted is the opposite position-
ing of the words "external" and "internal" in the two protocols. In the Protocol on Con-
federal Defence, "external" is placed before "internal", while in the Protocol on
Confederal Security, the reverse order of the two words is used. This positioning of such
crucial language indicates that the Armed Forces are principally concerned with external
attacks upon the Confederation and the Security Forces are focused upon maintaining
internal order.
138. Foundation Document, supra note 101, § II, cl. 7, at 262.
139. See supra notes 8, 10.
140. The field force is often described as a paramilitary field force. Battle for Banjul,
supra note 72, at 16.
141. Foundation Document, supra note 101, § II, cl. 7, at 262.
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attacked individually or collectively from within or without. Such use
of confederal forces is placed under the command of the President." 2
In an earlier clause, it is stated that "in agreement with the Vice-Presi-
dent, the President shall decide on the policy of the Confederation on
matters of Defence and Security."'"" The term "policy," however, is
undefined. If the "policy" of the Confederation includes sending
troops, then agreement with the Vice-President is required before the
President can command troops. If not, then "policy" would have to
encompass other matters distinct from the actual command of military
forces not specifically defined in the protocol.
The ambiguity of this section concerning when the President must
obtain agreement from the Vice-President before acting in military
matters may have prompted the insertion of a provision 144 designed to
quell any Gambian fears of military domination. The President of The
Gambia, in addition to his consultative authority in matters of defense
and security of the Confederation, "shall continue to be commander in
chief of the Armed Forces" of The Gambia.'4 5 This preserves for The
Gambia an acknowledged part of sovereignty accepted as essential to
the definition of an independent nation: the freedom and ability to se-
cure its borders from outside aggression.' s In fact, The Gambia, -with
the help of her former colonizer Great Britain, is rebuilding her army
to secure for The Gambia the status of a sovereign nation. 4"
142. Id. cl. 8. The President of the Confederation has command of the Armed Forces,
Protocol on Confederal Defence, supra note 105a, pt. 2, art. 3, para. 1, and the Security
Forces of Senegambia. Protocol on Confederal Security, supra note 105b, pt. I, art. 1.
143. Foundation Document, supra note 101, cl. 7, at 262.
144. Id. cl. 8.
145. Id. A subsequent protocol confirms that separate military forces of the Confed-
eration and the individual member states will exist simultaneously. Protocol on Confed-
eral Security, supra note 105b, pt. II, art. 2, para. 1.
146. The "true measure of sovereignty" has been seen as physical force. R. LANSING,
NOTES ON SOVEREIGNTY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE STATE AND OF THE WORLD 26
(1921). The Gambia's military forces would probably continue to be inferior in strength
to those of Senegal, given the divergent financial capabilities of the two nations. See
supra note 58 for gross national product per capita data. Consequently, the potential for
Senegalese military domination continues. Gambian officials appear content, however, to
keep Senegalese troops in the country until the Gambian army, see infra note 147, is
established. A legal conundrum, AFRICA, Jan. 1985, at 25, 26. Gambian officials have
stated that their new army "still need[s] a lot of training before any Senegalese with-
drawal can take place." Id.
147. It was noted in early 1982 that President Jawara "is in the process of establish-
ing a new army and a new paramilitary force to protect The Gambia and its people
against any future aggression." Gambia News Bull., supra note 137, at 1. A new Ministry
of Defense was created. Gambia News Bull., Aug. 2, 1982, at 6. "The new army will make
a significant difference in relation to both the former army and the police/paramilitary
arrangement which succeeded that to date. As it stands now, it incorporates a territorial
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A provision granting seemingly unlimited authority to the Confed-
eration is entitled "Special Powers of the President: ' .4.
When the functioning of the Administration of the Confedera-
tion is disrupted, or the existence of the Confederation
threatened, the President of the Confederation shall, in agree-
ment with the Vice-President, take any such measures as are
necessary to restore the normal functioning of the Administra-
tion of the Confederation and to ensure the safeguard of the
Confederation.1 4 9
This ominous provision, as viewed from the perspective of protection
of individual human rights,8 0 is exercised by the President only with
the agreement of the Vice-President."'1 Presumably, this necessary
agreement will protect the individual sovereignty of The Gambia from
usurpation by Senegal. At the very least, the existence of these "special
force and engineering corps and a paramilitary section or military police which will use
the more well known French name of Gendarmerie, all to better defend the territorial
integrity and independence of the country." Id. at 7. Four specialist officers from the
British army will be training the new Gambian army in the "British military tradition."
Senegambia Sun, July 6, 1984, at 2.
148. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. 1, art. 6, at 268.
149. Id.
150. An article exploring the standards to be used in the evaluation of human rights
in Africa examines the hazards of comparing human rights practices in more developed
parts of the world with that of Africa:
Academics cannot limit their analysis of human rights to comparisons with in-
ternational human rights documents. Insofar as all of these documents are essen-
tially political treaties based on compromise and consensus. . . they are neither
in the philosophical nor the sociological sense universally valid documents. Simi-
larly, to criticize African or indeed any other national, regional or continental
human rights practices on the bases of these documents is to beg the question of
whether human rights are culturally specific as well as the question of whether
poor or newly developing countries may be held to the same standards as
wealthy, developed countries.
Howard, Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: Some Problems of Implicit Comparisons,
HuM. R.Q., May 1984, at 160, 165. In the Senegambian Confederation, the standard to be
used for evaluating human rights in both Senegal and The Gambia is stated in the Foun-
dation Document, supra note 101, at 260 (preamble). The preamble declares that the
two nations affirm "their devotion to the rights of their people declared in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; in the United Nations Covenant of Human Rights;
and in the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights of 1981." Id. The value of
these human rights agreements can "in large measure be destroyed... with the declara-
tion of a state of seige." A.B. KEITH, FEDERATION: ITS NATURE AND CONDITIONS 20 (1942).
Such a "state of seige" could be the result of exercising these "special powers" of the
Confederation. See infra note 152 for a description of these powers.
151. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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powers"' " attests to the commitment of the two countries to add some
permanence to the Confederation.
The Foundation Document's guarantees of sovereignty for the two
nations could be imperiled by a certain provision of the Protocol on
the Institutions of the Confederation.' Among the interests covered
within the provision's use of the term "common matters," is defense.'"
Article 24 of the Protocol contains the provision that "[clommon mat-
ters may become matters falling under the exclusive competence of the
Confederation and may not revert to the field of competence specific to
the Confederated States."'' " This potential for increasing confederal
powers could be realized if, for example, the field of competence would
include the right of the Gambian President to command his own
armed forces.
C. Foreign Policy of the Confederation and Member States
The "co-ordination of policy in the field of external relations' 5 6 is
one basis for the Confederation. This is included among the principles
in Section I of the Foundation Document.
Cooperation between the President and Vice-President of Sene-
gambia is emphasized here as it was in the matter of defense and se-
curity. In the hope that Senegal and The Gambia will devise similar
policies regarding foreign affairs, the Confederal President and Vice-
President "shall, from time to time, consult with each other and ex-
152. Limitless authority of a similar type exists in the Senegalese Constitution. It is
contained in the Constitution of The Gambia as well but with some restrictions. Title
III, article 47 of the Senegalese Constitution, states that the president "may take any
measure" similar to the Confederal need to restore the functioning of the government.
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, SENEGAL 24 (1983). Chapter III, para-
graph 26 of the Gambian Constitution, however, states that it is the Parliament and not
the president who can authorize the use of emergency powers. CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, GAMBIA 28 (1983) (ch. II, para. 26). In addition, minimal pro-
vision is made in The Gambia for the protection of human rights. Should a person be
detained under emergency powers authorized by the Parliament and exercised by the
president, certain procedures must be followed. These include a statement of charges
which must be provided if detained, as well as provision for judicial review and legal
representation. Id. ch. III, para. 27, at 28-29. It is noteworthy that these provisions,
which do not appear in the Senegalese Constitution but exist in the Gambian counter-
part, are absent in the Confederation documents. This indicates that Senegal and not
The Gambia had a greater influence in the inclusion and wording of this section on spe-
cial powers.
153. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. 5, art. 24, at 274.
154. "Common matters" are defined as "external relations, communications and such
other areas as the two Confederal States may agree . I d. pt. 1, art. 4, at 268.
155. Id. pt. V, art. 24 at 274.
156. Foundation Document, supra note 101, § I, cl. 2, at 261.
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change information on such matters.' 1 57 The process of consultation
goes a step further by requiring the Presidents of both countries to
"endeavor to adopt a common position in the field of external rela-
tions." 1 8 Finally, the strongest pronouncement is the assurance that
"the policies of the Confederation are complementary to the policies of
the Confederal States."*5 An arrangement of accommodation is thus
established between the existing member states and the "umbrella" of
the central confederal government which seeks coordination of the pol-
icies of Senegal and The Gambia.
The process of ratification of international agreements is subject
to a set procedure rather than simply continual consultation between
the two member nations of the Confederation. s0 Responsibility for ne-
gotiation of international agreements is placed with the President, who
can act on behalf of the Confederation only with the agreement of the
Vice-President.1 1 The ratification of international agreements involves
three steps: (1) "authorization by the Confederal parliament,10' 2 (2)
"enactment by the Confederal States of any legislation necessary for
its implementation,"1 63 and (3) ratification of the agreement by the
President of the Confederation.' Presidential ratification is not man-
dated by the Foundation Document even after approval by the Con-
federal Parliament and the Confederal States. The President, who has
the final word on ratification, is thus able to ignore the pronounce-
ments of the Confederal Parliament and States.
Similar to the provision for continued command by the Gambian
President of the armed forces of The Gambia, is a provision allowing
for the separate conclusion of international agreements by the individ-
ual member states of the Confederation. " This continues the individ-
ual power of The Gambia and Senegal to set their own foreign policy.
It is also made clear in that provision that should any "disagreement
arise between this Agreement [Foundation Document] and any other
157. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. I, art. 4, at 268.
158. Protocol on External Relations, supra note 104, art. 1, para. 2, at 283.
159. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. I, art. 4, at 268.
160. Foundation Document, supra note 101, § VI, cls. 16-17, at 264.
161. Id. cl. 16.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. "Subsequent to authorization by the Confederal Parliament and enactment
by the Confederal States of any legislation necessary for its implementation, the Presi-
dent of the Confederation may ratify the Agreement." Id. (emphasis added).
165. Id. cl. 17. This provision provides in part that "Each Confederated State may
conclude International Agreements in accordance with its constitutional requirements."
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international obligation,"' 0  the Foundation Document will be
followed.
Diplomatic and consular representation of both Senegal and The
Gambia by one confederal nation should be infrequently exercised.'"7
Only in those situations in which both nations have not established
such representation shall the one confederal member engage in such
diplomatic or consular representation on behalf of the other
member. 68
A more frequent form of involvement by the two countries in for-
eign affairs may be established through the training of diplomatic and
consular personnel. The governments of both countries are required to
assist each other'6 9 in this training, allowing citizens of The Gambia
and Senegal to become members of the "specialized institutions"'' 7 of
the other nation for the purpose of such training. This provision pro-
motes the potential for unification of diplomatic representation abroad.
D. Unity of Member Nations' Economies and Confederal Finance
1. Economic Union
A principal objective of the Confederation is to harmonize the
economies of The Gambia and Senegal into one functioning unit bene-
fiting both nations.171 This macroeconomic goal is in sharp contrast
with the microeconomic necessity of financing the governmental opera-
166. Id.
167. Protocol on External Relations, supra note 104, art. 2, pars. 1, at 284. The rele-
vant section reads: "Each Confederated State shall undertake, on behalf of the other,
diplomatic and consular representation in each state or with such international organiza-
tion where the requesting state has not established diplomatic or consular mission." Id.
For example, if The Gambia has diplomatic relations with a country and Senegal does
not, then The Gambia could represent these interests of foreign affairs on behalf of
Senegal as well. The Gambian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alhadji Alieu Badji, was
asked in an interview about representation abroad for Senegal and The Gambia after the
Confederation was formed. He stated:
The Gambia is an independent and sovereign state like Senegal. If The Gambia
has an Embassy in a country and Senegal has not, the Gambian Embassy should
be responsible for the Senegalese community in that country in addition to its
main duties, so also would the Senegalese diplomatic missions in the States
where there are no Gambian Embassies.
Gambia News Bull., Mar. 10, 1982, at 3.
168. Protocol on External Relations, supra note 104.
169. Id. art. 4, at 285.
170. Id.
171. Foundation Document, supra note 101, at 260 (preamble). The preamble to the
document states the intention of the two countries to "strengthen the unity of their...
economies." Id.
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tion of the Confederation.
An endeavor so significant to The Gambia and Senegal as the
merging of their economic systems has received very few words in the
Confederation agreement. The preamble to the Foundation Document
declares the intention of Senegal and The Gambia "to strengthen the
unity of their. . . economies.' 72 This type of general statement is con-
tinued in Section I, which provides that a basis for the Confederation
is the "development of an economic and monetary union."11 3 Apart
from these two sections of the Foundation Document, the matter of
economic and monetary union, discussed with some intensity by com-
mentators and scholars 1 7' lacks any mention in the other documents
establishing the Confederation.
Why this brevity on a subject of such importance that experts ap-
pointed by the United Nations in 1964 could write that "any further
constitutional progress, in the direction of a strengthening of the asso-
ciation, will only be realizable after the major economic problems have
been solved to the satisfaction of both parties[?]' '1 75 It is the politically
complex nature of these major economic and monetary problems that
has produced such scant treatment of the subject in the Senegambian
documents. A host of negotiations must precede the resolution of these
thorny economic issues before economic and monetary union is
realized.
What benefit can be expected in the future should the Confedera-
tion reach its economic and monetary objectives? The general answer
is the continued existence of the Confederation itself. "[11n the end,
the effect of the union on people's pockets will decide whether Sene-
gambia has a stable future."'176 More specifically, however, each nation
can be seen deriving particular benefits from a union.
For Senegal, the southern province of Casamance would no longer
be isolated economically from the rest of the country. 77 The Gambia
River, which has never been fully utilized by Senegal, could support
much Senegalese commerce as it reaches several hundred miles into
the country. 78 Finally, a major sticking point between The Gambia
and Senegal could be controlled. There has always existed the highly
profitable and illegal smuggling of low priced Gambian goods into the
172. Id.
173. Id. § I, cl. 2, at 261.
174. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 111-20; and ROBSON, supra note 1, at 124-40.
175. Report on Alternatives for Association, supra note 15, ch. II.C. at 23.
176. Shotgun Marriage, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1981, at 42, 42.
177. See supra note 14.
178. See supra note 4.
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high priced Senegalese markets.'7 The smuggling trade, mentioned in
an earlier section of this note,' has been attacked more vehemently
by Senegal since the Confederation came into existence.' 8 1 The best
President Diouf can accomplish, however, is an alleviation but not
eradication of the problem which costs Senegal a great deal in lost tax
revenues. Political considerations prevent a direct, all-out attack
against the illegal trade at this early stage of Senegambia.' 82
For The Gambia, a major benefit of a union would be to transform
Banjul into a major port city handling the demands of a large economic
area. 18 The economic climate of Banjul would develop with the in-
crease in traffic of Senegalese ships on the Gambia River.""' A union
would also see The Gambia playing "a pivotal role between Senegal
proper and the Casamance" in a common market.18 6 This common
market would allow access by The Gambia to Senegal's superior tech-
nology.' 86 Finally, integration of the two countries' monetary systems
could benefit The Gambia's international trade. "It would bring Gam-
bia into a hard currency area using the CFA franc, which is fully trans-
ferable into French francs. CFA currency is already commonly used in
trade transactions and is almost as highly valued as [United States]
dollars or IBritish pounds) sterling.'"''
179. "The Senegalese economy suffers considerably from the long standing problem
of smuggling from The Gambia, . . . [The economy of The Gambia], according to ex-
perts[,] can absorb only one-third or one-fourth of its imports. The remainder pass
through holes in the customs barriers between The Gambia and Senegal. Thus, Senega-
lese manufacturers of such items as textiles, tobacco, and pharmaceutical products are
up against difficult competition from items that are imported at less cost via The Gam-
bia." Diouf's New Directions, AFmcA REP. Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 45, 48.
180. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
181. Senegal: Diouf Calls the Tune, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Apr. 28, 1982, at 4, 6.
182. Id. "We hear that the Senegalese have not totally cracked down on illegal trad-
ing because the economic livelihood of the Gambia elite is dependent on this activity.
The Senegalese coup de force is not popular with Gambian town dwellers and Dakar
officials want to avoid alienating the political elite by measures which undercut its finan-
cial well-being." Id.
183. ROBSON, supra note 1, at 125. See also AFRICA: SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, supra note
22, at 384. In describing the Gambian economy in relation to Senegal and the Confedera-
tion, the article notes that "a full integration of the Gambian economy into that of
neighboring territories, supposing it to be practicable, could produce long-term benefits
for many Gambians through greater utilization of the Gambia river for transportation of
the trade of Casamance, eastern Senegal and Mali." Id.
184. See supra note 183.
185. Gambia: Sir Dwada's Reservations, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, July 4, 1984, at 4.
186. Id.
187. Id. Although monetary conversion could be a benefit, "[tihe idea of renouncing
their own currency, the dalasi, in favor of the CFA franc is not enthusiastically sup-
ported by the (Gambian) population." Diouf's Dilemmas, AFRICA REP., July-Aug. 1985, at
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What actions would be necessary to produce benefits for both
countries that could give both permanence and prominence to Sene-
gambia? A form of economic integration would be required, which has
been explained as "the gradual but steady process of harmonized tariff
disarmament along with the removal of other barriers between the con-
tracting parties to their mutual advantage."' s8 Five stages of integra-
tion are possible, each of which represents an additional step towards a
closer union between the economies of Senegal and The Gambia: first,
a free trade area, which eliminates quantitative restrictions and cus-
toms traffic; 189 second, a customs union, which establishes a similar
tariff for both countries towards non-member states; 90 third, a com-
mon market, which creates an atmosphere for the unrestricted move-
ment of goods between the member states;191 fourth, an economic
union, which involves harmonizing economic, monetary, fiscal, social
and counter-cyclical policies;" 2 and fifth, a supranational union, in
which policies of the member states are decided by a supranational
authority. 19
At this point in the life of the Confederation, there are very few
indications pointing to a concrete goal of the Confederation more spe-
cific than merely an economic and monetary union.194 An indication of
the degree of economic unity is that of political unity, which requires
an examination of the workings of the Confederation, as discussed in
other sections of this note.'9"
The first economic scheme to be announced since formation of the
Confederation has been a study to revise petroleum legislation and to
redefine exploration permits and terms.'" It is especially interesting to
note that on the second anniversary of the Confederation, President
Jawara of The Gambia reiterated that his country and Senegal would
25, 29. On a similar note, an official of the Gambian Chamber of Commerce views the
confederation as a "catastrophe" for Gambian business. Senegambia-A Now and Fu-
ture Nation, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 1985, at 224, 239. Gambian business is "afraid that
uniform custom duties will spell doom for their re-exporting." Id. The Chamber of Com-
merce official viewed Gambia in the confederation as just "another Senegalese province
and a poor one at that!" Id.
188. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 10.





194. See supra note 173.
195. See supra notes 100-298 and accompanying text.
196. Senegal: Diouf Calls the Tune, supra note 181, at 6.
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move towards some type of monetary and economic union. 97 The Pres-
ident added that an expected result of such a union would be the elim-
ination of the Gambian currency and its replacement by the CFA
franc.' " A monetary and economic union could take place, insisted
President Jawara, only upon the satisfaction of certain Gambian de-
mands. 199 An important agreement between the two countries was to
establish a free trade area to begin sometime in late 1985.200 The Gam-
bia also is negotiating for membership in the West African Monetary
Union.201 Membership in the Union could be a first step towards full
monetary integration, because the Union "links countries using the
CFA Franc currency. °20 2 Whether these actions and words will lead to
significant changes must await future developments. 203 It is certain,
though, that the development of a successful economic and monetary
union mutually acceptable to The Gambia and Senegal will be "a grad-
ual process to be undertaken from both sides and accompanied by a
197. DEADLINE DATA ON WORLD AFFAIRS, GAMBIA, supra note 8, at 6.
198. The CFA franc is a currency backed by France and issued to members of the
West African Monetary Union. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 87. The members of the union
are Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta. Id. at 68.
199. In an interview, President Jawara said his country "would insist on unspecified
compensation in return for merging its relatively liberal and low-tariff economy with the
more protected and richer Senegalese economy." Sorting Out the Dowry, supra note 88,
at 32. It is unknown if The Gambia has made agreements with Senegal to receive this
compensation given recent increases in producer prices. These increases have been at-
tributed by the government to favorable market conditions. Year of the Rat-Race, W.
AFRICA, Feb. 4, 1985, at 204, 204. Higher producer prices, however, have been seen as the
result of confederation. "[T]he experienced Gambian trader will tell you that the real
reason [for the increase in producer prices] is to bring The Gambia's prices in line with
those of Senegal so as to stem the flow of Gambian produce into this country [Senegal]
in search of the stronger CFA franc." Id.
200. Senegambia: Trade Talks Begin, W. AFRICA, May 6, 1985, at 913, 913.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. In the preface to its comments on monetary and fiscal union between Senegal
and The Gambia, the Report on Alternatives for Association, prepared in 1964, noted the
difficulties in making specific proposals in this area. These comments are as relevant
today as two decades ago. "The changes in the monetary and fiscal systems of Senegal
and The Gambia that will be required for the purpose of closer co-operation or associa-
tion cannot be very well treated in any detail at this stage. [The monetary and fiscal
changes] will depend in the first place on the character of that co-operation at its incep-
tion and the direction and tempo of its development in the transitional years." Report on
Alternatives for Association, supra note 15, ch. V., at 67-68. The report went on to state:
"In both fields [monetary and fiscal] the relationships between the system and the daily
life of each community is so close that specific measures can only be designed through
direct discussion by and with their representatives; any theoretical scheme or schedule is
apt to prove insufficiently fitted to the necessities of the moment." Id.
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careful observation of its effects."2 0'
2. Confederal Finance
The procedures for funding the governmental machinery of the
Confederation have been established in some detail within the Protocol
on the Financial Regulations of the Confederation.20 5 The three princi-
pal sections of this protocol deal individually with the details of the
budget of the Confederation,0 6 implementation of the budget 0 7 and
control of the budget.
208
The first section, which outlines the budgetary process, begins
with a definition of the budget as "the resources and expenditures of
the Confederation. ' 20 9 Possible methods for obtaining revenues are
listed in five resources: contributions of member states;"0 gifts, subsi-
dies, legacies bestowed upon the Confederation;2 11 royalties for services
performed by a confederal administration; 2 interests on loans and
guarantees, proceeds from loans in investment or financial shares re-
sulting from subscribed deeds or covenants signed on behalf of the
Confederation;2 13 and finally, miscellaneous revenues. " ' Revenues ob-
tained from these sources may be expended under two general catego-
ries. Recurrent expenditures can be summarized as involving short-
term recurring needs, such as the public debt, equipment for the oper-
ation of confederal departments and monies needed to support eco-
nomic, social and cultural activities.1 5 Capital expenditures are more
of a long-term, one time expenditure item.2 16 Examples given for capi-
tal expenditures include financing of capital equipment and machinery,
and the physical infrastructure. "
The source of revenue coming from member states is elaborated
upon in Article Three which concerns "Assessment and Payment of
204. Id. ch. VII., at 81.
205. Protocol on the Financial Regulations, supra note 103.
206. Id. pt. I, art. 2, at 277-78. This section is entitled "The Budget of the Confedera-
tion." Id.
207. Id. pt. II, at 279. This section is entitled "Implementation of the Budget." Id.
208. Id. pt. III, at 280. This section is entitled "Control of the Budget." Id.
209. Id. pt. I, art. 1, at 277.
210. Id. para. A(i), art. 2.
211. Id. art. 2, para. A(ii).
212. Id. art. 2, para. A(iii).
213. Id. art. 2, para. A(iv).
214. Id. art. 2, para. A(v).
215. Id. art. 2, para. B(i).




Contributions to the Confederal Budget." " '8 It provides that the Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the Confederation must agree upon a
formula for assessing the contributions of Senegal and The Gambia to
the revenue side of the budget.21 9 This formula must take into account
the "economic position and financial capability" of the member
states2 20 As a consequence, Senegal, wealthier than The Gambia, can
be expected to contribute more to the budget.2 '
Preparation and approval of the confederal budget is a four-step
process. First, the Minister for Confederal Finance prepares a draft
budget based upon a directive of the President and Vice-President.
2 2
The next step involves the budget being submitted to the Council of
Ministers for consideration.221 Once the Council of Ministers has com-
pleted its perusal, the Confederal Parliament receives the budget and
gives its advice.2 24 The fourth and final step, "on the recommendation
of the Confederal Parliament,"'1" 5 is for the President, in agreement
with the Vice-President, to approve the budget.221
Once the budget is approved, it is the responsibility of the Presi-
dent to implement the budget for a given financial year.227 Such imple-
mentation involves both the collection of revenues from available
sources228 and the disbursement of budgetary allocations. 2 9 In addi-
tion, the President, in agreement with the Vice-President, is required
to set forth conditions for the award and execution of contracts with
the Confederation.230
Three budgetary oversight mechanisms are provided for in the
Protocol on Financial Regulations.'3 ' First, an internal control mecha-
nism, unspecified, to be formulated and established by an act of the
President of the Confederation, is mentioned." 2 Second, an external
control exists in the form of an independent Board of Auditors.2 3 ' The
218. Id. art. III, at 278.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See supra note 58 for gross national product per capita data.




226. Id. art. 5.
227. Id. pt. II, art. 7, at 279. The financial year for the Confederation begins July 1
and ends June 30. Id.
228. Id. art. 9.
229. Id.
230. Id. art. 12, at 280.
231. Id.
232. Id. pt. III, art. 13, at 280.
233. Id.
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Board is composed of three nationals of The Gambia and Senegal who
are appointed, with the requisite qualifications as auditors, by the
President in agreement with the Vice-President.2 34 The duties of the
Board are to audit the accounts of the Confederation for each financial
year immediately after the conclusion of that year23' and to submit a
report on the findings of the audit to the President and Vice-President
"within three months following the end of the financial year to which
the accounts relate."2 ' Finally, the third oversight mechanism pro-
vided for is the position of "Principal Accountant, '237 who must an-
swer to the Confederal Finance Minister. 38 The Principal Accountant
has three duties: to be responsible for the implementation of revenue
and expenditure in the budget;23  to present to the Council of Minis-
ters midway through the fiscal year statements on receipts and expend-
itures,240 and other pertinent matters of interest in this area;" and to
present to the Council of Ministers an annual report on the Confedera-
tion's financial accounts at the end of the financial year.24 2
E. Confederal Institutions and Dispute Resolution
1. Institutions
The preamble to the Foundation Document declares the inten-
tions of Senegal and The Gambia to "strengthen the unity of their de-
fense and their economies and co-ordination of their policies in other
fields"'4 through the establishment of "an institutional framework,
consistent with national sovereignty and democratic principles
"244
Some aspects of this Confederal structure have already been dis-
cussed. The respective roles of the President and Vice-President of the
Confederation with regard to several key areas of confederal concern
have been mentioned. 245 To be examined in this section are two other
confederal institutions: 246 the Council of Ministers2 47 and the Confed-
234. Id. art. 14, para. 1, at 281.
235. Id. art. 14, para. 2.
236. Id.






243. Foundation Document, supra note 101, at 260 (preamble).
244. Id. at 261.
245. See supra notes 138-66 and accompanying text.
246. Foundation Document, supra note 101, § I, cl. 3, at 261. The three institutions
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eral Parliament.2 48 A provision for resolving disagreements between
The Gambia and Senegal will also be discussed.49
The Council of Ministers consists of the President and Vice-Presi-
dent and an unspecified number2"' of ministers.25' The President and
Vice-President of the Confederation fill comparable positions on the
Council.2"2 The President of the Council, in agreement with the Vice-
President, appoints individuals to positions as ministers.5 3
The ministers are responsible for "strictly Confederal matters." ' 4
As an example, the Protocol on the Financial Regulations makes men-
tion of a "Minister responsible for Confederal Finance. 2 5 5 Therefore,
only Confederal matters, those of joint interest to Senegal and The
Gambia, should come to the attention of the Council.
The President of the Council sets the agenda in agreement with
the Vice-President. 5 ' Meetings can be convened on the power of the
of the Confederation are listed as the President and Vice-President of the Confederation,
the Council of Ministers and the Confederal Parliament. Id.
247. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. III, at 271.
248. Id. pt. II, at 269.
249. Foundation Document, supra note 101, § V, at 264. See infra notes 274-81 and
accompanying text.
250. Although the number of ministers is not specified in the document, the composi-
tion of the Council of Ministers has evolved since the founding of Senegambia. It was
reported in November of 1982 that the Council, referred to as a Cabinet, consisted of
nine ministers, "five from Senegal and four from Gambia, with the Senegalese ministers
taking portfolios for Defense, Security and Diplomacy and the Gambian ministers taking
portfolios for Finance and Economic Affairs." DEADLINE DATA ON WORLD AFFAIRS, GAM-
BIA, supra note 8, at 4. This would make the total membership of the Council of Minis-
ters to be eleven persons: nine ministers and the President and Vice-President of the
Confederation. In April 1983, a "reshuffle" of the Council took place. "The new defense
minister of Senegal, Medoune Fall, has switched his Senegambian portfolio from security
to defense. His former security post in the confederal cabinet has been assumed by
Ibrahim Wone, the new (Ilnterior [Mlinister of Senegal. The Senegambian [Mlinister of
[Tiransport is now Robert Sagna, who is Senegal's [Mlinister of [Slupply and
[E]quipment." African Update, AFRICA REP., July-Aug. 1983, at 23, 26.
251. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. III, art. 14, at 271.
252. Foundation Document, supra note 101, § III, ch. 10, at 262-63.
253. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. I, art. 2, at 267. The appoint-
ment process is stated in two one-sentence paragraphs as follows:
"In agreement with the Vice-President, the President shall appoint the Ministers
responsible for strictly confederal matters."




255. Protocol on the Financial Regulations, supra note 103.
256. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. III, art. 16, at 272.
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President alone.2 57 He need only consult with the Vice-President
before calling a meeting but is not required to obtain the Vice-Presi-
dent's approval before convening the meeting.
258
When performed on behalf of the Confederation, "acts of Minis-
ters" are to be referred to as "decisions. ' 25 9 It remains unclear whether
"acts of Ministers" designates collective action by the Council or indi-
vidual action by a Minister in his or her separate area of confederal
interest. This ambiguity aside, it is relevant to note a complete absence
in the Confederation documents of any binding authority of the Coun-
cil or its individual Ministers upon the Confederation or its two mem-
ber nations. Lacking any mention of such binding authority, it can be
assumed that none exists. The Council appears to serve only in an ad-
visory and fact-finding role for Senegal and The Gambia on matters
sought to be decided by the two nations.
The Confederal Parliament260 serves a similar advisory and fact-
finding role as that of the Council of Ministers. The membership of the
Parliament consists of sixty persons with seats unevenly divided in
number between The Gambia and Senegal. 261 The Gambia is allocated
one-third of these seats while Senegal controls two-thirds. 2 2 The mem-
bers of the Confederal Parliament are selected from each member na-
tion's legislature:2 3 The Gambia's House of Representatives 2l" and
Senegal's National Assembly.2 5 Members hold office "until the legisla-
ture of the Confederal State that selected him first meets after it is
dissolved. "266
Despite its minority position, The Gambia is able to exercise sig-
nificant influence in the Confederal Parliament. A quorum requires the
presence of three-quarters of the Parliament.2 7 Without the coopera-
tion of five members of The Gambia's representatives, the necessary
forty-five parliamentary members cannot be obtained. The Senegalese
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. pt. V, art. 25, at 274.
260. The Confederal Parliament, together with the Council of Ministers, met for the
first time in January 1983. Synge, supra note 22, at 688.
261. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. II, art. 8, at 269.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, GAMBIA, supra note 152, at 43.
Part I of The Gambian Constitution also discusses the "Composition of Parliament." Id.
pt. I, ch. VI.
265. Id. at 25. Title IV of the Senegalese Constitution describes "The National As-
sembly." Id.
266. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. II, art. 9, at 269.
267. Id. at 10.
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representatives are unable to form a quorum on their own.
The Confederal Parliament deliberates on matters of social, eco-
nomic and financial importance 6" as submitted to it by the Confederal
President or Vice-President.2 " It may also decide "any matter of com-
mon interest submitted to it by a majority of three-quarters of its
members. 2 °7 0 In this regard, the powers of the Parliament are very lim-
ited. It may initiate proposals, 27' and give advice2 7 2 on the budget of
the Confederation and proposed amendments to the Foundation Docu-
ment. A further illustration of the minimal authority of the Parliament
in the confederal scheme is the designation given to its acts. The terms




Disagreements as to the interpretation and implementation of
Senegambian documents are resolved under Section V of the Founda-
tion Document, entitled "Settlement of Differences."'2 7' Different views
on the meaning of documents are handled first by the President and
Vice-President.2 7 5 They settle any disagreement by mutual consensus
on what the actual interpretation and implementation of a particular
provision should be.27 1 If such a consensus cannot be reached either the
President or Vice-President may refer the matter to arbitration. 27 7 Pro-
vision is made for a "Protocol of Implementation" which will establish
an "arbitration tribunal. 2 7 8 This protocol has yet to be issued. Refer-
ence to the protocol, and consequently the arbitration tribunal, is
made in the Protocol on the Institutions'79 and the Protocol on the
268. Id. at 270.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 269.
271. Id. art. 11, at 270.
272. Id.
273. Id. pt. V, art. 25, at 274. "The assembly is empowered only to provide recom-
mendations to the confederal executive and decisions will have to be ratified by the par-
liaments of the individual countries." African Update, AFRICA REP., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at
28.





279. Protocol on the Institutions, supra note 102, pt. V, art. 26, at 275. The provision
referring to the protocol is entitled "The Settlement of Differences Arising from the Im-
plementation of this Protocol." Id.
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Financial Regulations. 280 The existence of machinery for the resolution
of disputes was urged by the Technical Assistance team in its 1964
report. "One vital element of whatever agreement might be entered
into between Senegal and The Gambia would obviously be a clause
providing, first, for a procedure of conciliation and then for arbitration
in the event of difficulties in the performance or interpretation of any
particular agreement. 2 8 1
IV. REACTION TO THE CONFEDERATION
During a joint press conference with President Diouf of Senegal in
August 1981, President Jawara of The Gambia said the coup attempt
"opened our eyes to the need to go further" in establishing relations
with Senegal on matters beyond military forces.2 2 Once these relations
were formally agreed to, domestic political interests and foreign com-
mentators took a hard look at the Confederation. Many of the issues
on the merits of a closer union between Senegal and The Gambia,
brought to the fore prior to the coup attempt, were resurrected during
this post-Confederation scrutiny.28 2
Reaction among political parties in both countries was predictable.
It gravitated towards the maintenance of existing self-interests. In
Senegal, the initial response by the principal opposition parties to
President Diouf's military involvement in stopping the Gambian coup
was to condemn it as an annexation of The Gambia.28 4 Once the Sene-
gambian Confederation was unveiled, however, the opposition's public
denouncements of the President were quieted.2 85 Benefits for the se-
curity of Senegal, as well as its political parties, were detected in the
absence of a radical regime in The Gambia hostile to Senegal.288 An-
other advantage was the ability of the Confederation to control the
border smuggling which was detrimental to the Senegalese economy.
2 7
In The Gambia, politicians had a compelling reason for supporting
280. Protocol on the Financial Regulations, supra note 103, pt. IV, art. 15, at 281.
The provision referring to the protocol is entitled "Settlement of Differences." Id.
281. Report on Alternatives for Association, supra note 15, ch. II.C., at 30.
282. African Update, AFRICA REP., Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 23, 25.
283. See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
284. Senegambia: Conundrums, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Nov. 25, 1981, at 8.
285. Senegal: Diouf Calls the Tune, supra note 181, at 6.
286. Id. The Senegalese province of Casamance, see supra notes 14 and 90, generally
favored the confederation as a device to eliminate the province's isolation. Secessionist
Agitation Grows in Casamance Region of Senegal, supra note 90, at 29. "The [Confeder-
ation] is being implemented very slowly, however, and the delays have revived the seces-
sionist movement in Casamance with new force." Id.
287. Senegal: Diouf Calls the Tune, supra note 181, at 6.
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the Confederation. One author, writing on the prospects of African
unity, expressed an evident motivation that could lead any politician
to desire union with another nation: "Only where it is probable that
inter-territorial unity will contribute to strengthening domestic politi-
cal control[s] is an existing political elite apt to welcome it. '28 8 With-
out the help of Senegalese forces in 1981 and in similar situations in
the future, the prospects for any Gambian government would be dim.
It is important to note the reason why opposition parties in The Gam-
bia did not voice an opinion on the birth of the Confederation:
"[0]pposition leaders are either in the process of being tried for alleged
complicity in the [coup attempt] or are keeping quiet for fear that any
noise they make may be misconstrued as treason.
289
One article dealing with the announcement of the Senegambian
Confederation was entitled "Shotgun Marriage. "290 The author be-
lieved that The Gambia was not a willing participant in the Senegam-
bian marriage given the existence of several thousand Senegalese
troops in the country.29 ' Several months later, however, the same peri-
odical was able to print that "Gambia is surviving the birth of the con-
federation of Senegambia with its individuality and democratic tradi-
tions mostly intact .. ,. . Another African observer, rather than
discussing the benefits to The Gambia and Senegal of the Confedera-
tion, commented on the more general benefits to the African continent
as a whole:
Ultimately, whatever The Gambia may stand to lose of its sov-
ereignty[,] Africa could stand to gain in its quest for unity. For
any merger which successfully challenged the hitherto inviola-
bility of the continent's artificial and divisive political bounda-
ries would represent a major step down unity road.292
Many feared that The Gambia would lose its sovereignty upon entering
288. FOLTZ, supra note 60, at 193.
289. Shotgun Marriage, supra note 176, at 42. The trials of those persons charged
with participation in the 1981 coup attempt were observed by Amnesty International
during January, 1982. Although the trials "fulfilled internationally recognized standards
regarding the fairness of trials," there were three exceptions: "a) the nonavailability of
defence counsel and legal aid; b) the detention of suspects prior to trial under the deten-
tion procedures; (and] c) the shortness of time between formal charging of offences and
the trials from the stand point of the preparation of defence." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TRIAL OBSERVATION MISSIONS TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA,
June 1983, at 21,
290. Shotgun Marriage, supra note 176, at 42.
291. Id.
292. Each still itself, supra note 4, at 26, 29.
293. Battle for Banjul, supra note 72, at 14, 19.
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the Confederation. These fears have long been alive in the minds of
Gambian politicians and citizens. 9 "
Gambian President Jawara's acknowledgement that there has been
some loss of sovereignty has not quieted reports in the print media
that far more sovereignty has been lost than was acknowledged.2 95
There continues to be the strong belief typified by the comments of
one writer that The Gambia's sovereignty has been mortgaged,"' and
even more, as mentioned earlier, that the union is the annexation of
The Gambia.2 9 7 It has been said that the restoration of President
Jawara to power by the Senegalese was costly.29 8 The price was "the
unconditional acceptance of the idea of confederation. . . . Although
this seems to be a realistic solution to the Gambian politico-economic
problem, it is based on expediency rather than free choice. '299
V. FUTURE PROSPECTS: CONFEDERATION LEADING TO FEDERATION?
Having analyzed the Foundation Document and protocols, an in-
quiry is now possible into whether the term "confederation" accurately
denotes the union of Senegal and The Gambia. Where Senegambia
might take the two nations in their continuing quest for union can also
be examined.
The common characteristics of a confederation can be classified
into political, judicial and financial elements. The absence of a single
individual as the executive with independent powers,300 the lack of leg-
294. See supra note 62.
295. In an interview after the 1981 coup attempt, President Jawara was asked if the
Confederation would mean "any loss of sovereignty for The Gambia." Battle for Banjul,
supra note 72, at 17. In response, the President acknowledged that "any cooperation
between two or more states involves some losses of sovereignty by the countries con-
cerned. That is a fact .... Take the EEC, it is the same, take any other group of
countries, regional or otherwise, as soon as they come together each country loses part of
its sovereignty." Id.
296. Id. at 15.
297. Senegambia: Conundrums, supra note 284, at 8.
298. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 120.
299. Id. A Western diplomat in Dakar was quoted as saying that "[tihe government
of Senegal got the confederation as a quid pro quo for saving Jawara's skin, but now they
must pressure him to develop minor protocols supporting it." Christian Science Monitor,
supra note 58, at 13. One year after the formation of the confederation, one correspon-
dent concluded that "the confederation seems to be an empty postscript to the military
intervention. It is a union more in form than in substance." Id.
300. During the period of the United States Confederation, from 1781 to 1789, four-
teen presidents of Congress represented "the dignity of the United States... but (they]
had no more power than any other delegate." J. FisKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERI-
CAN HISTORY: 1783-1789, at 96 (1916). Unlike the office of the President in the United
States today under a federal system, the Confederal President of the late 18th century
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islative powers vested in a congress or body of representatives,3"' and
the inability of the supranational government to enforce its decisions
upon the member nations,3 0 2 are the political elements defining a con-
federation.303 The judicial elements are conspicuous by their total ab-
sence in a confederation. Typically, a mechanism for arbitration will be
provided in place of an independent judicial body.304 Finally, the levy-
ing of taxes upon the member states is not feasible in a confederation
without the assent of the member nations.305 This position of the con-
federal government for obtaining revenue for its various operations is
akin to "the role of a beggar, hat in hand, at the capitals of the several
commonwealths. '"30 6 A summary description of a confederation would
be that the member nations "agree indeed on a central body to which
they send delegates, but which has virtually no powers or finances and
whose decisions are not necessarily binding on the members."' '
The confederal nature of Senegambia is confirmed by its Founda-
tion Document and protocols.308 The Confederal President, the Presi-
had no more power than any other member of Congress. The Confederation lacked an
executive, having instead "a committee of thirteen (who) sat when Congress was not in
session. It had no system of courts." J. MARSHALL, SWORDS AND SYMBOLS: THE TECHNIQUE
OF SOVEREIGNTY 213-14 (1969).
301. "The basic principle underscored in confederations is that the centre is not sov-
ereign-it holds its authority at pleasure from the constituent ('peripheral') units of the
confederation." P. KING, FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION 133 (1982). In a confederation "ul-
timate power or sovereignty resides in the individual units making up the confederation,
[and] their interrelationships [can be seen as] 'diplomatic.'" WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE REQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL FEDERALISM xii (T.M. Franck ed. 1968).
302. In analyzing the causes for failure of the United States Confederation of the
1780's, one author saw the "greatest defect" as the "lack of any means, on the part of
Congress of enforcing obedience." FISKE, supra note 300, at 99. See infra text accompa-
nying note 307.
303. MARSHALL, supra note 300, at 214.
304. "Not only was there no federal executive or judiciary worthy of the name [in the
United States Confederationi, but the central government operated only upon states,
and not upon individuals." FISKE, supra note 300, at 99.
305. "In the early Leagues and Confederations it was the norm that financial re-
sources belonged in the first instance to the units, so that the general government de-
pended upon contributions from the members to finance its obligations and policy." U.
HICKS, FEDERALISM: FAILURE AND SUCCESS 181-82 (1978). The member states of the
United States Confederation had the power to impose taxes. The Continental Congress
did not possess this power. FIsKE, supra note 300, at 98. "Congress could call for troops
and for money in strict conformity with the [A]rticles [of Confederation]; but should any
state prove delinquent in furnishing its quota, there was no constitutional means of com-
pelling it to obey the call." Id. at 99.
306. MARSHALL, supra note 300, at 214. The "commonwealths" refer to the thirteen
colonies or states of the United States Confederation.
307. HICKS, supra note 305, at 5.
308. In an interview, the Gambian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia made clear that with
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dent of Senegal, is powerless to act alone on all important matters un-
less the Confederal Vice-President, the President of The Gambia,
agrees."' The confederal parliament is best described as a body of del-
egates. The parliament has no legislative function of its own, in the
sense that its assent to legislation is required before becoming law.31 '
Rather, the parliament can only initiate and advise on important is-
sues. 3" The only final say it possesses is choosing individuals to hold
office within the parliament itself.3 "3 Arbitration takes the place of a
sitting judicial body.31 4 Confederal finance is akin to a beggar with hat
in hand. The President and Vice-President must agree upon a formula
for Senegal and The Gambia to make their respective contributions to
confederal finance.3 15 Once agreed to, there is no system for compelling
such contributions short of "firing upon its citizens or blockading two
or three harbors," 3 which, for purposes of collecting yearly taxes from
its citizens or contributions from its member states, would be "the ab-
surdest political anomaly imaginable.
'31 7
Three political scenarios exist for the future of Senegambia. One
Senegambia, "what is currently established is confederation and not federation." Gambia
News Bull., supra note 167, at 3.
309. It is worthwhile here to mention the use of two different phrases in the Sene-
gambian documents which signify this "agreement" between the president and vice-pres-
ident of the Confederation. The two phrases are "shall agree on" and "in agreement
with." Examples can be found in The Protocol on the Financial Regulations, supra note
103, pt. I, at 278. "In determining contributions to the budget of the Confederation, the
President and Vice-President shall agree upon a formula which shall take into consider-
ation .... Id. (emphasis added). "The currencies in which contributions shall be paid
to the Confederal Budget shall be determined by the President, in agreement with the
Vice-President." Id. (emphasis added). The author interpreted the two phrases as synon-
ymous in expressing the requirement that for an action to be taken by the President of
the Confederation, the Vice-President of the Confederation must also assent to the deci-
sion. Id.
310. Analogy can be made to the confederal legislature of the United States in the
late 1700's. FisKE, supra note 300.
311. See supra notes 260-73 and accompanying text.
312. Id.
313. The Confederal Parliament is able to select its President. Foundation Docu-
ment, supra note 101, cl. 11, at 263. The Parliament can also "elect its speaker and other
persons to hold office in the Confederal Parliament." Protocol on the Institutions, supra
note 102, pt. II, art. 11, at 270. At the first meeting of the Parliament in 1983, "the
Gambian speaker of the house of representatives, Alieu Sulayman Jack, was elected pres-
ident of the assembly." African Update, AFRICA Rp., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 23, 28.
314. See supra notes 274-81 and, accompanying text.
315. Protocol on the Financial Regulations, supra note 103, pt. I, art. 3, at 278.
316. FisKE, supra note 300, at 100. The author, in making this statement, discussed
the difficulties faced by the United States Confederation of 1781-89, in which the central




possibility is that the Confederation has no future at all. The agree-
ment, even on the minimal consultative level that it operates, might be
-found ill-suited for various reasons by either Senegal or The Gambia or
both. Another possibility is that Senegambia continues unchanged
from its present form. The experience of other confederations, how-
ever, indicates that this is unlikely. "Historically, confederations have
tended to be transitional organizations of unifying states."31' There is a
third scenario for Senegambia, to be discussed below, which would in-
volve the confederation evolving into a federal system of government.
Such a future would be consistent with the Foundation Document's
preamble that The Gambia and Senegal will "strengthen the unity"31 9
of their policies in various fields.2 0
A federal, unlike a confederal, system of government exists with a
central government organ superior to the member nations.2 ' The cen-
tral organ has the twin attributes of finality of decision and the power
to exact obedience to those decisions.2" For most common matters, de-
cisions are arrived at by majority vote.2 ' The legislative mechanics of a
federation usually consist of a small central government 3 4 patterned
after the United States executive branch embodied in the office of the
President.3 2 5 A legislature, probably bicameral, 3 2 6 ensure% that "the
smaller and weaker states feel that they can make a positive contribu-
tion to national policy decision.3 12 7 A judicial branch or supreme court
acts as the "chief interpretor" of the constitution.3 2 8 As the federal
government can exact obedience, the power to tax exists in a federal
governmental system to compel financial contribution from the mem-
ber nations. To transform the union of Senegal and The Gambia into a
"Senegambia Federation" would require several fundamental
318. J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 292 n.26. (1979).
As proof of the proposition, the author gives the examples of the Confederation of North
American States (1778-87) and the German Confederation (1815-66). Id. In addition, cf.
The Senegal-Mali Federation (1959-60) and the Syrian-Egyptian Federation (United
Arab Republic) (1958-61).
319. Foundation Document, supra note 101, at 260 (preamble).
320. Id.
321. HICKS, supra note 305, at 7.
322. KING, supra note 301, at 140.
323. Id. at 143. In a federation, the majoritarian principle would serve as the rule for
"normal purposes." Id.
324. HICKS, supra note 305, at 7.
325. Id.
326. See HICKS, supra note 305, at 7. The author discusses three "essential govern-
mental organs" of a federation, including "a sizeable freely elected Assembly" and "[aln
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changes.""9 The confederal structure would have to be transformed
from one giving advice and consultation to the member states to one
making decisions which are binding upon the states. The unanimity
principle between the President and Vice-President of the Confedera-
tion would have to be replaced. A substitute structure might involve
the President having power to make decisions alone, without the need
for the Vice-President to concur, similar to the executive branch of the
United States Government. A cabinet system with the President and
Vice-President as members, but other individuals added to the group,
could be another scenario for the executive. 30 The parliament would
become a vital part of the legislative process, rather than just an advi-
sor in the confederal system. Assent by the parliament to legislation in
a federation would be required before the President or cabinet could
enact laws. In conjunction with the above, the federal structure, once it
was truly a government and not merely a body of delegates, would
have the power to enforce decisions upon its member nations. This
would include the power to tax and enforce contributions from mem-
ber states. Finally, the system of arbitration in a confederation would
be discarded for a judicial system. A supreme court on the federal
level, responsible for dealing with conflicts over the interpretation of
the federation agreement, would also resolve disputes between the
states.
What is the likelihood for the Confederation becoming a federa-
tion? For now, the possibility is not favorable. Two main obstacles,
touched on earlier, stand in the way. First, the strong fear remains in
The Gambia that the Senegalese will become hegemonic through ma-
jority control of a central government with federal powers.33 1 This fear
continues to prevent The Gambia from willingly entering into an
agreement for a supranational body with power of decision and obedi-
329. These changes can be made in the Senegambian Confederation under its amend-
ment procedure. This involves four steps. First, each confederated state may submit pro-
posals for consideration to the President and Vice-President of the Confederation; sec-
ond, the President and Vice-President, as the "depositories" of the Agreement, must
submit the proposals to the Confederal Parl iament for its opinion; third, once the opin-
ion of the Parliament has been made, The Gambia and Senegal must "enter into negotia-
tions for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendment to be made to
the Agreement"; and finally, for the amendment to become effective, the individual
member confederal states must ratify the amendment "in accordance with their respec-
tive constitutional requirements." Foundation Document, supra note 101, cl. 20, at 265.
This amendment procedure does not apply to changing any of the protocols in force. The
protocols "may be amended from time to time by agreement between the Confederated
States." Id.
330. HicKs, supra note 305, at 7.
331. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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ence over The Gambia. The second obstacle is the desire of the two
nations to remain sovereign and independent states.332 Both countries
wish to remain self-governing and avoid a return to a situation of colo-
nial rule, regardless that such rule comes from an African neighbor.
These obstacles preventing federation could be overcome through
the experience of Senegal and The Gambia working together in the
Confederation. An increased sense of amity might develop through the
continual confederal relationship of cooperation and consensus. Gam-
bian fears of domination by Senegal might be alleviated. Both coun-
tries would see a federal system not as a relinquishment of sovereignty
but rather as a sharing of power with a trusted ally.
Should Senegambia make the transition from confederation to
federation, what might be its prospects for continued survival? A fed-
eration under such amiable conditions as previously described still
could not hold out a guarantee for a lasting future. The essential linch-
pin to success or failure would be the "atmosphere" or commitment to
federation rather than the "formula" or institutional machinery of the
federal system. s "Successful governments are made by men, not
merely by institutional arrangements. Unless members of the govern-
ment accept and support the necessary compromise the federal solu-
tion will fail."3 3
4
In a study of four unsuccessful federations,335 the one consistent
factor found by the author was "the absence of a positive political or
ideological commitment to the primary goal of federation as an end in
itself among the leaders and people of each of the federating units
... "36 The future of a Senegambian Federation would thus be de-
pendent upon the acceptance of the idea of federation by all parties
332. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. The emphasis upon sovereignty
and independence in the documents is notable in this section of the Foundation Docu-
ment, but it is also a theme pervading through all the Senegambian agreements. See,
e.g., Treaty of Association Between The Gambia and The Republic of Senegal, Apr. 19,
1967, The Gambia-Senegal, 640 U.N.T.S. 101, at 102.
333. AFRICAN AFFAIRS 37 (K. Kirkwood ed. 1969) (quoting M .Picquemal, Les
problLmes des unions d~tats en Afrique noire, REVUE JURIDIQUE ET POLITIQUE D'OUTRE
MER, Mar. 27, 1962, at I).
334. Id. One article has suggested that the evolution of confederation to federation
will probably not result because "both parties seem disappointed and suspicious of each
other's intentions and are facing serious economic problems at home." Uneasy Bedfel-
lows, NEw AFRICAN, May 1985, at 42, 43. The article conjectured that these problems
may account for Gambian President "Jawara's renewed friendship with [Libyan Presi-
dent] Gadaffi and his petrodollars," Id. See infra note 360.
335. WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL, supra note 301, at 167. In examining the reasons for
unsuccessful federations, the author discussed four failures of the recent past: the federa-
tions of West Indies, Central Africa, East Africa and Malaysia. Id.
336. Id. at 173.
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involved. Although the common heritage and history of the peoples of
The Gambia and Senegal3 7 would help to solidify a federation, this
heritage and history would not be sufficient to guarantee success. 3 ' So,
too, a legalistic or institutional analysis of the federal structure would
not alone offer the answer to the viability of federating3 3 The crucial
determinant to successful federation would lie in the desire of the two
nations to embrace federalism. At the present time, such a desire must
be analyzed in light of the events of the summer of 1981 and the subse-
quent motivations to unite into the Confederation. "Where what is
wanted is not a new nation but a pragmatic solution to certain
problems of trade and marketing, population movement, defense or
foreign policy, some other solution different from classic federalism
may be more realistic and so, more successful. 3 4 0 In the case of Sene-
gambia, for the present, that "other solution" other than federalism
may remain confederation. 4'
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of the degree of sovereignty retained by The Gambia
after its entry into the Senegambian Confederation can now be an-
swered. The query, initially posed in the introduction to this note,
takes on special importance in light of the long-standing concerns of a
potential Senegalese annexation842  of its smaller and weaker
neighbor. 43
The resolution of the issue of Gambian "sovereignty" begins with
an understanding of that term as applied to nation states. The idea of
337. See supra note 21.
338. WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL, supra note 301, at 173.
339. AFRICAN AFFAIRS, supra note 333, at 37. "The success or failure of federal sys-
tems, once established. . . depends to a substantial degree upon the attitudes of leaders.
Federalism requires respect for the spheres of authority demarcated constitution-
ally-for these areas of autonomy reflect the underlying diversities that made the federal
solution appropriate. Indeed, the diversity of federal systems makes legalistic or institu-
tional analysis both unrewarding and incomplete." Id.
340. WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL, supra note 301, at 183.
341. Another term which can be substituted for "confederation" would be "quasi-
federation." The three elements that constitute the term apply to the Senegambian Con-
federation. A quasi-federation includes "any form of association between sovereign states
(1) in which the relationship is a continuing one; (2) regulated by an established system
of normative rules and roles; (3) executed in an impartial and flexible manner consonant
with those rules and roles." Id. at 193. The author adds that such a "continuing relation-
ship generally features not a parliament and an executive, although it may have these as
well, but a treaty and an administration." Id.
342. Senegambia: Conundrums, supra note 284, at 8.
343. See supra notes 8 and 10.
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sovereignty has classically assumed that "there is a sovereign in every
system and that this sovereign consists in some one indivisible agent
always to the exclusion of other agents within the system." ' , In this
respect, finality of decision by the sovereign, with the authority to
command all others within the territory, has been viewed as a prereq-
uisite to the "function of command and obedience. 3 45 The difficulty
with accepting the classic definition of sovereignty as valid is its idea
that the sovereign possesses power which is "total, illimitable and indi-
visible."'34 Such a description of sovereigntyas absolute and unlimited,
in effect above the law, becomes impossible to reconcile with the mod-
ern democratic state.3 47 When democracy is taken to infer "a sharing of
power, citizen participation in its exercise, and rule of law," 34 8 it is
readily seen that no one agent within the polity possesses total, illimit-
able and indivisible power.3 49 The problem, then, with classical sover-
eignty is that its strict application does not recognize what in fact is
quite commonplace today: a democratic state which "is necessarily
bound by some rules which it cannot stand above or otherwise escape,
and that in this sense it is necessarily limited." 310
An alternative exists to the concept of sovereignty in its classical
form. This alternative is cognizant of the limitations of the democratic
form of government. A suggested meaning of sovereignty, one to be
applied in this analysis, eliminates the idea of absolute, total, illimita-
ble or indivisible power.38 1 Instead, a sovereign state is seen to be "a
territorially defined unit which has established and coherent proce-
dures for conflict-resolution and decision-making within its borders,
which is neither legally subject to nor substantively bound by any
other entity external to itself, and which has designated agents (for
example, rulers, and civil servants) to act on its behalf."352 (emphasis
added).
The inquiry, then, as to the sovereignty of The Gambia within the
Confederation is to ask if the former is legally subject to or substan-
tively bound by the decisions of the latter. In this regard, the analysis
will examine the language of the Senegambian agreements, the events
occurring since formation of the Confederation and the position of The
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Gambia from an historical perspective.
The governmental structure of Senegambia confirms the words of
the Foundation Document s" that "[e]ach state [maintains] its inde-
pendence and sovereignty. '" 354 All decisions are based upon a unanim-
ity principle.3 55 This attests to the conclusion made earlier that the
union of The Gambia and Senegal is truly a confederal one. 8 6 The
President and Vice-President of the Confederation must agree upon a
decision before it can be applied to the member states. "' In other
words, the President of Senegal and the President of The Gambia
must willingly assent to an action of the Confederation. Both Presi-
dents will be bound by a decision of the Confederation when they
choose to do so. Senegambia, under this unanimity principle, becomes
not an "entity external" to The Gambia, but rather, a political struc-
ture which is totally dependent upon The Gambia for its existence. If
The Gambia does not agree to a decision then there is no decision
reached. Consequently, The Gambia is "neither legally subject to nor
substantively bound by any other entity external to itself."38s This con-
clusion, based upon the unanimity principle, is also confirmed by the
existence of dispute resolution through arbitration.8 9 If The Gambia
and Senegal do not agree on an issue, the only legal avenue available is
arbitration. Again, no decisions of the Confederation are binding unless
total agreement is reached. It is relevant to point out that when such
total agreement is lacking, the two nations can still conduct their af-
fairs in all areas alone, thus ignoring the Confederation.
36 0
If The Gambia had truly lost its sovereignty to any degree, events
since Senegambia became a reality would indicate this fact but such
events have not materialized. There has not occurred any dramatic ac-
tion on the part of the Confederation which could classify The Gambia
353. Foundation Document, supra note 101.
354. Id. § I, cl. 2, at 261.
355. See supra notes 308-17 and accompanying text.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 274-81 and accompanying text.
360. The individual Confederal States may conclude international agreements in ac-
cordance with their own constitutional requirements. Foundation Document, supra note
101, § VI, cl. 17, at 264. The stipulation that the two countries "shall endeavor to adopt a
common position" in foreign policy indicates that The Gambia and/or Senegal could im-
plement their own foreign policy as independent, sovereign nations should such a com-
mon position be lacking in the Confederation. Protocol on External Relations, supra
note 104, at 283. The Gambia recently concluded an agreement to restore diplomatic
relations with Libya without consulting Senegal. Uneasy Bedfellows, supra note 334, at




among the vanquished. If Senegal under the guise of Senegambia had
annexed its tiny neighbor, the expected result should have been for
Senegal to vigorously pursue its interests, This would have included
eliminating the smuggling trade from The Gambia,3 6 1 unifying the two
countries' currencies and economies, taking over and fully using the
Gambian river for commerce,362 and perhaps interfering in the internal
affairs of The Gambia. Instead, indications are that Senegal has be-
come even more sensitive to Gambian interests %ince Confederation.
Witness, for example, its handling of the smuggling trade, discussed
earlier.363
The desire and success of The Gambia in maintaining its sover-
eignty can be examined from an historical perspective, both pre-Con-
federation and post-Confederation. Particularly relevant to this inquiry
is the concept of sovereignty as held by The Gambia prior to gaining
independence in 1965, compared to the reality of the Senegambian
agreements. Has The Gambia compromised its vigor for independence
and sovereignty as expressed in statements made when the country
was on the threshold of nationhood?
In requesting that a team of experts be appointed by the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations to examine the various methods for
a union with Senegal,3 64 The Gambia stipulated certain guarantees
which were required to be met before such a union would be accept-
able. 68 These "essential safeguards concerning the measure of auton-
omy which would be enjoyed by The Gambia after association [with
Senegal], '  included retaining responsibility for "internal administra-
tion, the police, civil service, and local government; preservation of
Gambian civil and criminal law, educational and professional stan-
dards and qualifications; and the maintenance of the close ties of asso-
ciation between The Gambia, the United Kingdom and the Common-
wealth." 6 7 The Gambia had said it would consider sharing with
Senegal such policy areas as defense, foreign policy, joint representa-
tion abroad, financial and developmental matters.36 8 The Gambia also
wished to ensure the continuance of its liberal trading policies as well
as the "provision for some form of constitutional appeal to protect
361. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
365. Report on Alternatives for Association, supra note 15, Annex II, at 86.
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safeguards and conditions secured in any final agreement." ' Post-
Confederation scrutiny indicates that The Gambia has not compro-
mised its pre-independence interests by entering into the Confedera-
tion. Full autonomy is possessed by The Gambia regarding all internal
matters of governance. Based upon the unanimity principle within the
decision-making process of the Confederation, the two nations truly
share certain areas of mutual concern. To date, it appears that The
Gambia's trading policies remain intact.
The final word on the Senegambian Confederation should be one
of "cautious optimism."3s To a continent whose states are often torn
apart from within and without, leaving behind undemocratic govern-
369. Id.
370. Both caution and optimism are called for in assessing the Confederation given
recent events. Caution is required for at least five reasons. First, on the third anniversary
of the Confederation, the Presidents of The Gambia and Senegal broadcast on their re-
spective national radios "two entirely different appraisals of progress made .... The
Rumbles Within, W. AFRICA, April 1, 1985, at 603, 603. Gambian President Jawara said
"he was satisfied with progress made and counselled the need for slow but steady pro-
gress ...." Id. Senegalese President Diouf "was for more concrete signs of progress
especially in the economic and monetary fields." Id. Second, during a series of football
games between teams of the two Confederal nations marking the third anniversary of the
Confederal Agreement, the Senegalese press noted the "shouting down of the Senegalese
national anthem" by Gambian fans. Id. This incident was interpreted as showing "ap-
parent signs of strains in the confederation." Id. Third, a "brawl" erupted between Gam-
bian and Senegalese fans during the soccer match held to commemorate the Confedera-
tion's third anniversary. Confederal forces, made up solely of Senegalese troops, "moved
in on the Gambian athletes and their fans, and an estimated 100 persons were injured."
The Gambia: Soccer Clash Strains Relations, AFRICA REP., May-June 1985, at 37, 37.
Fourth, an incident involving a fishing boat brought anger to Senegalese officials and
rejoicing to Gambian authorities. The boat, operated by Senegalese, was "challenged in
the territorial waters of The Gambia. The two Gambian officers sent aboard to check the
cargo were drunk, so the captain set sail back to Dakar. Furious, the Gambians de-
manded the immediate return of the officers, the ship, and the entire crew." NEW AFRI-
CAN, supra note 334, at 43. Senegal acceded to the Gambian demands. Id. The ship was
heavily fined by The Gambia even though no fish were found on board. Id. Finally, there
was the decision by The Gambia in regard to agreements with Libya and Nigeria without
consulting its Confederal member, Senegal. Id. at 42. See supra note 360.
Despite this caution, at least five reasons warrant optimism. First, discussions be-
tween the two countries on the evolving nature of the Confederation are an ongoing pro-
cess. Second, agreements have been reached in the sensitive areas of economic integra-
tion. For example, a free trade area was expected to be established in late 1985. See
supra note 200 and accompanying text. Third, a limited joint foreign policy has been
announced. A Senegambian position on the question of Western Sahara was agreed to by
both countries in the Confederation. Few Signs of Real Progress, W. AFRICA, Jan. 7, 1985,
at 35, 35. Fourth, discussions are underway for a Senegambian passport or identity card.
Id. Finally, the two countries are considering issuing a "Senegambian driving license and
insurance cover." Id. See Appendix B, Protocol for the Coordination of Policy in the
Field of Transportation, Pt. V, "Land Transport."
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ments, economies without stability or growth, and people without lib-
erty or happiness, an agreement between two sovereign nations for the
betterment of both should be a guidepost to all the countries of Africa.
It is a guidepost, however, that is only beginning to form. A great deal
still depends upon how Senegal interprets the agreement .3 1 If it does
so in the spirit of democratic negotiation and compromise rather than
exercising its ever-present potential for domination, The Gambia
should be a mutual beneficiary. If this scenario does describe the fu-
ture, then the peoples of The Gambia and Senegal will truly look upon
February first as a national holiday worthy to celebrate the Senegam-
bian Confederation. 37 2
Paul Joseph Coppa
371. Hughes, supra note 22, at 382.
372. African Update, African Rep., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 23, 28. The Confederation
agreement became effective on February 1, 1982. Id. at 28.
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APPENDIX A
PROTOCOL
ON COORDINATION OF POLICY IN THE FIELD OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA
AND THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL
RECALLING The Agreement between the Republic of The Gam-
bia and the Republic of Senegal establishing the Senegambia Confed-
eration, signed at Dakar on the 17th day of December 1981;
AWARE of the importance of telecommunications in the mainte-
nance of state security;
CONSCIOUS of the need to improve facilities for communications
within the Confederation as a means of strengthening the close rela-
tions which unite the peoples of the two States;
DESIROUS of rationalising the use of telecommunications net-
works and harmonising the development of their telecommunications
policies in the interest of the peoples of the two States;
REFERRING in particular to Clauses, 2, 5, 15, 17 and 22 of the
Agreement;
HAVE HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
PART I
THE CONFEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Article 1 There shall be a Commission to be known as the Confed-
eral Telecommunications Commission composed of experts
of the two States in the field of telecommunications.
Article 2 The President of the Confederation after consultations
with the Vice-President shall define the composition and
mode of operation of the Commission.
The President of the Confederation in agreement with
the Vice-President shall appoint the members of the
Commission.
Article 3 The Commission shall be responsible for the planning of
the development of telecommunications networks within
the Confederation, taking into account the economic, tech-
nical and commercial aspects, in the interest of the
Confederation.
In this respect the Commission shall make recommen-
dations to the President of the Confederation.
Article 4 The Commission shall hold its regular session once every




USE AND IMPROVEMENT OF EXISTING
TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES
Article 5 The existing telecommunications facilities in the two Con-
federated States shall be used to achieve economy, effi-
ciency of operation and to ensure security.
These facilities shall be improved and developed to
achieve efficient routing of traffic within and outside the
Confederation.
Article 6 The existing Banjul-Dakar and Banjul-Kaolack direct cir-
cuits which are operated in semi-automatic mode shall be
transformed into fully automatic mode as soon as adequate
facilities are installed.
Article 7 As back up facilities both the Banjul and Dakar Interna-
tional Telephone and Telex Switching Centres shall be
connected via terrestrial link or any other appropriate
means as may be determined by the two Confederated
States.
Article 8 The Dakar International Telephone and Telex Switching
Centres may also be used by The Gambia for routing in-
tra-African telecommunications traffic to those countries
with which Dakar has direct links.
Article 9 The Satellite Earth Stations at Gandoul in the Republic of
Senegal and Abuko in the Republic of The Gambia, shall
serve to establish direct circuits for the need of the
Confederation.
Article 10 The Commission shall design a plan for mutual assistance
between the submarine Cable systems and the Satellite
Earth Stations at Gandoul and Abuko.
Article 11 The Commission shall carry out studies in the two Confed-
erated States to determine the full use of the telecommuni-
cations facilities for greater economic and social benefits.
Article 12 The training of experts and technicians in the two Confed-
erated States shall be coordinated and a programme of ex-
change of experts and technicians in the field of telecom-
munications shall be worked out by the two Confederated
States.
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PART III
THE CONFEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
Article 13 There shall be established a Confederal Telecommunica-
tions network.
Article 14 For this purpose the Commission shall undertake appropri-
ate studies particularly for the harmonisation of the opera-
tions of the networks of the two Confederated States. The
structure of the Confederal network shall be based on the
diversification of the national and international traffic
channels of the two Confederal States.
PART IV
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 15 Differences arising from the interpretation and implemen-
tation of the present Protocol shall be settled in accor-
dance with Clause 15 of the Agreement and as provided
for in Clause 22.
Article 16 The present Protocol shall be ratified in accordance with
the Constitutional requirements of each of the Confeder-
ated States.
Article 17 The present Protocol shall come into force as soon as the
instruments of ratification are exchanged.
Article 18 Each Confederated State may submit proposals for
amendments to this Protocol to the depositories of the
Protocol. Such amendments shall come into force upon
agreement of the Confederated States.
Article 19 The original of the Protocol, done in the English and
French languages, both texts being equally authentic, shall
be communicated to the Secretary General of the United
Nations for registration.
Article 20 The President of the Republic of the Gambia and the
President of the Republic of Senegal shall each be deposi-
tory to the present Protocol.
DONE at DAKAR on the 28th day of July 1983.
For the Republic of Senegal For the Republic of The Gambia
Mustapha NIASSE Lamin Kiti JABANG
Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of External Affairs





FOR THE COORDINATION OF POLICY IN THE FIELD OF
TRANSPORTATION
PREAMBLE
THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF
SENEGAL
RECALLING The Agreement between the Republic of The Gam-
bia and the Republic of Senegal establishing the Senegambia Confed-
eration signed at Dakar on the 17th day of December, 1981;
RECALLING further the Agreement on Road Transport between
the Republic of The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal signed on the
9th day of April, 1965, at Dakar and revised on June 26th 1970;
AWARE of the important role transportation can play in the eco-
nomic and social development of the two Confederated States;
REFERRING to the provisions of Clauses 2, 5, 15, 17 and 22 of
the Agreement;
HAVE HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
PART I
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
Article 1 The provisions of the present Protocol shall apply to Air,
River, Maritime and Land Transport in the two Confeder-
ated States.
Article 2 In coordinating the transportation policies of the two Con-
federated States, the legislative and regulatory measures




Article 3 All aircrafts registered in either of the Confederated States
shall have free passage to the airspace of the other Confed-
erated State.
Such free passage to the airspace of either of the two
Confederated States shall be made in accordance with leg-
islative and regulatory rules in the field of air navigation
and traffic in each of the Confederated States.
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Article 4 The two Confederated States shall continue to work to-
gether to harmonise their policies in the field of Civil Avia-
tion within the framework of international bodies, such as
the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the Afri-
can Civil Aviation Commission.
Article 5 The Civil Aviation policies of the two Confederated States
shall be coordinated to permit an optimum use of their air
traffic rights, in accordance with modalities to be set out in
a separate Agreement between the two Confederated
States.
Article 6 The two Confederated States shall coordinate their policies
in the field of training and the development of Civil Avia-
tion Infrastructures and logistics.
Article 7 The two Confederated States shall coordinate their Civil
Aviation regulations relating to flight safety.
PART III
RIVER TRANSPORT
Article 8 The canoes, boats and other river crafts registered in either
of the Confederated States shall have free and unhindered
access over the navigable rivers, streams and inland water-
ways of the other Confederated State.
Such free and unhindered access over the navigable
rivers, streams and inland waterways shall be made in ac-
cordance with the legislative and regulatory rules in the
field of marine navigation and traffic in each of the Confed-
erated States.
Article 9 The two Confederated States shall cooperate in the field of
river transportation including the exchange of information
and statistics.
Article 10 The two Confederated States shall cooperate in the field of
navigation aids and systems within the framework of the
International Light House Authority particularly in the
area of safety of navigation in the inland waterways of the
two Confederated States.
Article 11 The two Confederated States shall cooperated in carrying
out search and rescue operations in the rivers and inland
waterways of the two Confederated States.
Article 12 The two Confederated States shall work together to de-
velop river transportation for promoting trade and increas-








Article 14 All ships registered in either of the Confederated States
shall have free passage through the internal waters of the
other Confederated State.
Such free passage to the internal waters of either of
the two Confederated States shall be made in accordance
with the legislative and regulatory rules in the field of
Marine navigation and traffic in each of the Confederated
States.
Article 15 The two Confederated States shall coordinate their policies
and working procedure in use at their respective ports.
Article 16 Ships registered in the two Confederated States shall be
granted identical treatment particularly with regard to the
entry into, stay within and exit from the ports, the use of
port facilities for carrying out commercial, maritime sey-
vice and operations.
Article 17 The two Confederated States shall work together and co-
operate with international organisations such as the Inter-
national Maritime Organisation in controlling the conduct
and safety of ships and the pollution of their territorial
waters and their exclusive economic zone.
Article 18 The Maritime and transport policies of the two Confeder-
ated States shall be coordinated in accordance with modal-
ities to be set out in a separate agreement to permit the
optimum exploitation of the maritime rights of the two
Confederated States in the field of marine transportation.




Article 20 All vehicles licensed by the authorities in each Confeder-
ated State shall have free access to the use of the roads
and highways within the Confederated States.
Such free access shall be exercised in accordance with
.the legislative and regulatory rules in force in the field of
road traffic in each of the two Confederated States.
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Article 21 The licensing policies of the two Confederated States relat-
ing to the use of motor vehicles on the roads and highways
shall be coordinated with a view to adopting a uniform li-
censing system with the Confederation.
Article 22 The road traffic regulations of the two Confederated States
shall be harmonised particularly in relation to the
following:-
(i) the maximum permitted axle load;




(vi) driving under the influence of drinks or drugs;
(vii) use of safety belts and other safety measures
Article 23 The two Confederated States shall endeavor to harmonise
the methods and conditions for the issue and renewal of
driving licences and the design and installation of road
signs in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Road
Traffic and Road Signs.
Article 24 Vehicles registered in either of the Confederated States
shall be granted identical treatment as that granted to ve-
hicles registered in the other state regarding the use of
road transport facilities and ferry crossings.
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 25 Differences arising from the interpretation and implemen-
tation of the present Protocol shall be settled in accor-
dance with Clause 15 of the Agreement and as provided for
in Clause 22.
Article 26 The present Protocol shall be ratified in accordance with
the Constitutional requirements of each of the Confeder-
ated States.
Article 27 The present Protocol shall come into force as soon as the
instruments of ratification are exchanged.
Article 28 Each Confederated State may submit proposals for amend-
ments to this Protocol to the depositories of the Protocol.
Such amendments shall come into force upon agree-
ment of the Confederated States.
Article 29 The original of the Protocol, done in the English and
French languages, both texts being equally authentic, shall
be communicated to the Secretary General of the United
Nations for registration.
Article 30 The President of the Republic of The Gambia and the
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President of the Republic of Senegal shall each be deposi-
tory of the present Protocol.
DONE at DAKAR on the 28th day of July 1983.
For the Republic of Senegal For the Republic of The Gambia
(Sgd) M. Niasse (Sgd) L.K. Jabang
Mustapha NIASSE Lamin Kiti JABANG
Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of External Affairs
of the Republic of Senegal of the Republic of The Gambia
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
APPENDIX C
PROTOCOL
ON COORDINATION OF POLICY IN THE FIELD OF
INFORMATION
THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF
SENEGAL
RECALLING The Agreement between the Republic of The Gam-
bia and the Republic of Senegal, establishing the Senegambian Confed-
eration signed at Dakar on the 17th day of December 1981:
RECALLING further the Cooperation Agreement in the field of
Information signed at Dakar on the 10th of June, 1967, between the
Republic of Senegal and the Republic of The Gambia and the Cooper-
ation Agreement between the National Broadcasting Systems of Sene-
gal and the Broadcasting Service the The Gambia signed at Banjul on
31st July, 1968;
CONSIDERING the inextricable links which bind the two
countries;
CONSCIOUS of the common heritage of the peoples of the two
States and their desire to preserve their cultural identity;
CONVINCED of the importance of Information in the develop-
ment of better understanding between peoples;
REFERRING to Clauses 2, 5, 15, 17 and 22 of the Agreement;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:-
PART I
THE CONFEDERAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
Article 1 There shall be established Confederal Information Com-
mission composed of experts of the two States.
Article 2 The President of the Confederation, in consultation with
the Vice-President, shall define the composition and the
mode- of operation of the Commission.
The President, in agreement with the Vice-President, shall
appoint the members of the Commission.
Article 3 The Confederal Information Commission shall meet in reg-
ular session once a year, either in Banjul or in Dakar.
Article 4 The Commission shall be responsible for assisting the Con-
federal Authorities in the formulation of a confederal pol-
icy in the field of Information.
For this purpose, it shall make recommendations to the




CONDITIONS GOVERNING PUBLICATIONS AND THE
PRACTICE OF JOURNALISM
Article 5 The President of the Confederation, in agreement with the
Vice-President shall define:-
(a) the conditions governing the publication of national
news;
(b) the conditions governing the publication of foreign
news;
(c) the conditions governing the dissemination of
propaganda material of foreign origin;




Article 6 The authorities of the two Confederated States shall pro-
mote the exchange and dissemination in both The Gambia
and Senegal of newsreels, documentary films, photographs,
brochures, periodicals and daily publications of the two
Confederated States.
PART IV
INFORMATION AND NEWS AGENCIES AND AUDIO VISUALS
Article 7 There shall be a separate agreement setting down the mo-
dalities for the coordination of the activities of the Sen-
galese Press Agency and The Gambia Information News
Service.
Article 8 The Confederal Authorities shall endeavour to promote the
development of joint actions by the agencies in The Gam-
bia and Senegal responsible for news and audio visuals.
PART V
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 9 Differences arising from the interpretation and implemen-
tation of the present Protocol shall be settled in accor-
dance with Clause 15 of the Agreement as provided for in
Clause 22.
Article 10 The present Protocol shall be ratified in accordance with
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the Constitutional requirements of each of the Confeder-
ated States.
Article 11 The present Protocol shall come into force as soon as the
instruments of ratification are exchanged.
Article 12 Each Confederated State may submit proposals for amend-
ments to this Protocol to the depositories of the Protocol.
Such amendments shall come into force upon agree-
ment of the Confederated States.
Article 13 The original of the Protocol, done in the English and
French languages, both texts being equally authentic, shall
be communicated to the Secretary General of the United
Nations for registration.
Article 14 The President of the Republic of The Gambia and the
President of the Republic of Senegal shall each be deposi-
tory of the present Protocol.
DONE at DAKAR on the 28th day of July 1983.
For the Republic of Senegal For the Republic of The Gambia
Mustapha NIASSE Lamin Kiti JABANG
Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of External Affairs






AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF
SENEGAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION
The Republic of The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal.
RECALLING the Agreement between the Republic of The Gam-
bia and the Republic of Senegal establishing the Senegambia Confed-
eration, signed at Dakar on the 17th day of December, 1981.
AWARE that clause 2 of The Agreement specifies the principles
on which the Confederation is based;
RECALLING further the provisions of clauses 5, 8, 9, 15, 17 and
22 of The Agreement;
DETERMINED to realise within the context of clause 2 of The
Agreement the integration of the Armed Forces of the two Confeder-
ated states for the purposes of defending the sovereignty, integrity and
independence of the two confederated states.
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
PART 1 - DEFENCE OF THE CONFEDERATED STATES
Article 1: DEFENCE
1. In accordance with clause 2 of The Agreement, the Armed
Forces of the Confederation (Army, Navy, Air Force and
the Gendarmerie) shall at all times, defend the sover-
eignty, the territorial integrity and the independence of
the two confederated states against all forms of external
agression and internal subversion.
2. The Confederal Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force
and Gendarmerie) shall also fulfil any obligation relating
to any international alliances, treaties and agreements en-
tered by the Confederation.
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PART 2 - INTEGRATION OF THE CONFEDERAL ARMED
FORCES
Article 2: COMPOSITION OF THE CONFEDERAL ARMED
FORCES
1. The Confederal Armed Forces shall be constituted by
transferring to the Confederation part of the military
staff, equipment and facilities available in the two Con-
federal States.
2. The size and composition and the type of equipment of
the Confederal Armed Forces shall be determined by the
President in agreement with the Vice President.
Article 3: COMMAND OF THE CONFEDERAL ARMED
FORCES
1. The President of the Confederation shall command the
Confederal Armed Forces.
2. The President of the Confederation shall, in consultation
with the Vice President, decide on the deployment and
movement of the Confederal Armed Forces.
3. The Armed Forces of the Confederation shall be placed
under the exclusive command of the Confederation and
deployed for purposes specified in The Agreement.
4. The Confederal Armed Forces may be deployed and sta-
tioned throughout the territories of the Confederated
states.
5. The Confederal Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie shall
respectively be under one military command, except that
in time of war and in other circumstances specified by this
Protocol and its annexes the Confederal Armed Forces
and the Gendarmerie shall be under a single high ranking
military commander appointed by an Act of the President
of the Confederation.
Article 4: ORGANISATION, STATUS AND ADMINISTRATION
OF THE CONFEDERAL ARMED FORCES.
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1. The general organisation of the defence of the Confedera-
tion and the rules necessary for its operation are embod-
ied in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol.
2. The general status of officers and non-commissioned of-
ficers of the Confederal Armed Forces the rules governing
the administration of the Confederal Armed Forces, ac-
counting procedures, payments of salaries and other bene-
fits; the rules governing pension rights and other military
law shall be the subject of a seperate Protocol of imple-
mentation.
PART III FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 5: ANNEXES
The annexes referred to in this Protocol shall form part of
it and any reference to this Protocol shall be construed to
be a reference to the annexes.
Article 6: TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Pending the entry into force of Protocols of implementa-
tion provided for in this protocol and its annexes the law
in force in each Confederated State shall apply.
Article 7: SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES
Differences arising from the interpretation and implemen-
tation of this Protocol shall be settled in accordance with
clause 15 of The Agreement and as provided for in clause
22.
Article 8: RATIFICATION
This Protocol shall be ratified in accordance with the con-
stitution of each confederated state.
Article 9: ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Protocol shall come into force as soon as the instru-
ments of ratification are exchanged.
Article 10: AMENDMENT
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Proposals for amendments to this Protocol shall be sub-
mitted to the depositories of the Protocol.
Such amendments shall come into force upon agreement
of the parties.
Article 11: ORIGINALS AND REGISTRATION
The originals of the Protocol, done in English and French
languages, both texts being equally authentic, shall be
communicated to the Secretary General of the United Na-
tions for registration.
Article 12: DEPOSITORIES
The President and the Vice President of the Confedera-
tion shall be depositories of this Protocol and any amend-
ments made thereto.
DONE AT BANJUL
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF
THE GAMBIA
ALHAJI LAMIN KITI JABANG
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE GAMBIA












AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE SECURITY FORCES OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF
SENEGAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECURITY
FORCES OF THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION
The Republic of The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal.
RECALLING The Agreement between the Republic of The Gam-
bia and the Republic of Senegal establishing the Senegambia Confed-
eration, signed at Dakar on the 17th day of December, 1981;
AWARE that clause 2 of The Agreement specifies the principles
on which the Confederation is based;
RECALLING further the provisions of clause 5, 8, 15, 17 and 22 of
The Agreement; and
DETERMINED to realise within the context of clause 2 of The
Agreement the integration of the Security Forces of the two confeder-
ated states for the purpose of defending the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and independence of the two confederated states,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
PART I: COMMAND OF THE CONFEDERAL SECURITY
FORCES
Article 1: RESPONSIBILITIES AND POWERS OF THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE CONFEDERATION.
The President of the Confederation shall be responsible
for the security of the Confederation; he shall command
the Confederal Security Forces. The President of the Con-
federation may delegate part of the powers conferred on
him by the Agreement and this Protocol to the Confederal
Minister of Security.
PART II: SECURITY OF THE CONFEDERATED STATES
Article 2: THE ROLE OF THE CONFEDERAL SECURITY
FORCES
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1. In accordance with clause 2 of The Agreement the Con-
federal Security Forces shall, in collaboration with the Se-
curity Forces of the confederated states, ensure public se-
curity and prevent internal and external subversion.
2. The Confederal Security Forces shall also fulfill any obli-
gation arising to any international treaties and agreements
entered into by the Confederation.
PART III - INTEGRATION OF THE SECURITY FORCES
Article 3: COMPOSITION OF THE CONFEDERAL SECURITY
FORCES
1. The Confederal Security Forces shall be constituted by
transferring to the Confederation part of the security
staff, equipment and Police and Gendarmerie facilities be-
longing to the Security Forces of each confederated states.
2. The size and composition and the type of equipment of
the Confederal Security Forces as well as the nature of the
facilities to be used shall be determined by the President
in agreement with the Vice President.
Article 4: RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CONFEDERAL MINIS-
TER OF SECURITY
1. The Confederal Minister of Security shall in collaboration
with the security authorities of the confederated states, be
responsible for public security and the prevention of inter-
nal and external subversion.
2. The Confederal Minister of Security shall, in collaboration
with the Confederal Minister of Defence, prepare and im-
plement plans for the civil defence of the Confederation.
3. In pursuance of paragraph 2 of this article the Confederal
Minister of Security shall coordinate and control all mea-
sures undertaken by the confederal departments for the
civil defence of the Confederation.
Article 5: ORGANISATION, STATUS AND ADMINISTRATION
OF THE CONFEDERAL SECURITY FORCES
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A protocol of implementation shall be established to pro-
vide for the status of the personnel of the Confederal Se-
curity Forces, the rules governing their administration,
management, salaries and pensions.
Article 6: TRANSITIONAL PROVISION
Pending the entry into force of the protocol of implemen-
tation the matters referred to in paragraph 1 of this article
shall be governed by the laws and rules in force in each of
the two confederated states.
Article 7: SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES
Differences arising from the interpretation and implemen-
tation of this Protocol shall be settled in accordance with
clause 15 of The Agreement and as provided for in clause
22.
Article 8: RATIFICATION
This Protocol shall be ratified in accordance with the con-
stitution of each confederated state.
Article 9: ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Protocol shall come into force as soon as the instru-
ments of ratification are exchanged.
Article 10: AMENDMENT
Proposals for amendments to this Protocol shall be sub-
mitted to the depositories of the Protocol.
Such amendments shall come into force upon agreement
of the parties.
Article 11: ORIGINALS AND REGISTRATION
The originals of the Protocol, done in English and French
languages, both texts being equally authentic, shall be
communicated to the Secretary General of the United Na-
tions for registration.
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Article 12: DEPOSITORIES
The President and the Vice President of the Confedera-
tion shall be depositories of this Protocol and any amend-
ments made thereto.
Done at Banjul
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF
THE GAMBIA
ALHAJI LAMIN KITI JABANG
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE GAMBIA
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1. In September 1963, a team of four experts was appointed by
the Secretary General of the United Nations, at the joint request of the
Government of the Republic of Senegal and of her Majesty's Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of The Gambia, under
the following mutually agreed terms of reference:
To examine the present constitutional, legal, economic and
fiscal systems of Senegal and The Gambia and to provide data to
enable the Governments and peoples concerned to consider and to
decide on the form which the future relationship of the two coun-
tries might take on the attainment of independence by The Gam-
bia. This report should have regard to the following:
(a) The expressed desire of the Governments of Senegal and
The Gambia to negotiate a close and friendly association
between the two countries and to promote closer African
unity;
(b) The expressed desire of the two Governments to contrib-
ute to the stability, development and prosperity of their
two countries and in particular to harmonize the objec-
tives of their economic development plans;
(c) The consequential need to harmonize their present eco-
nomic and fiscal systems in the light of present and likely
future trends;
(d) The need to examine the suitability of various modes of
constitutional structures with a view to apportioning re-
sponsibility between the two Governments and maintain-
ing political stability within the two countries;
(e) The desire of The Gambia in any ultimate association
with Senegal to secure the safeguards summarized in par-
agraph 5 of The Gambia Government's supplementary
statement of 26 October 1962. (See annex I).
2. The members of the team were Mr. Hubertus Johannes van
Mook (the Netherlands), chief of mission and public administration
expert; Dr. Max Graessli (Switzerland), expert in economics; Dr. Henri
Monfrini (Switzerland), expert in constitutional law and Mr. Hendrik
Weisfelt (the Netherlands), fiscal and financial expert. They started
work at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 24 September
19861
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
1963 and, after brief consultations in London, on 30 September, at the
Colonial Office and with the British Council and further briefing at the
European office of the United Nations in Geneva, they reached Dakar
between 7 and 10 October 1963.
3. The mission spent about two months in Senegal and The
Gambia, where they visited Bathurst twice. One of its members went
to Cameroon between 24 and 30 November to study what appeared to
be a similar situation after which a few days were spent in London
consulting with British authorities on fiscal and monetary matters.
4. It would be impossible to mention individually all the people
who assisted the mission. Acknowledgement must be rendered in a
more general manner, however, to H.E. Dr. Leopold Sedar Senghor,
President of the Republic of Senegal and several members of his Coun-
cil, other officials and prominent private persons in that country; to
H.E. Sir John Warburton Paul, Governor and the Hon. David K.
Jawara, Premier of The Gambia, certain members of the Cabinet and
many of their collaborators and co-citizens in Bathurst and the Protec-
torate. The helpful understanding experienced in London also contrib-
uted largely to the work of the mission, and the authorities in Came-
roon were most forthcoming, notwithstanding short notice and the
brief time available. Finally mention should be made of the informa-
tion and support provided by United Nations Headquarters, the Ge-
neva Office and the office of the Technical Assistance Resident Repre-
sentative in Dakar and the very valuable preliminary investigation
made by Messrs. J. Rapoport and S. Rossen of the United Nations.
5. A thorough investigation of possibilities of the development of
the Gambia river basin, surveyed as a whole on both sides of the fron-
tier between the two countries, was made during November and De-
cember on the initiative of the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization by their experts Mr. J. de Meredieu (irrigation) and Mr.
R. Aubrac (water utilization); this report will be presented shortly to
the two Governments.
6. The report which follows presents the unanimous views and
recommendations of the mission, the members of which wish to express
their gratitude for the opportunity of undertaking this singularly chal-




A. The general outline
7. On 26 October 1962, the Governments of Senegal and The Gambia
- the latter with the consent of Her Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom - published a joint Communiqu6 concerning discus-
sions which had taken place between them about the possibility that,
on the attainment of full sovereign independence by The Gambia,
some form of association might be entered into between The Gambia
and Senegal. As proposed by the Premier of The Gambia, parallel re-
quests were made by both Governments to the Secretary General of
the United Nations for a technical assistance team of experts in the
constitutional, administrative, economic and fiscal fields, which would
lay before the Governments "economic and political data on which de-
cisions can be taken as to the form which their future relationship
should take" (see Annex I). The provisional terms of reference for the
team, as agreed upon by both Governments, were transmitted by the
end of January 1963, together with a supplementary statement of the
Government of The Gambia of 26 October 1962 (see Annex II). A rapid
visit by two United Nations staff members,' a legal expert and an econ-
omist, in May 1963, produced extensive information as the groundwork
for the mission's operations and led to the final determination of its
composition and its terms of reference (see Preface). To complete the
framework within which the mission had to shape its research, it
should be added that the President of the Republic of Senegal, in his
first discussion with the team, expressed the conviction of his Govern-
ment that any form of association between the two countries should at
least establish a common foreign policy and representation and a com-
mon defence.
8. A simple glance at the map makes it clear why this problem
has been raised. The Gambia is an artificially fashioned territory from
the colonial period. It enters into the much larger body of Senegal from
the coast along both sides of the Gambia River as a narrow strip about
325 km long and from 25 to 50 km across, which more or less follows
the general course of the river at a distance of between 10 and 30 kin,
without reaching the natural limits of the river basin or continuing to
its sources. The frontiers cut through both natural features and human
settlements. But for the coastal strip, it is wholly surrounded by the
territory of Senegal and separates the southern region (province) of
Casamance almost entirely from the other parts of that country.
1. Messrs. Rapoport and Rossen, mentioned in the Preface.
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9. Ethnically the indigenous populations of The Gambia and Se-
negal are identical; the same groups with the same languages and social
structures live on both sides of the border. People cross the frontier
without the feeling that they are coming among foreigners; they have
relatives in the neighbour country; they inter-marry and have social
contacts without difficulty. The Islam religion dominates in both com-
munities. Of the thousands of "strange farmers" who enter The Gam-
bia annually with little or no formality to take part in the groundnut
harvest, many are from Senegal; cattle go to pasture from one side of
the border to the other; Gambians find jobs in Dakar and other Sene-
galese towns, as Senegalese do in Bathurst, and hardly consider them-
selves as immigrants. Daily life is very much the same in the rural ar-
eas of Senegal and The Gambia, centering around the same types of
production in similar houses and with the same customs and family
organization. The standard of living for the masses differs but little.
Personal relations are everywhere good and friendly.
10. But the long influence of two quite different colonial systems,
the British and the French, has created a divergence in administrative,
cultural and certain economic respects that becomes more marked the
higher one goes up the social ladder and the closer one comes to the
larger centres of population and the business world. These differences
and the separate identities that have engendered are the most impor-
tant obstacles in the way of closer association and are, to a certain
measure, aggravated by the considerable difference in size between the
two countries.2
11. On the other hand, it is realized by many that the present
situation has a number of grave disadvantages, both for The Gambia
and for Senegal and stands in the way of a full development of their
resources and of a harmonious linking of efforts for improving their
economies. Although a number of these points will be more fully
treated in later chapters, a short survey of their importance may help
to define the major aspects of the problem and indicate in what way
certain differences may be less serious than they appear or even hold
certain advantages if the countries can join forces in the future.
12. Both countries have been and are as eager to achieve inde-
pendence as all the other colonial and ex-colonial territories in Africa.
Senegal obtained political independence on 4 April 1960. The Gambia
has had a Cabinet under a Premier since March 1961 and almost com-
plete internal self-government since October 1963. The British Govern-
2. Senegal has 19 times the area and 10 times the population of The Gambia.
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ment is committed to an ultimate grant of full independence, although
there has been some uncertainty about the attachment of a condition
making the grant dependent on a previous agreement with Senegal
about close co-operation in some form.
13. It has to be understood that in The Gambia the feeling is as
strong as in all former colonies that the people must be allowed to de-
cide their political future for themselves without outside compulsion.
Any association with Senegal must be based on a clear understanding
on both sides of its implications and its desirability, and on a careful
evaluation of its pros and cons. Joint participation in a possible Sene-
gambia' must be mutually experienced as a voluntary sharing of the
hard-won independence, not as the absorption or, worse, the subjec-
tion-of the smaller country by the larger one. The members of the
mission have had this fundamental sentiment constantly in mind in
contacts in the field, this was impressed upon its members from the
beginning as the most weighty political datum for its problem.
14. Two major considerations have, during the last years, led to
an active discussion of a closer relationship between Senegal and The
Gambia. In the first place, the question has to be faced whether The
Gambia will be able to bear, by itself, the cost and responsibility of
international statehood. This question is not answered by the mere
statement of fact that The Gambia is small and even today needs con-
siderable outside help to pay the current cost of its Government and
services. Many larger countries, including Senegal, receive sizable sub-
sidies for their regular expenditure, although not always in the form of
a grant-in-aid to cover a budgetary deficit; other independent states
exist that are neither larger nor more populous than The Gambia. This
fact by itself, however, does not recommend the creation or the iso-
lated continuation of such weak states if forms of mutual support can
be found wholly compatible with their right to self-determination. It
must not be forgotten that weakness beyond a certain limit may sooner
or later compromise their independence in a world where even states of
medium and larger size are looking for association or federation with
others in order to maintain their freedom or to strengthen their
economy.
15. The second reason why association between Senegal and The
Gambia has been studied for some time is that the geographical situa-
3. A name devised for the case of an association which would merge the two countries
into a larger international unit, however constructed, which would probably be accepted
for that eventuality, though not without some regret on the side of Senegal.
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tion causes very grave economic disadvantages for both countries if
their frontiers are kept as barriers between two wholly separate units.
For Senegal, it means a partial isolation of the Casamance, even
though the transgambian road has eased the access to the southern
province. It poses the problem of guarding a customs frontier of inordi-
nate length that can be easily crossed at many places. It finally de-
prives southern Senegal and even the adjoining countries of the full
use of the splendid waterway and harbour of The Gambia river. For
The Gambia, it means that the part of the river basin which forms the
main agricultural asset of the country cannot be fully and rationally
exploited and that Bathurst cannot become the port for a much wider
area, which its natural advantages entitle it to be.4 In short, it is im-
possible to make an adequate use of the hydrological, agricultural and
commercial potentialities of The Gambia and a large part of Senegal
without a close co-operation that is not barred by an international
frontier, rigidly dividing two nations.
16. A last point concerning these more basic reasons for closer
co-operation has to be mentioned, because it was hinted at in some of
our conversations. The political history of many nations, not only those
of recent birth, has known cases of subversion or rebellion organized by
political refugees of one country who had found asylum in a neighbour-
ing one. Of course neither the people in Senegal nor those in The Gam-
bia can be blind to the hypothetical possibility that a completely sepa-
rate and unfriendly Gambia or Senegal could be such a refuge.
Whereas this idea may be an additional incentive for both countries to
strive for closer ties, it has no actual importance because the mutual
relations of the two peoples are and have been steadfastly friendly and
the elements of the present political climate in each of them are largely
identical.
17. Among the differences between the two communities, those
which represent the French and the British inheritance respectively
are by far the most important, particularly if one includes those that
result from divergent policies, initiated during the colonial period, al-
though not specifically "British" or "French" in character. They can be
grouped under the headings: Language and education; government and
administration; the courts; civil, criminal and commercial law; the eco-
nomic and fiscal system; the monetary system; commercial relations
and foreign (bilateral and multilateral) aid. Most of these elements of
the problem will be treated in later chapters; what is presented here is
mainly a general enumeration of these divergences as they affect the
4. These aspects will be fully treated in the FAO report, mentioned in paragraph 5.
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problems of close co-operation or association. As the first condition for
co-operation, however, is the ability to communicate, to converse, the
problem of language is included in this chapter.
B. Language and education
18. At the simple level of daily life for the great majority of the
people the problem of communication between Senegalese and Gambi-
ans does not differ from that among the peoples of each of the two
countries themselves. The same indigenous languages are spoken on
each side of the border; it is as easy or as difficult for a Wolof-speaking
Gambian to converse with a Mandingo in an African language, whether
the latter comes from The Gambia or from Senegal. It would seem
that, however dissimilar these African languages may be, the spread of
certain common words makes a certain amount of communication at
this level possible among members of a large part-of the population.
19. The African languages in this region, however, are so numer-
ous and their development for literary and modern usage is so slight
that it has been accepted policy of the former colonial governments as
well as of the present authorities to introduce, mainly through the edu-
cational system, either French or English as the common language of
the future; they are taught and used exclusively in all the schools5 with
the exception of the Koranic schools. Moreover either one or the other
will most probably be the common language of the vast majority of
African nations south of the Sahara; where Arabic or one of the better
developed African languages like Amharic or Swahili can be and are
adapted to modern requirements, the knowledge of English and/or
French will remain of great importance for the better educated.
20. At present, however, illiteracy is still over 50 per cent in the
towns and mostly more than 90 percent in the rural areas. People with
a good command of either English or French are relatively rare and
those who can use both languages sufficiently well in a conversation on
legal, administrative, economic or technical subjects as they present
themselves to the contemporary statesman, politician, administrator,
judge, teacher, manager or engineer are as yet exceptional. One cannot
pass over the question of how Gambians, even if well-grounded in Eng-
lish, and Senegalese with fluent French are going to discuss modes and
forms of association, and work together in common institutions and
5. This creates a serious problem in adult education to combat illiteracy; it does not
only have to teach adults to read and write but must start with teaching them a wholly
unfamiliar language. Experiments in Senegal with Arabic as a vehicle for education have
proved abortive so far.
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services under certain rules, perhaps, of common legislation.6
21. Yet the experience in Cameroon seems to prove that with the
assistance of a well-organized translation and interpreter service this
difficulty is less formidable than it appears; given goodwill, mutual un-
derstanding seems easier than one would expect. But such a service is
indispensable and the present provisions in this field are wholly inade-
quate. The translating section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Da-
kar 7 is very small (three translators) and overloaded with work of the
utmost variety; in Bathurst translating is an additional chore for a few
linguists among the officials. The job of translator where it exists (Se-
negal), is poorly paid and underrated, even though good ones require
rather arduous training. Bilingual secretaries are actually valued more
highly but are difficult to obtain, because of the competition of the
private sector and the technical assistance organizations. A career for
this type of government personnel is found in Senegal mainly in the
foreign service, with the majority stationed abroad.
22. In both countries an appreciable effort is being made to in-
troduce English or French, respectively, as a second language into the
curriculum of the Secondary schools. The University of Dakar offers a
good course of higher studies in English (also in Spanish and Arabic)
with the possibility of graduating in that subject. All this will exercise
an influence in the not too distant future, but for the present the avail-
ability of bilingual persons who can function in the negotiations and
staff common institutions is below the minimum requirements. When
close co-operation or association is actively under-taken, it will be very
useful to organize special language training courses for Senegalese and
Gambian officials who will have to work together.
23. It will therefore be necessary to provide outside assistance of
sufficient quality for interpretation and translation in the initial stages
of co-operation. Quantity and duration cannot yet be estimated; much
depends on the scope of that co-operation, on the tempo of its develop-
ment and on the effort made by the Senegalese and the Gambians to
fill this need themselves. The United Nations would seem to be the
most appropriate source for this assistance which can, however, also be
provided by France and the United Kingdom. An interpreter and
translator service of this kind, however, ought from the beginning to be
a common concern of both countries and probably to constitute the
6. Even the different spelling of identical names, e.g. N'Diaye (French) and N'Jie
(English) can be confusing.
7. Division de rInformation, de la presse et traduction.
(Vol. 7
SENEGAMBIAN CONFEDERATION
first common office in the development of their collaboration, even at
the negotiating stage.
24. With regard to the language problem a further observation is
important. The strong trend towards inter-African co-operation that
has embodied itself recently in the Organization of African Unity is
undoubtedly stressing the need for bilingual proficiency in English and
French. In this respect, an association between Senegal and The Gam-
bia might have particularly fruitful results as has been clearly realized
by President Senghor. A group that has the advantage of including
persons for whom either French or English is the everyday language
can produce bilingual ability fitted to the need of each case better than
if it uses only one of those languages habitually. One can imagine Sene-
gambian teams with a complete ability to operate smoothly in an envi-
ronment where French and English are used and the employment in
English - or French - speaking countries of persons thoroughly conver-
sant with the appropriate tongue. At the same time it will not be nec-
essary to go outside Senegambia for practical training in the use of the
unfamiliar language.
25. The system of public education in Senegal is closely related
to that in France; that in The Gambia follows British pattern. Their
general structures are not far apart. Six or seven years of primary
school lead to a Certificat d'Etudes Primaires or a School Certificate;
six or seven years of general education at a secondary school find their
successful termination in a Baccalaur6at or a General Certificate of Ed-
ucation advanced level which opens the gate to the university. Both
countries have general secondary school certificates of a lower order
after a shorter period of study (though not of equal length), the Brevet
d'Etudes du Premier Cycle and the West African School Certificate.
Secondary technical schools and normal schools for teachers exist in
Senegal and The Gambia with courses from three to seven years after
primary or two to three years after the shorter general secondary
course. Technical education in Senegal is more diversified; apprentice-
ship and on-the-job training are probably little more developed in The
Gambia. Private schools have to conform closely to government school
standards. The Gambia has no university and has to send its students
either to the United Kingdom or to other - mostly African - English-
speaking countries.
26. The spread of education in both countries is of the same gen-
eral order, with Senegal well in the lead and at the moment expanding
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faster,8 although the long-term plans foresee a similar rate of increase.
In both cases some of the major complaints are the great differences in
school and teacher concentration between the cities and the rural re-
gions and the excessive number of pupils who fail to finish school ei-
ther at the primary or the secondary level. The village produces far
fewer scholars and lose a large number of those they produce - and
most of the best - to the urban areas. One can say that literacy, which
means knowledge of French or English, is only beginning to take hold
and spread outside the population centres.
27. Although the picture in these respects is more or less the
same, the similarity fades away when it comes to the content of the
general - cultural - education; in the technical and some of the profes-
sional fields (medical, pharmaceutical, veterinary and those belonging
to the natural sciences), the teaching tends to follow more parallel
lines. As a result, the alumni have either a marked French or a marked
British outlook. In both countries, however, it has been felt for some
time that education has too little contact with the African reality and
interest is increasing in studies about the ways in which education can
be made to conform closer to that reality and its needs. A co-operation
between Senegalese and Gambian experts would bring a greater wealth
of experience to the consideration of this problem, which is vital to
Africa's future.
28. As the continued and even accelerated growth of both educa-
tional systems is strongly desired by the Senegalese and the Gambians,
sustained technical assistance for this purpose from France and the
United Kingdom is obviously a matter of some concern. For The Gam-
bia, it presents this additional peculiarity that education and training
at the university level, for quite some time to come, have to be found
outside the country in the English-speaking world. Even secondary ed-
ucation there requires a teaching staff formed at English institutions of
higher studies and will need teachers recruited abroad as long as the
supply of qualified Gambian personnel is insufficient. The same applies
to Senegal although to a modified degree, because of the existence of a
university in Dakar. In the teachers' corps of Senegal France still par-
ticipates with technical assistance for 4 per cent at the primary and for
70 per cent at the secondary level. Similar assistance, though of course
in proportionately smaller numbers, will have to come to The Gambia
from the United Kingdom or from other suitable English speaking na-
8. The Senegal estimates for 1963-1964 provide for 3,969 primary and 448 secondary
school teachers as against 3,730 and 407 in 1962-1963; for The Gambia the comparable
figures are 258 and 56 (1963 estimates) as against 254 and 53 (1962).
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tions if its educational institutions are to have a healthy growth. Ade-
quate scholarships abroad must be available for the increase in the
number of Gambians among their personnel. Even a close association
with Senegal will not do away with this need, although a development
of the Dakar University can be imagined that could progressively help
to fill it.
29. For some time to come, the United Kingdom will have to con-
tinue its contribution to education and culture in The Gambia as
France will undoubtedly do in Senegal. The African synthesis between
the two is a task of the countries themselves, for which a call upon the
aid of the appropriate international organizations should certainly re-
ceive a sympathetic and generous answer.
II. - LEGAL QUESTIONS
30. So far the legal problems involved in a possible association
between Senegal and the Gambia are concerned, the mission's task was
duly defined (see Preface) and may be summarized as follows:
(a) to study the constitutional and legislative systems of the
two countries and to identify what factors they will have
to take into account when they come to decide upon the
form of their future relationship, and more specifically,
at the time when The Gambia attains independence;
(b) to show what are, from the legal point of view, the vari-
ous possible forms of association, with some assessment
of the advantages and drawbacks which they involve.
31. In its study of the legal problem as thus defined, the mission
remained very conscious of the purely informational function of its
work. It found, incidentally, that this was not always correctly under-
stood. During its conversations with various groups of persons, it noted
that many-especially at the higher levels-looked upon its as a nego-
tiating body; some, especially in The Gambia, even expressed concern
lest the mission might be exerting some sort of pressure in order to
achieve, in one form or another, The Gambia's incorporation into Se-
negal. Accordingly, the mission had to use every possible opportunity
to stress that its task was solely to gather information for the Govern-
ments of Senegal and The Gambia, and it had to emphasize that it had
been set up at the express request of those Governments pursuant to
the joint communiqu6 of 26 October 1962.
32. The structure of this report likewise reflects the mission's
purpose of working essentially for the Governments of Senegal and of
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The Gambia and of laying before them the data which might form the
basis of a free and fruitful discussion. In keeping with this intention,
although it was thought desirable, for the sake of the clarity of the
report, to introduce it with an account of the fundamental constitu-
tional and administrative institutions of the two countries, that ac-
count is in succinct form, for the institutions of the Gambia are famil-
iar to the Senegalese Government and vice versa. Besides, any
additional or detailed documentary material on the subject can be ob-
tained quite easily, if required. On the other hand, more space has
been given to a discussion of the Senegalese and Gambian notions on
the problem of future constitutional and international relations be-
tween the two countries and to the study of the various possibilities
conceivable. Any judgments expressed by the mission were not in-
tended to be proposals to the Governments; they are exclusively the
outcome of the mission's observations and are simply pointers to the
courses which, in its opinion, might reasonably be followed.
A. The present institutions of Senegal and The Gambia
The Senegalese institutions
33. The constitutional organization of Senegal is laid down in the
Constitution of the Republic, as amended on 7 March 1963. Under this
Constitution, Senegal is an independent State, republican in form and
secular, democratic and social in character. The basic institutions are
the President of the Republic, the National Assembly and the Supreme
Court, which are, respectively, the embodiment of the executive, the
legislative and the judicial powers at the highest level.
(a) The President of the Republic is elected by direct universal
suffrage for a term of four years and may be re-elected. The executive
power vests in the President, who conducts the policy of the nation; he
is responsible for the enforcement of the laws; he is the head of the
administration and of the armed forces; he makes the appointments to
al civilian and military offices; he selects and appoints the ministers
and secretaries of State, who are responsible to him. In more general
terms, he is invested with all the powers of a Head of State in a presi-
dential system; he promulgates the laws; he negotiates and ratifies or
approves international treaties, subject to the powers vested in the Na-
tional Assembly in a number of cases specified in article 77 of the
Constitution.
(b) The National Assembly is the representative assembly of the
Republic; its members are elected for a term of four years at the same
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time as the President of the Republic, by universal suffrage and by
absolute majority (scrutin de liste majoritaire) on a single ballot and
without the mixed (panachage) or preferential vote. As the body in-
vested with the legislative power, the National Assembly is alone com-
petent to enact laws on the matters enumerated in the Constitution,
subject to the possible delegation of powers to the President of the
Republic. The President or any deputy to the National Assembly may
initiate legislation; in more general terms, the National Assembly has
the powers of the supreme legislative assembly in a representative, but
not a parliamentary, system.
(c) The Supreme Court exercises the highest judicial power;
under article 80 of the Constitution, it is independent of the legislature
and of the executive, and its members are irremovable and subject only
to the authority of the law. The Supreme Court deals with cases in-
volving the constitutionality of laws and international commitments,
and with conflicts of competence between the executive and the legisla-
ture; it supervises the administration of justice by the courts and
tribunals.
34. The administrative organization of Senegal is that of a cen-
tralized State. The territory is divided into seven regions (Cap-Vert,
Casamance, Diourbel, Fleuve, Eastern Senegal, Sine-Saloum, Thins),
each administered by a Governor. The region of Cap-Vert comprises
two cercles, the others from three to six; the cercles are administered
by a Commandant and are subdivided into two or more arrondisse-
ments, or districts, in which local affairs are administered by a Chef
d'arrondissement. It should be noted that an administrative reorgani-
zation is under way which will give the Governors broad powers and
more direct responsibility for regional government. It is also expected
that the titles of some posts will be changed; Commandants de cercle
will probably be called Pr~fets and Chefs d'arrondissement will be
called Sous-Pr~fets; the cercles will be raised to the level of depart-
ments. The Village Chiefs, an institution which has survived, are no
longer elected or designated by the local communities in the traditional
manner, but are appointed by the Minister of the Interior on the pro-
posal of the Commandant de cercle. The Conseil sup~rieur de la fonc-
tion publique (the Higher Civil Service Council) is an important factor
in the operation of this administrative machinery, in which there are
several other institutions directly or indirectly responsible to the cen-
tral authority; among the more noteworthy are the rural development
centres formed for the purpose of increasing agricultural productivity
by modernized methods and, above all, by better vocational training
for farmers and cattle farmers. So far as municipal functions are con-
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cerned, Senegal is divided into communes, organized as in France and
governed by municipal councils. At the regional level there are regional
assemblies of twenty to sixty conseillers gneraux, which perform vari-
ous administrative (including fiscal) functions.
35. The administration of justice throughout Senegal is the re-
sponsibility of the Supreme Court, the Appeals Court, the Assize
Courts, the Courts of first instance, the Magistrate's Courts (justices
de paix) and the Labour Tribunals. There is no need to describe in
detail here the competence of each of these judicial authorities; the
system is very elaborate, based on French conceptions, and corre-
sponds to an advanced stage of development; an outline is given below.
The Courts of first instance, which sit at the principal town of each
region, are the basic courts; they deal with all civil, correctional and
administrative cases which are not assigned to some other court; they
consist of single judges and have jurisdiction to adjudicate appeals
from decisions by the Magistrates and the Labour Tribunals. The ju-
risdiction of the Magistrate's Court, which sits at the principal town of
a cercle or, in some cases, of an arrondissement, is exercised at a lower
level than that of the Court of first instance, but it is nevertheless
fairly broad in both civil and criminal matters; it has absorbed the ju-
risdiction of the former customary courts; proceedings are heard by a
single judge, except in %pecial cases. The main function of the Appeals
Court is to decide appeals against judgements by the lower authorities.
The Assize Courts, sitting at Dakar, St. Louis, Ziguinchor and Kaolack,
deal with criminal proceedings, and an appeal lies from their decisions
to the Supreme Court. In addition to exercising the general powers al-
ready mentioned, the Supreme Court adjudicates appeals against or-
ders and decisions by courts of all kinds, and rules on applications for
review and on claims alleging miscarriage of justice; it supervises the
financial management and accounting of the administration and of the
nationalized undertakings. The system of law is closely modelled on
that of French law.
The institutions of The Gambia
36. The constitutional structure of The Gambia is defined by the
Orders in Council dated 18 April 1962 and 27 September 1963 (herein-
after referred to as "the Constitution"); it is that of a territory which is
as yet not independent, subject to the British Crown but enjoying al-
most complete internal self-government. The fundamental institutions
are the Governor, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers ex-
ercising the executive power, and the House of Representatives exercis-
ing the legislative power. The administration of justice is placed under
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the authority and supervision of the Supreme Court, with the collabo-
ration of the Attorney-General.
(a) The Governor is appointed by the British Crown; he appoints
the Prime Minister, and in accordance with the latter's advice, the
members of the Cabinet. The Governor, acting in his discretion, has
exclusive responsibility for external affairs, defence and internal secur-
ity and for other matters left to his discretion under the Constitution.
In many other executive or administrative matters, however, the Gov-
ernor acts on the advice of or after consultation with the Prime Minis-
ter or the person acting in his stead. The Governor causes to be pub-
lished the laws passed by the House of Representatives, but may refuse
to do so in certain special cases. The Governor may dissolve the House
of Representatives either acting on the advice of the Prime Minister or
if the House passes a resolution of no confidence in the Cabinet. The
Governor exercises, in addition, the powers of a Head of State under a
parliamentary system. As regards the appointment of persons to the
public service, the Constitution enumerates the cases in which the
Governor acts in his discretion and those in which he must consult the
Public Service Commission.
(b) The Cabinet of Ministers is composed of the Prime Minister
and not less than six Ministers; the Prime Minister presides at its
meetings except when it is summoned by the Governor; it is responsi-
ble to the House of Representatives; it has general executive and ad-
ministrative competence, subject only to the limitations expressly stip-
ulated in the Constitution.
(c) The House of Representatives is composed of thirty-six mem-
bers elected by universal suffrage (seven for the Colony, twenty-five for
the Protectorate and four tribal chiefs) and two nominated members.
The Attorney-General attends the sittings of the House of Representa-
tives, but in an advisory capacity only. The Speaker is elected by the
House of Representatives or, failing such election, is appointed by the
Governor.
(d) The Supreme Court is broadly responsible for the adminis-
tration of justice. Its members are appointed by the Governor, acting
after consultation with the Prime Minister. The Chief Justice presides
over the Supreme Court. The independence of the judges of the Su-
preme Court is guaranteed by the fact that they may be removed from
office only for inability to perform their functions arising from infir-
mity of body or mind, or for misbehaviour; even in such cases, how-
ever, they may be removed only by a special procedure which gives the
judge concerned very broad safeguards.
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37. The administrative organization of The Gambia has remained
very similar to that of certain British territories overseas which are not
yet independent, even though it has been receiving an ever-increasing
measure of autonomy. The Gambia is composed of two quite separate
parts, the Colony and the Protectorate. The territory covered by the
town of Bathurst and its adjoining area is called the Colony; the Pro-
tectorate consists of the remainder of The Gambia and is made up of
four Divisions: Western, Lower River, MacCarthy Island and Upper
River. Each Division is under a Commissioner directly responsible to
the Governor and is subdivided into Districts. Each District is adminis-
tered by a Chief nominated by the Governor. The Heads of Villages
still exist and are active in the communal administration; they are ei-
ther elected or appointed in the traditional manner. The local councils
are also active administratively; the District Council is composed of the
Chief of District, the Heads of Villages and a number of elders; the
Area Councils, of which each Division has one, except McCarthy Island
and Lower River which have two each, are composed of the Chiefs of
Districts, a majority of elected members and one appointed woman
member. The town of Bathurst has a Town Council, with four ap-
pointed members and three members elected in each of the five urban
districts; the Town Council deals mainly with municipal affairs.
38. Justice is administered in The Gambia at the base by the
customary courts and the District Tribunals. The Cadi's Courts in the
Colony and the District Tribunals in the Protectorate have jurisdiction
in all cases involving indigenous inhabitants of the Islamic communi-
ties and relating to such matters as personal status, marriage, inheri-
tance, gifts and guardianship. Other cases are tried in first instance
mainly by the Magistrate's Courts which are presided over by the
Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner and which possess broad
powers in both civil and criminal matters, though at Bathurst this
Court is called the Court of Requests when hearing civil cases. Impor-
tant civil or criminal cases are tried, in first instance too, by a court
known as the High Court in the Protectorate and the Supreme Court
in the Colony. This Court also hears appeals in second instance against
judgements by the lower courts. Lastly, there is a Court of Appeal
whose decisions may in certain cases be referred to the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council in London. The Attorney-General's func-
tions are somewhat like those of a procureur g~nral; he also acts,
when requested, as legal adviser to the Governor or to the Government.
The statute law in force is comparable to that of territories under Brit-
ish sovereignty, except as modified by customary local law and by the
positive law formed by the body of specifically Gambian enactments.
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B. The problem of association
The position of the Senegalese Government
39. Reference should be made at the outset to certain stipula-
tions laid down on behalf of the Government of Senegal by the Presi-
dent and by all the Ministers with whom the matter was discussed by
the mission as prior conditions for any association with The Gambia.
These conditions are that foreign policy must be conducted jointly and
that the defence of the two territories must also be on a joint basis. It
is necessary to examine these conditions more closely and to discuss
the reasons given by the Senegalese Government, the possibilities con-
templated by it and the arrangements which it might accept. A point
to be noted is that, although the Senegalese Government expressed it-
self firmly on the subject, it did so in most courteous terms towards
The Gambia. The Senegalese Government added that in whatever ac-
tion was taken by agreement between the two countries, including in
particular action in the matter of representation abroad, The Gambia
would be assured of a share well above that which would be commen-
surate with its territorial extent or size of population as compared with
Senegal.
40. The Senegalese Government has set out very clearly its rea-
sons for insisting on these two conditions. It emphasizes expressly and
with complete sincerity that these conditions are being insisted upon,
not because of any desire on the part of Senegal to dominate The
Gambia or for any misconceived nationalistic reasons, but because they
are absolutely essential. They are essential in the first place for geo-
graphical reasons: according to the Senegalese Government, The Gam-
bia's paradoxical position as an enclave in Senegalese territory de-
mands a common defence organization. The Senegalese Government
considers, secondly, that these conditions are essential for political rea-
sons, for in its view there is a danger that, when The Gambia attains
full independence, it will be subjected to undesirable interferences
which it might be unable to prevent; hence the necessity of a common
foreign policy, in the enlightened interest of both countries. The Gam-
bia's manifest dependence on external aid, the definite advantage of
forming part of a larger economic area and the unquestionable parallel
between its import and export requirements and those of Senegal-all
these are additional factors making it indispensable, in the Senegalese
Government's opinion, that there should be close co-operation between
the two countries in their foreign relations. The Senegalese Govern-
ment states, in conclusion, that, although anxious that the two coun-
tries should be closely linked in as many ways as possible, it has no
intention of exerting any pressure whatsoever on The Gambia and
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that, in particular, it is prepared to leave it to the Government of
Gambia to choose of its own free will the ways and means of this neces-
sary co-operation between the two countries, subject only to the estab-
lishment of common machinery for the purposes of defence and of rep-
resentation abroad. The Senegalese Government asks also, it is true,
that a solution should be worked out for two urgent problems; firstly,
the difficulties hampering transport and communications with the
Casamance, particularly in the area of the road across The Gambia,
and secondly the ceaseless clandestine traffic on Senegalese territory in
merchandise brought in through the port of Bathurst. The Govern-
ment states, however, that it is disposed to approach these problems
with full regard for The Gambia's interests.
41. Nor does the Senegalese Government wish to put any pres-
sure on the Government of The Gambia as regards the form of the
proposed common organization in the matter of defence and represen-
tation abroad. The Senegalese Government is of course anxious that
there should be close co-operation between the two countries from the
beginning, particularly where these two matters are concerned; but it
claims not to have any preconceived or fixed ideas in favour of some
particular formula and emphasizes that it is prepared to consider quite
objectively any proposal by the Government of The Gambia that tends
to establish adequate co-operation between the two countries. As re-
gards foreign policy, more particularly, the Senegalese Government
states that, if a community having international legal personality were
established (under the name of Senegambia, for example), it might be
receptive to the idea that the community should be represented, espe-
cially in some English-speaking countries, by Gambian citizens having
the rank of head of mission without prejudice to the appointment of a
good many Gambians to international delegations and to the lower
ranks of the diplomatic service, both abroad and in the Ministry. Fur-
thermore, the Senegalese Government does not exclude the idea that
the co-operation between the two countries in foreign affairs should, at
least in the first stage, be organized under a single treaty concerning
the representation of Gambian interests by Senegal; this formula
would likewise imply, according to the Senegalese Government, an eq-
uitable and even generous participation by Gambians in international
delegations and in the activities of diplomatic missions, especially in
the English-speaking countries.
42. The foregoing account does not mention all the problems of a
constitutional nature which will arise in the near or more distant fu-
ture in connexion with an association between Senegal and The Gam-
bia; it mentions only those which are foreseeable immediately, and on
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the solution of which, in the Senegalese Government's view, all later
progress is dependent. So far as the mission is aware, the question has
not been publicly discussed in Senegal, but there is no reason to sup-
pose that Government and public opinion in Senegal will be divided on
the subject. The Senegalese Government consists entirely of members
of the Union Progressiste Sngalaise (UPS); this party obtained an
overwhelming majority at the general elections of 1 December 1963,
securing 94 per cent of the valid votes in the country as a whole,
against 6 per cent cast for the opposition party. Besides, the opposition
party does not seem to have taken any particular interest in the prob-
lem of relations between Senegal and The Gambia, for its electoral
manifesto contains no reference to it.
The position of the Government of The Gambia and the view
of the opposition
43. In its supplementary statement to the joint Communiqu6 of
26 October 1962, the Government of The Gambia stated that, in the
event of any form of association with Senegal, The Gambia should re-
ceive certain safeguards, regarded as essential by its Government,
concerning
(a) the maintenance of its responsibility for internal admin-
istration (including local government, the police and the
civil service);
(b) the preservation of Gambian civil and criminal law, and
educational and professional standards and
qualifications;
(c) the maintenance of close ties with the United Kingdom
and the Commonwealth.
44. In that supplementary statement, the Gambian Government
also laid stress upon the safeguards to be given to it in those matters
which it would consider sharing with Senegal (defence, foreign policy
and representation abroad, financial matters and development) with a
view to its fair representation on the executive bodies responsible for
them. The Gambian Government further expressed the wish that the
country's external trade might remain liberalized. In general, the Gam-
bian Government requested that provision should be made for the es-
tablishment of a high judicial appellate authority to ensure observance
of the commitments entered into by Senegal in any final agreement.
45. These basic principles are undoubtedly still upheld by the
Gambian Government as a whole. Nevertheless, it should be noted
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that, since the issue of the joint communiqu6 of 26 October 1962 and
the supplementary statement, opinion, even in Government circles, has
evolved somewhat. This evolution, which is in the direction of a more
reserved attitude towards the proposed association, is probably not un-
connected with the activities of the opposition, whose views are given
below.
46. In the political field, the opposition contends in substance
that association with Senegal will result sooner or later in the loss of
The Gambia's identity; that, in consequence, The Gambia, which
would like to be independent, will merely be exchanging one boss for
another by entering into any form of association whatsoever; that the
example of the Federation of Mali, which broke up soon after it had
formed, proves that political unions between African States should not
be improvised, especially in the present state of affairs; and that under
these conditions, and in view of the considerable differences which ex-
ist between Senegal and The Gambia at the present time, arising from
characteristics acquired by them under the influence of France and the
United Kingdom respectively-differences in education and training,
for example, or between their institutions-an association between the
two countries is doomed to failure. So far as economic matters are con-
cerned, the opposition holds that association with Senegal will involve
serious drawbacks for The Gambia, which will be offset by inade-
quate-and in any case hypothetical-advantages; that, in particular,
it will not be possible to maintain the present relatively low level of
prices in The Gambia and that, as a consequence, the currency will
lose an appreciable part of its purchasing power; that the inevitable
increase in customs duties in the event of association with Senegal will
have a catastrophic effect on the port of Bathurst and on all persons
whose livelihood depends, directly or indirectly, on a liberal trading
policy. We ought to add, however, that while the spokesmen for the
opposition reject the idea of an association, they are not altogether
hostile to the conclusion of certain agreements with Senegal, provided,
firstly, that these agreements are objectively necessary or desirable
and, secondly, that they can be concluded without direct or indirect
prejudice to The Gambia's sovereignty. Spokesmen for the opposition
urge, however, that the Government should not embark upon any at-
tained full independence; in their view, this condition is indispensable
if The Gambia is to be able to carry on discussions with its big neigh-
bour on equal terms.
47. The party at present in power in The Gambia is the P.P.P.
(People's Progressive Party), most of whose supporters come from the
Protectorate; in Bathurst they are in the minority. The opposition has
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its stronghold at Bathurst, where its members have a majority on the
Town Council, and is made up of two numerically unequal parties: the
U.P. (United Party) and the G.C.P. (Gambia Congress Party). The
P.P.P. has 22 elected members in the House of Representatives, the
U.P. nine and the G.C.P. one; in the Bathurst Town Council there are
12 representatives of the opposition parties as against three members
of the P.P.P. In the other local councils the P.P.P. has a majority of
varying size. With a few exceptions, the representatives of the P.P.P.
quite naturally support the idea of an association providing for the
safeguards referred to in the supplementary statement to the joint
communiqu6 of 26 October 1962. Nevertheless, as has already been ex-
plained, this idea has not gained strength during the time that has
elapsed since then; quite the contrary. The supporters of the idea of an
association are unquestionably still in the majority in The Gambia as a
whole; but many of them, and even more those who lend an attentive
ear to the opposition's arguments, feel somewhat apprehensive about
the proposed association and wonder what its consequences, and more
particularly its economic effects, will be on the community and on indi-
viduals. From the mission's observations, what seems to trouble most
people is the economic aspect of the matter, and this is mainly or
wholly responsible for the political attitude adopted by some of them.
They fear that they will lose their established positions, that they will
no longer enjoy directly or indirectly the benefit of very liberal import
regulations, or that certain internal and external markets will no longer
be open to them. They are afraid of a rise in the cost of living and of
being merged into an economic system whose advantages they consider
to be problematical and whose drawbacks they regard as certain; they
are apprehensive, too, lest they should lose on the exchange rate if the
two currencies are unified. In addition to these misgivings, all of which
are readily understandable, there are others which, though much less
important, are nevertheless not without significance, such as the often
expressed fear of having to abandon a way of life to which they had
become accustomed and of losing the manifold advantages which close
connexion with the United Kingdom has brought them.
48. With regard to the procedure to be followed for working out
possible agreements between the two countries, the U.P., as explained
above, wishes the full independence of The Gambia to be recognized
and to be an established fact before any discussions are begun. Indeed,
this party criticizes the United Kingdom for having wished to make
the grant of independence to The Gambia conditional on the formation
of an association between that country and Senegal. The Government,
for its part, cannot agree that the grant of independence to The Gam-
bia by the United Kingdom should be postponed until some form of
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association with Senegal has been achieved; still less can it agree that
The Gambia's independence should hinge on whether the British Gov-
ernment regards any agreements concluded with Senegal as being sat-
isfactory to that Government.9 On the other hand, the Government of
The Gambia does not object to immediate talks on the future relations
between the two countries, provided that the date of the grant of inde-
pendence to The Gambia is settled forthwith. In short, although on
this point, too, opinion in Government circles seems to have undergone
some change, their attitude towards the problem of association remains
on the whole favourable. It may be observed that, whereas indepen-
dence is for The Gambia a condition that will enable it to treat with
Senegal on an equal footing, the loss at the same time or shortly after-
wards of the financial, administrative and cultural support of the
United Kingdom would put The Gambia at a serious disadvantage vis-
A-vis Senegal, which enjoys ample French assistance; the withdrawal of
such support is, however, improbable.
C. Consideration and discussion of possible solutions
General considerations
49. The first truth that has to be recognized, in the opinion of
those who have closely studied the various factors reviewed here, both
from the institutional point of view and from that of popular senti-
ment, is that any form of association between Senegal and The Gambia
will, if it is to be viable, have to respect the identity of The Gambia.
To ignore this factor would be to invite the risk of grievous disappoint-
ments, and before very long serious difficulties would probably have to
be faced. From the point of view of international law, The Gambia
could, it is true, achieve full autonomy by associating itself freely with
an independent State, in this instance Senegal; this solution would be
in conformity with the principles adopted by the General Assembly in
the matter. It is desirable, however, that this solution should be subject
to the prior or possibly subsequent concurrence of the electorate. The
question of solutions compatible with this requirement is considered
below.
50. Respect for the identity of The Gambia does not imply only
that in case of association and a fortiori, of an even broader union with
Senegal, the electorate's approval is needed. It requires in addition
that ample allowance should be made for all the factors which, al-
9. Recent information indicates that such a condition is no longer maintained, if ever
it was strictly imposed.
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though the direct or indirect consequence of more than a century of
British presence, have been so thoroughly assimilated by certain strata
of the population that they have become for them, as it were, second
nature. This consideration applies likewise in the event of an associa-
tion being considered premature, in which case the important and ur-
gent problems affecting Senegal and The Gambia would be settled pro-
visionally under one or more inter-state treaties. It goes without
saying, however, that The Gambia will not be justified in taking refuge
behind the respect due to its identity in order to evade the paramount
obligations inherent in its geographical position and its economic and
other circumstances. Hence the Governments of the two countries will
have to find a solution making it possible to reconcile the demands of
this state of affairs with the respect due to the identity of The Gambia;
this task will certainly not be easy; it.will require a great deal of pa-
tience and understanding on both sides and it will be accomplished
only if a genuine desire to succeed is shown by both parties.
51. Lastly, respect for the identity of The Gambia, as also the
viability of any form of association or co-operation, requires that
whatever measures may be taken by agreement between the two coun-
tries should be spread suitably over a period of time. In the light of the
main preoccupations which the mission noted in Gambian thinking, in
general there are also grounds for thinking that, beyond a certain ini-
tial stage which is described below in the paragraph dealing with the
possibility of a federation between Senegal and The Gambia, any fur-
ther constitutional progress, in the direction of a strengthening of the
association, will only be realizable after the major economic problems
have been solved to the satisfaction of both parties. In other words,
beyond this initial stage it would seem that economic development
should have priority over, and precede, political development, although
this does not mean that a specified economic advance ought to be the
necessary prerequisite for a corresponding political or constitutional
advance. Furthermore, the viability of any possible political or consti-
tutional advance beyond the initial stage referred to above seems to
depend on a harmonious development of the co-operation between the
two countries in economic matters, for only in that way can the neces-
sary psychological climate materialize.
52. We now come to consider the solutions which may be con-
templated either from a theoretical or from a practical point of view as
regards the future relationship between Senegal and The Gambia.
These solutions may be reduced to three main possibilities, each ad-
mitting of variants and numerous modalities; they are respectively the
total or partial integration of The Gambia with Senegal, the establish-
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ment of a more or less close federation between the two countries and
thirdly, the working out of an entente based on the conclusion, through
inter-state treaties, of a number of agreements for co-operation. The
passages which follow will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
each of these three possibilities; in this context, the mission has paid
special attention to the concrete feasibility of each of the solutions and
to their probable or possible viability.
Integration of The Gambia with Senegal
53. In theory the simplest solution of the problem of the future
relationship between the two countries would obviously be the integra-
tion of The Gambia with Senegal, as the eighth Senegalese or Sene-
gambian region. This solution might, of course, be accompanied by
provisions which would to some extent respect the identity of The
Gambia: the grant of a broad measure of legislative, administrative and
judicial autonomy to the Gambian region; the presence of Gambian
representatives in the Senegalese Government, among the higher judi-
cial and administrative authorities, and in the National Assembly; ar-
rangements for the teaching of French in the Gambian region and of
English in the other regions of Senegal; the grant to the legislative au-
thority of the Gambian region of a right to make proposals or to ratify
decisions concerning the appointment of the Governor or other high
officials who are to perform their functions in the region, and so forth.
This simple and, frankly, somewhat over-simplified solution would
have obvious advantages for Senegal but would, if imposed abruptly,
have scant regard for the identify of The Gambia, however one might
try to moderate or temper it. Besides, in the present state of affairs,
the practical prospects for an integration of The Gambia with Senegal
have to be viewed with scepticism; for it is quite conceivable that the
Gambian electorate, which would be consulted either beforehand on
the principle of integration or subsequently on a constitution making
provision for such integration, would cast a predominantly adverse
vote. In short, the possibility of even a very limited form of integration
appears, if not unrealizable, at least very premature. It would appear
that this possibility cannot be entertained until a long period of
friendly and fruitful collaboration between the two countries has
elapsed.
Establishment of a Senegambian federation
54. The next case to be considered is that in which the legal per-
sonality of both States would be preserved internally but in which they
would establish a central State organization, superior to both, likewise
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possessing legal personality and responsible for performing numerous
and more or less important common functions. It would depend on the
importance and number of the common functions delegated to the cen-
tral authority-in pursuance, of course, of a federal constitu-
tion-whether the resulting form of State would be one capable of
evolving from a federation between States limited to the performance
of certain functions, to a highly centralized federated State. In the case
in question, this State form would be compatible with the idea of vest-
ing in the central authority, for the initial period, powers limited-or
very nearly limited, to defence and to the representation abroad of the
community; hence, it would make it possible to maintain, in all other
respects, the complete autonomy of the two federated States, their own
institutions and even their political system. Federal organs might be
set up as the federation developed, in accordance with needs recog-
nized by both sides, and these organs would not interfere in any way
with the traditional structures of the federated States, except to the
extent laid down by the federal constitution, which means, in effect, to
the extent decided directly or indirectly by the electorate of each of the
States. Consequently it is the will of the people, freely expressed on
both sides, which would determine the fields in which the exercise of
certain powers would be delegated by the federated States to the feder-
ation in the higher interest of the latter. Clearly, this formula would
make it possibie to reconcile respect for The Gambia's identity with
the needs inherent in its geographical and economic position; more-
over, it is difficult to see what serious disadvantages this formula could
involve, so long as the stages are carefully planned, or what grounds
there might be for not regarding it as the solution most consistent with
the interests of both countries.
55. One interesting example of a very recently formed federation
of French and English-speaking African States is that of the Camer-
oonian Federation. It should he remembered in this conney-ion that the
English-speaking Cameroon, which was latterly administered by Great
Britain under a Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations, had
the opportunity to express itself concerning its future through a plebi-
scite in February 1961; whereas the northern region of the country de-
cided by a majority to achieve independence by joining the Federation
of Nigeria, the southern region decided, also by a majority, to link its
future to that of the French-speaking Republic of Cameroun [sic].
That is how the present Federal Republic of Cameroon, consisting of
the former French Cameroun [sic], now called East Cameroon, and of
the English-speaking southern region of Cameroon, henceforth called
West Cameroon, came into being. By article 5, 6 and 24 of the Consti-
tution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, which entered into force
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on 1 September 1961, very broad powers are conferred on the central
or federal authority. Yet the principle remains that the two federated
States retain their autonomy in all matters not expressly reserved to
the federal authority and that even in the matters so reserved they will
retain their autonomy for so long as the federal authority does not ex-
ercise the powers vested in it by the Constitution. In short, each of the
federated States, subject to the powers granted to the federal State,
retains its own system; these systems exist side by side, despite the
differences between them, which are great since one is of French and
the other of British origin.
56. Admittedly the parallel between the case of the two Came-
roons on the one hand and that of The Gambia and Senegal on the
other is by no means complete; it is close enough, however, to offer
some useful guidance. As was said above, two territories are involved
which, like Senegal and The Gambia, were under the influence of
France and Great Britain, respectively, and have remained strongly
marked by this influence. Furthermore, as in the case of Senegal and
The Gambia, the external interests, including those in the matter of
defence, are practically identical; and the economic problems in the
two Cameroons are also the same, or nearly so. A further analogy with
the case of Senegal and The Gambia is the great disproportion between
the two States as regards territorial extent and size of population.
57. In a very general way, what the mission's representative ob-
served on the spot in Cameroon is encouraging. The institutions pro-
vided for by the Constitution of 1 September 1961, in so far as they
have been established or become operative, seem to fulfil the hopes
placed in them; the collaboration between the two States at the federal
level is satisfactory, and the problem of the difference in languages is
not proving insurmountable in practice, particularly as services for the
translation and interpretation of documents have been set up. In both
States, those in charge of affairs are moreover animated by the wish to
make the federal experiment a success, despite the difficulties which
may occur. It is not the mission's business to enumerate these difficul-
ties and still less to forecast what further difficulties may arise; it is,
however, interesting to observe that most of them are the direct or in-
direct consequence of over-centralization at the outset; it should be
noted objectively, in this connexion, that the articles in the Constitu-
tion of 1 September 1961 which define the powers of the federal au-
thority go extremely far. There is no doubt that, if a federation should
be established between Senegal and The Gambia, the powers to be




58. Another source of difficulties, according to the statements
made to the mission's representative in Cameroon, is certain actions on
the part of the federal gendarmerie which have sometimes angered the
population; similarly, there has been some friction between the federal
gendarmerie and the local police in West Cameroon. It is unnecessary
to go into the details of these incidents but right to mention them, for
they show once again-and history records many examples of this
type-how discreet a central State whose authority is superimposed on
that of recently federated States has to be in using its armed forces
inside the territory. Still, as was indicated above, the Cameroonian
Federation now presenti a favourable picture, thanks particularly to
the stimulus given and the efforts being made on both sides by the
responsible politicians. Public opinion in the two Cameroons is very
generally in favour of the idea of federation. This fact is the more sig-
nificant as before federation many criticisms and apprehensions were
voiced, particularly in West Cameroon, which were very similar to
those now being expressed by many people in The Gambia.
59. The foregoing suggests that despite certain appearances and
current expressions of opinion, it is certainly possible that the majority
of the Gambian public will support the idea of a federation with Sene-
gal, subject to assurances concerning respect for the identity of The
Gambia and to the maintenance of positions which have been legiti-
mately acquired; similarly, in view of the example of the Cameroonian
Federation, one may hope that, provided that the will exists on both
sides to establish it and to keep it in being, an association of a federal
character between Senegal and The Gambia would be viable and last-
ing. A further condition is that this will should exist among those who
are responsible for the destinies of the two countries and also among
the majority of the electorate. The first of these conditions is unques-
tionably fulfilled; but can it as yet be said that the second is so far
fulfilled in The Gambia that it is possible to go forward without fur-
ther delay? The most appropriate step would be to remedy the present
unpreparedness of opinion, in certain circles, for the idea of an associa-
tion. According to the mission's observations, the apprehensions widely
entertained in The Gambia are accounted for chiefly, at least in the
majority of cases, by people's ignorance as to the future in general and
more particularly as to their personal fate. This perfectly legitimate
anxiety needs to be allayed by concrete measures. One such measure,
probably not decisive but important, might be to draw up, as a prelimi-
nary, a draft constitution delimiting clearly and exhaustively the pow-
ers of the federation and, in addition, guaranteeing to The Gambia the
autonomy it desires. Another desirable step would be to impress on
Gambian public opinion advantages which could result from an associ-
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ation with Senegal.
60. In that event, what might be the possible content of such a
draft constitution? First and foremost, as already indicated, it should
affirm the principle that the autonomy of each of the two States will be
maintained integrally in all matters not expressly reserved to the fed-
eration. The matters reserved to the community might be limited to
those in which common action by Senegal and The Gambia is patently
necessary. They would include, apart from the urgent and indispensa-
ble economic agreements, those of representation abroad and defence.1"
With regard to representation abroad, the constitution might, more-
over, lay down the principle of an equitable participation by persons of
Gambian origin; similarly, the constitution might provide for the estab-
lishment of a joint consultative body to enable the Government of The
Gambia to share in the conduct of foreign affairs and defence matters,
and to have a voice in the appointment of officials dealing with thesq
two matters. So far as defence is concerned, the principle of common
action might likewise be laid down in the Constitution; there would be
no reason why it should not be specified that the defence community is
formed exclusively for the purpose of dealing with cases of aggression
by one or more third States; in addition, the rule might be laid down
that the armed forces of Senegal, whether military or police, would in
no case have the right to enter Gambian territory without a prior ex-
press agreement between the two Governments. Other articles of the
constitution-even at the initial stage-might contain provisions by
which each of the two States would expressly pledge itself not to toler-
ate on its territory any subversive activity whatsoever directed against
the institutions or authorities of the other State, as well as provisions
on the following matters:
(a) the obligation of prior consultation between the two fed-
erated States in any matter of common interest;
(b) the right of the nationals of each of the two federated
States to settle freely in the territory of the other, inde-
pendently of the provisions conferring the nationality of
the federal State upon the nationals of the two States;
(c) the organization of co-operation between the two feder-
ated States in the administration of justice (recognition
of jurisdiction; convention on the extradition of persons
10. One may also consider the unification of the P.T.T. as well as, at a somewhat




convicted of offences under the ordinary law);
(d) the procedure for amending the constitution, in particu-
lar by provisions under which, without any great compli-
cation, (e.g. by the simple affirmative vote of both parlia-
ments, possibly by a qualified majority). Broader powers
would be vested in the community and the federal organs
necessary for this purpose (legislative, executive, admin-
istrative or even judicial bodies) would be established as
the relations between the two States become more
trustful and fruitful.
61. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the mission
thinks that, already in the present state of affairs, the experiment
might be tried of consulting the electorate in both countries on the
principle of the establishment of a Senegambian community having in-
ternational legal personality, particularly if this community should at
first be designed on a scale no more ambitious than that outlined in
the preceding paragraphs. Even in that eventuality, however, a consul-
tation of the electorate will not be without its risks so long as the state
of mental unpreparedness mentioned earlier persists in The Gambia,
with all the consequences that it involves. If nevertheless the two Gov-
ernments should decide to go ahead, they might submit to the electors
either the question of principles of a federation or else the draft of a
federal constitution. If, on the other hand, the two Governments
should prefer to wait for some change in thinking and, by appropriate
measures, first to allay the apprehensions on both sides, the best
course would undoubtedly be to prove to all by means of facts-in
other words, by actual experience-the advantages accruing to The
Gambia from co-operation with Senegal. This co-operation would then
have to be organized, i.e. the necessary conditions for it would have to
be created. How could this be achieved? This question leads directly to
a consideration of the third possibility visualized regarding the future
relationship between Senegal and The Gambia: the conclusion of
agreements between the two countries, in the form of international
treaties, on urgent matters of common interest.
Establishment of a Senegambian entente
62. Initially, and indeed for a long period, co-operation between
Senegal and The Gambia might be organized by the conclusion of a
number of inter-State agreements having (as indicated above) the
character of ordinary international treaties. In this event, no new State
entity having international legal personality would be set up by the
two States and the latter would remain fully sovereign-a situation
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that many Gambians would probably regard as a major advantage.
This formula would have the additional advantage of flexibility and of
offering to the two parties the opportunity gradually to intensify their
reciprocal relationships and not to set up until later-in the light of
the needs recognized on both sides-whatever federal institutions
proved to be necessary or desirable on the basis of experience. It would
in any case be for the two States concerned, and for them alone, to
decide whether to continue the co-operation in the manner described
above, notwithstanding the possible establishment of a much closer re-
lationship between them, or to set up a federal structure when they
consider it desirable. Besides, each of the contracting parties might, of
course, reserve its rights by inserting a denunciation clause in all or
some of the agreements concluded.
63. The actual content of these agreements would naturally de-
pend exclusively on the will of the parties. Initially, it might be useful
and appropriate for Senegal and The Gambia to express their agree-
ment to common action in the matters of representation abroad and
defence. This would involve, not the establishment of a Senegambian
state community, but a delegation by The Gambia to Senegal, on terms
and subject to limitations that would be clearly specified, of its sover-
eign powers in this respect. As regards representation abroad more spe-
cifically, the agreement between the two States might spell out the de-
tails of the participation of Gambians in this type of representation,
particularly at the United Nations, in certain African countries and
also in certain English-speaking countries. The agreement on common
defence might be confined to the case of aggression from outside and
might be contingent on Senegal's pledge to guarantee the integrity of
Gambian territory and not to allow armed elements to enter that terri-
tory except by prior agreement between the two Governments.
64. The co-operation thus instituted could and should, of course,
be supplemented by other agreements. Independently of some of the
agreements referred to above, the two countries would find it in their
interest to settle by convention a large number of questions, including,
in the first place, those dealt with below in the present report. At a
later stage, and if the two countries should contemplate laying the
foundations for a future federation, it would be desirable if they pro-
gressively adjusted their structures to the same model, for which pur-
pose they should be guided much more by local and African needs than
by colonial traditions, both in legislative and in executive, administra-
tive and judicial matters. Similarly, they might endeavour to unify the
civil and criminal legislation in force, and also the laws of procedure.
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65. One vital element of whatever agreement might be entered
into between Senegal and The Gambia would obviously be a clause
providing, first, for a procedure of conciliation and then for arbitration
in the event of difficulties in the performance or interpretation of any
particular agreement. In the absence of such a clause, the entente be-
tween the two countries might be jeopardized whenever a difference of
some consequence supervened. The two countries would remain free, of
course, if the contemplated conciliation and arbitration procedure
should prove insufficient to refer the case to the International Court of
Justice whose compulsory jurisdiction might be recognized for that
purpose by the two countries.
66. It is not without interest to consider also what might be the
shape of the agreements which would, at the initial stage, form the
basis for the Senegambian entente. The first thought which comes to
mind is that a treaty of friendship might be appropriate. Such a treaty
is described by learned authors as one by which two States, noting the
good relations between them and the feelings of reciprocal friendship
of their populations, agree on measures to maintain and develop this
favourable situation, notably by organizing various forms of co-opera-
tion. In principle, however, a mere treaty of friendship, even if it in-
cludes provisions to ensure good neighbourly relations, does not imply
a duty of mutual assistance at any level whatsoever, nor does it provide
for the representation of one of the States by the other in international
relations. Such a treaty would therefore be inadequate to satisfy the
needs of the situation in the case of Senegal and The Gambia. A treaty
of alliance would certainly go further to fill those needs since, accord-
ing to learned authority, it is a treaty entered into by two States desir-
ous of adopting a common line of action with respect to the outside
world by reason of the identity of their respective interests. But even if
the alliance between Senegal and The Gambia were purely defensive,
the casus foederis being deemed to arise only in the event of an attack
from the outside-with the consequence that any participation by one
of these States in an offensive action taken by the other would be ex-
cluded-this kind of treaty might perhaps encounter some resistance,
at least in the present state of affairs, inasmuch as an alliance is gener-
ally held to imply ab initio a very advanced degree of co-operation, and
co-operation of a political rather than of an economic nature. Hence,
one ought to look for a better solution. The answer might be an ad hoc
treaty, to be known as the treaty of "Senegambian entente", laying
down more specifically the principle of friendly co-operation in all mat-
ters of common interest, of the settlement of all disputes by arbitra-
tion, of a common organization of representation abroad and defence
(on the terms and conditions already indicated), of mutual assistance
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against subversive elements, of the freedom of establishment for citi-
zens in both countries, and of co-operation in judicial matters. Such a
treaty of Senegambian entente would constitute the essential basis of
the relations between the two countries, for such time as they may see
fit to specify, and also the natural framework for the many other agree-
ments to be entered into by them, as and when possible and necessary,
on economic, political and cultural matters.
67. As regards the procedure to be observed for the conclusion of
the treaty of Senegambian entente, and of the agreements which might
follow or accompany it to deal with a number of matters, the situation
would not present any difficulties from the Senegalese point of view,
for these would be treaties within the meaning of article 77, first para-
graph, of the Constitution of Senegal and hence would simply have to
be ratified by a law passed by the National Assembly. On the other
hand, so far as The Gambia is concerned the situation would vary ac-
cording to whether the treaty or the agreements in question would be
concluded before the date of independence or after that date. If they
were concluded before the date of independence, then, because they
would be international treaties, the Governor would have capacity to
act, for the Constitution of Gambia provides expressly, in section 20(1)
and section 21(2), that the Governor continues to be alone responsible
for certain matters, including external affairs and defence (see The
Gambia (Constitution) (Amendment) Order in Council 1963, loc. cit),
except in so far as he sees fit to assign certain responsibilities to the
Prime Minister or to a member of the Cabinet (section 20(2)). There is
no doubt, however, that, if the Governor chose to take action himself
in the matter, he would not fail to obtain the approval of the Govern-
ment of The Gambia and, if appropriate, of the House of Representa-
tives. If, on the other hand, all or some of the contemplated agree-
ments should be entered into after the grant of full independence to
The Gambia, the conditions governing their acceptance and the proce-
dure to be followed would be laid down in the new constitution; in that
case, the power to ratify international treaties would probably be
vested in the legislature, and the approval by means of a referendum
would normally be required only in constitutional matters.
68. In conclusion, the mission ought to stress that the above con-
siderations regarding the conclusion of a Senegambian entente by
means of international agreements apply mainly in the event of a fed-
eration being considered premature; it remains of the opinion that a
federal solution on the lines described above would offer most advan-
tages, if not in the immediate future, at least in a comparatively near
future, both from the point of view of Senegal and of The Gambia and
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from the more general point of view of African unity. The solution of a
mere entente accordingly remains, in the light of the mission's assess-
ment of the problem of the relations between the two countries, more a
means than an end; it is more a means of preparing for the future, of
laying the foundations for an initial co-operation, than of expanding
that co-operation in many matters and so of impressing on both sides
the need for an association of the federal type. In other words, the
mission considers a mere entente as a transitional solution which the
contracting parties can dispense with if they decide forthwith to join
their destinies by setting up a federation of the type described above.
Supplementary questions
69. The problem of the nationality or status of persons will obvi-
ously arise, whatever the form in which Senegal and The Gambia de-
cide to settle the problem of their future relations. In the event of the
integration of The Gambia with Senegal-a solution which the mission
has in any case dismissed as unrealistic in present circum-
stances-Gambian nationals should logically acquire Senegalese or
Senegambian nationality to the exclusion of any other. If, on the other
hand, a federation of Senegal and The Gambia is set up, the problem
will be more complex. No doubt, at the stage of a highly centralized
federal State, the solution most consistent with legal logic would be to
confer upon the nationals of both countries a single Senegambian na-
tionality to replace their respective Senegalese and Gambian nationali-
ties. At the initial stage of a very limited federation, however, it would
be conceivable and perhaps even advisable that the two nationalities
should be maintained; Senegambian nationality would be conferred
upon the nationals of both countries, but it would be additional to
Senegalese or Gambian nationality. It will be for the two component
States of the Federation to take in due course whatever decisions they
consider appropriate in this respect; they will also have to come to
terms with France and the United Kingdom for the purpose of deter-
mining whether, and if so to what extent, their respective nationals
may, notwithstanding the acquisition of Senegambian nationality,
qualify for the benefit of a special status in the one or the other of
these countries. Lastly, if The Gambia should not form a federation
with Senegal straight away and if to begin with it should regulate its
relationships with Senegal by means of a mere entente, it will have to
consult with the United Kingdom and with the Commonwealth coun-
tries concerning the question of the status of Gambian nationals in
these countries.
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70. Obviously, it will also be for the Commonwealth countries to
determine what links can be maintained between them and The Gam-
bia after that country has attained independence. In its supplementary
statement to the joint communiqu6 of 26 October 1962, The Gambian
Government expressed the wish that, whatever form the proposed
union might take in the future, The Gambia should be able to main-
tain its close ties of association with the United Kingdom and the
Commonwealth; the mission can do no more than take note of this
wish and mention it in this report. At all events, and even if The Gam-
bia becomes closely associated with Senegal, there will be no reason
why friendly and confident relations between the Gambian people and
the Commonwealth should not subsist-and this, presumably, is what
matters. Besides, it will be possible to maintain these excellent rela-
tions by giving to Gambians (as indicated earlier in this report) a gen-
erous share in diplomatic representations, particularly in the United
Kingdom and in the English speaking countries, and by the continuing
aid to The Gambia which the United Kingdom may be willing to pro-
vide. It would, in the opinion of the mission be particularly fitting if a
Gambian head of diplomatic mission were appointed to represent the
federation or the entente of the two States in London and in some of
the countries mentioned.
71. One last question which will be asked, particularly in The
Gambia, is whether this country should, on attaining independence,
apply for admission as a Member of the United Nations. It should be
pointed out that this question will arise only if The Gambia plans at
first to enter into a mere entente with Senegal for a comparatively long
period, for, if the two countries form a federation straightaway in the
sense given to that term in this report, then the federation alone will
logically be a Member of the United Nations, to the exclusion of Sene-
gal and The Gambia as such. No doubt membership of The Gambia in
the United Nations, even for a short period, will be regarded by some
as symbolizing its independence in the eyes of world opinion, and for
this reason they will perhaps advocate such membership. Surely, how-
ever, when The Gambia attains independence, the event will necessa-
rily receive such wide publicity as to give to Gambian opinion the sat-
isfaction to which it is legitimately entitled on this score. For the rest,
The Gambia's potential resources are quite limited both in personnel
destined to discharge important administrative duties and in financial
means; The Gambia should therefore hesitate to draw upon these po-
tential resources. Those who would like a Senegambian federation to
materialize as soon as possible will likewise reject the idea of The Gam-
bia's joining the United Nations; they will rightly consider that such a
move would have a negative effect at a time when, as a result of the
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establishment of the Senegambian federation, the Gambia would have
to relinquish its United Nations membership, and many would then
regard this relinquishment as a surrender or a step backwards, or even
as a sort of capatis diminutio. In the final analysis, The Gambia's ad-
mission into the United Nations might, by diminishing the importance
of the representation of Gambian interests by Senegal, even thwart the
Senegambian entente as it is described above. The solution whereby
the interests of The Gambia would be represented by Senegal in the
United Nations, on the condition of an equitable participation in this
representation, would thus appear to be advisable.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS
General Observations
72. The differences between the administrations of Senegal and
The Gambia are considerable; they mirror the differences in adminis-
trative organization and practice between France and the United King-
dom. Nevertheless they do not pose very serious problems, with one
exception that will be mentioned below. For this there are two reasons.
In the first place it is well agreed by both parties that association,
whatever its form, 1 will not impose the Senegalese pattern on The
Gambia, nor for the time being necessitate difficult administrative revi-
sions and adaptations on both sides except in the rather narrow field of
external affairs and trade. In a federation with strictly limited func-
tions for the federal government certain common administrative provi-
sions will also be necessary with regard to the President's office and the
federal assembly; possibly but not necessarily too for a central federal
court. The Gambia will, even under a federal structure, retain most of
its internal autonomy until the people themselves come to see an ad-
vantage in more uniformity, which in itself should be approached in a
bilateral way, merging Senegalese and Gambian elements into an Afri-
can pattern that suits a more unified Senegambia best.
73. But apart from the agreed gradualness of this process which
can leave much of the existing duality untouched, it must be observed
that the British colonial administration shows a much closer resem-
blance to the rather centralized character of the French model than the
administration of the United Kingdom itself. And it should be under-
stood that in the developing countries there are good reasons for cen-
11. The administrative consequences of rapid integration are not considered here as
such an integration is deemed highly improbable in the near future; see paragraph 53
above.
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tralized forms of government. The scarcity of highly trained personnel
requiring concentration of authority in fewer hands; the integration of
still somewhat loosely joined traditional groups into one nation; the
grave problems of accelerated evolution; the need for economic plan-
ning on a national scale accompanied by the general lack of capital; the
extreme dearth of local revenue and credit; these and other-including
political-factors explain the trend towards centralization that can be
observed in most, if not all newly independent states.
74. Certain features of the two administrations may induce the
authorities in the two countries to consider the possible advantages to
be derived from a comparative study. The traditional elements in local
government have been more preserved in The Gambian than in Sene-
gal, although the "conseillers coutumiers," the "chefs honoraires" and
the modern civil servants who belong to the old chiefs' families indi-
cate that traditional authority has not yet been completely submerged
in the new hierarchy. The change, however, seems unavoidable, witness
the same change occurring all over the world. This difference will dis-
appear in time.
75. The reglementation is much more detailed in Senegal than in
The Gambia. This may have the advantage of greater precision but it
tends to make the administration more formalistic; it might not be bad
to leave the application of the laws a little more to the judgment of the
executants. In this same area of divergence lies the somewhat greater
devolution of authority and decisions in The Gambia towards the lower
level. Though this may entail some risks in a developing administra-
tion, it also teaches more responsibility and adds to the attractiveness
of many jobs. It also makes for quicker decisions, on the other hand a
regular control and supervision can prevent serious mistakes. It should
be noted in this respect that The Gambian system makes more use of
civil servants with a secondary or equivalent education for quite re-
sponsible posts, whereas in Senegal such civil servants have to be pro-
moted first to the higher hierarchies, which is made possible for out-
standing candidates from the lower ones who succeed in the annual
examination to which they can be admitted in limited numbers.
The civil service and the administrative structure
76. The personnel administration in Senegal is conducted under
a very detailed, though as yet incomplete legislation. In both countries
there exists a central institution, charged with the general supervision
of personnel policies, be it mainly in an advisory capacity. In Senegal,
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where the Ministry of the Civil Service and of Labour 2 directs the per-
sonnel administration, it is the Conseil sup~rieur de la fonction pub-
lique; in The Gambia the Public Service Commission to which certain
executive functions can be delegated. The power of appointment seems
a little more centralized in Senegal; for the present, of course, certain
appointments in The Gambia are still at the discretion of the
Governor.
77. The impression that on-the-job training is more prevalent in
The Gambia, whereas special schooling is more developed in Senegal,
would need closer study. Both systems have their advantages, but the
lack of really competent trainers among the civil servants in the early
stages of development may make the Senegalese arrangements more
effective when metropolitan assistance is reduced.
78. Recruitment also follows somewhat different lines, although
in both countries an impartial selection among candidates and an ob-
jective testing of their capacities are accepted in principle and fairly
systematically applied in practice. In Senegal the competitive examina-
tions for admission to the 'alious corpS are rather move 'elabrately
regulated. The same applies to the rules for advancement, periodic re-
ports and discipline and the machinery of bipartite administrative
committees and disciplinary councils with representatives of the ad-
ministration and the personnel, in the ministries; in both countries
promotion depends on the occurrence of vacancies. But generally it
may be said that in essence the factors that determine the conditions
of service are not far apart. Leave, medical care, children allowances
are provided for, be it in different measure; only housing and al-
lowances for rent are definitely more liberal in Senegal even though a
reduction in this field has been recently undertaken.
79. The major differences, however, are found in the structure of
the civil service and particularly in the salary scales.
80. In both countries the structure is related to the educational
system; subprimary, primary, secondary and higher education, together
with vocational schools and training courses, give shape to its frame-
work. But the shapes are quite different as can be seen from the fol-
lowing figures. If we distinguish roughly between university graduates
(A), holders of certificates for vocational study beyond secondary
school (B), of full secondary school certificates (C), of primary school
certificates (D), and people with less than complete primary schooling
12. Minist~re de la Fonction et du Travail.
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(E), and distribute the intermediate groups as rationally as possible
among them we obtain the following very tentative approximations."I
Senegal The Gambia
A. 1.350 5% 110 3.3%
B. 2.700 10% 50 1.5%
C. 4.050 15% 200 6.0%
D. 8.100 30% 1.500 44.6%
E. 10.800 40% 1.500 44.6%
Total 27.000 3.360
81. The Gambia shows a much narrower top for its pyramid
which indicates a different division of labour; there appears to be more
delegation to group C and even to the senior members of group D and
the civil servants in the three highest groups work with relatively more
members of the clerical category or equivalent groups as their assist-
ants and subordinates. This would lead to a relatively cheaper admin-
istration, but the total number of of civil servants seems proportionally
larger if compared with the population; the Gambian civil service con-
stitutes about 12.5% of the Senegalese, whereas in population is only
10% of Senegal. The figures have to be judged, however, with a certain
reserve as the considerable number of French civil servants, working in
Senegal under technical assistance arrangements, is presumably not
counted.
82. It may be expected that the composition of the Gambian ser-
vice will in due time develop a closer approach to the Senegalese pyra-
mid; the very narrow top is undoubtedly, at least in part, a "colonial"
phenomenon although it is also characteristic of British administra-
tion. Broadening of that top as a result of Gambianisation would, how-
ever, also mean increased expense, hardly to be neutralized by a simul-
taneous decrease in numbers.
83. A structural difference that may not be of immediate impor-
tance but might have to be considered later is to be found in the or-
ganization of the ministries. As a result, probably, of the rather recent
transformation of the colonial organization in The Gambia, with its
Governor's office, colonial secretary and department heads, into an ad-
ministration for which the responsibility is divided among a Prime
13. In neither country personnel statistics are complete; the budgets do not fully re-
flect the actual situation. The Senegal figures present only a very global estimate and
could not be made more precise.
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Minister and the members of his Cabinet, the staff of the ministers'
personal offices is as yet very small, several ministers having hardly
more than one or two clerks and a messenger at their immediate dispo-
sal. A few ministries have a high level secretary, but in several others
the head of the most important service fills that role. How the various
services which are now directly under the Governor are to be redis-
tributed when The Gambia becomes independent is not known; for the
present only the Prime Minister's office and that of the Minister of
Finance provide them with direct assistance of rather better quality.
There is an advantage in the need for regular and personal consulta-
tion with the service chiefs as a result of the weakness of these offices,
but it seems that the top organization of certain ministries will require
strengthening.
84. In Senegal, on the contrary, each minister has his "cabinet"
and other central offices, e.g. for financial and personnel administra-
tion, including high level assistants and advisers. Nothing as elaborate
and costly appears to be either necessary or possible in The Gambia,
but for the daily work and co-ordination a somewhat better equipped
secretariat may well prove to be indispensable.
85. This leads to the last and most serious divergence: the quite
distinctive salary systems. Again the comparison suffers a little from
the lack of completely detailed and up-to-date figures, but they are
close enough to reality to warrant the general conclusions drawn.
86. If the lowest and highest salaries for administrative personnel
in group E are compared, the bottom salary of an apprentice "agent"
(hi6archie E) in Senegal is equivalent to over £ 265 a year whereas the
comparable scale G in The Gambia starts at £ 114 a year. The maxi-
mum in this scale, given continuous promotion, is £ 261 a year in the
18th year as against £ 486 (equivalent) in Senegal, where in excep-
tional cases the possibility exists for a further increase to £ 511
(equivalent) after three more years. In the group "hi6rarchie E" in Se-
negal, requiring less than full primary schooling, salaries are therefore
roughly double those in The Gambia, a difference that appears to go
much beyond the difference in the cost of living.
87. This difference persists in the next group, "hi~archie D" in
Senegal and Scale F in The Gambia, with full primary schooling as the
condition for entrance, where salaries begin respectively at £ 373
(equivalent) and £ 147 annually upon entrance, but here the levels
converge in the later stages. In Senegal they can reach £ 675
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(equivalent) for the very best among the administrative civil servants '
of this group, whereas outstanding Gambians, after a rather longer pe-
riod of service, get up to £ 576. In the case of those who have had
vocational training after primary school the scales approach each other
still more. Definite percentages for the gradually diminishing differ-
ences are hard to calculate; such a calculation would need a far more
detailed study. It is, however, not wide from the mark if it is assumed
that the differences of 100 per cent and more in the lowest ranks drop
to an average of some 50 to 70 per cent in those categories of group D
which require a full primary school certificate and decrease still further
to about 30 to 50 per cent for civil servants with additional vocational
qualifications. In the last named cases a certain quality with the differ-
ence in the cost of living can be noted.
88. The picture changes completely when group C is reached,
where full secondary schooling or its vocational equivalent is required.
If one compares the Senegalese "secr6taires d'administration" with the
category of "executive" officers in The Gambia, the gap at the en-
trance, between an annual salary of £ 549 (equivalent) in "hi~rarchie
C" and of £ 450 in scale C is reduced to 22 per cent and tends to
disappear at the top, where the possibilities of promotion in this group
for a - very limited - number of Gambians reach and even may sub-
stantially exceed the Senegalese levels. A much greater responsibility is
put on the shoulders of selected and experienced civil servants of this
kind in The Gambia; a holdover of the recent past when most of these
jobs were filled by overseas officers. The group itself, however, is rela-
tively small as has been pointed out above; much smaller than in
Senegal.
89. Groups B and A should be considered together. Here the
trend reverses again. From an average of not much more than 10 per
cent difference in group B, with entrance salaries of £ 762 (equivalent)
and £ 690 against top-salaries of £ 1746 (equivalent) and £ 1524, the
gap widens again to an average of about 30 to 35 per cent in group A.
Comparison becomes rather difficult near the top where a number of
positions with a special remuneration in both countries should be left
out of consideration, but some of the "super-scales" in The Gambia
apply to functions similar to those at the peak of "hi~archie A" in Se-
negal. The fact that the majority of the incumbents in scales A, AM
(medical) and B in The Gambia are overseas officers and that in Sene-
gal the higher salaries are influenced by the pay of a rather large num-.
ber of French officials serving on contract or under technical assistance
14. "Commis" in Senegal; "clerk" in The Gambia.
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arrangements tends to draw up the rates of pay to levels that might
not be fully justified in a purely national service. For the more exclu-
sively administrative functions the entrance salary in "hi~archie A" is
£ 950 (equivalent) yearly and in scale A £ 720, leading to maxima of £
2237 (equivalent) and £ 1524 respectively, to which the super-scales 7
to 4 or 3 (from £ 1600 to £ 2000 or £ 2150) may have to be added in a
very few cases. In view, however, of the numbers of officials involved
the percentages mentioned above may well be accepted to represent
the average differences. In this respect it may finally be noted that the
salaries of Ministers are of the same order in both countries: £ 2700 in
The Gambia and between £ 2685 and £ 3229 (equivalent) in Senegal.
90. The administration of Senegal is, for the time being, consid-
erably assisted by French civil servants provided under certain ar-
rangements for technical assistance, at the expense of France. The ma-
jority of these functionaries are seconded to the Government of
Senegal for a limited number of years, after which they can return to
their service in France. Recently this aid has been expanded by creat-
ing the possibility for qualified persons among the French conscripts to
serve the greater part of their military service period in their civilian
profession overseas, with the possibility of continuing such service
under technical assistance. In a number of cases professional French
military personnel render technical service. Other French civil servants
work under contract with the Government of Senegal, have been tem-
porarily continued in the Senegalese civil service, or acquired the Sene-
galese nationality. The total number of these functionaries, including
those attached to the University of Dakar, which is financed by France,
can only be very roughly estimated at some 2.500.' 5 Their task in pro-
viding qualified help until Senegal can adequately produce such per-
sonnel itself in all fields of government activity is obviously of great
value and the methods chosen are sufficiently flexible to adapt their
numbers and categories to Senegal's diminishing needs.
91. Similar provisions will be necessary for The Gambia, where in
1962 out of 220 senior posts 24 were vacant and only 76 out of the 196
incumbents were Gambians, a situation which is only gradually chang-
ing and which would seriously deteriorate if an exodus of overseas of-
ficers were to occur without proper replacement. It may be expected
that the British Government will find ways and means to continue its
assistance in this respect as long as is necessary, whatever form of co-
15. This assistance is particularly important in the field of education and in a num-
ber of technical and professional services, such as public works, health, finance, justice
and public enterprises.
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operation or association with Senegal is chosen. It should at least make
it possible for the Gambian authorities to contract suitable English-
speaking personnel on reasonable conditions.
92. For the few common services needed in case the countries de-
cide to form a federation with limited federal functions or to conclude
a treaty by which The Gambia delegates certain functions to Senegal -
see paragraphs 54 ff. and 62 if. above - an equalization of service condi-
tions for the rather small groups of civil servants concerned would be
indispensable and as, in those common services, the Gambians would
obviously constitute a minority, however generous a share might be al-
lotted to them, application of the Senegalese conditions would offer the
most practical immediate solution. In the fields of foreign affairs and
defence this should present no services difficulties in view of the fact
that The Gambia does not yet possess a foreign service or a military
establishment. The same is true for certain new organizations that the
negotiation about and the implementation of co-operation between the
two Governments will require. A common interpretation and transla-
tion service has already been mentioned in paragraph 23 above. Once
negotiations are started a joint secretariat may prove to be highly de-
sirable; if it is organized it can very well serve as a pattern for the
substructure of the joint boards or committees that will be necessary
for consultation about policies in the fields where joint action is to be
undertaken, including personnel management for the common services.
Constructive work can be done in this respect through the creation of
training and orientation courses for the appropriate officials, in order
to facilitate association and to build up a reciprocal understanding of
each others' administrative organization and practices.
93. Ultimately a really fruitful development of common adminis-
trative services will require a careful weighing of the relative advan-
tages and drawbacks of both systems, welding them together with one
that is best adapted to the very similar needs and conditions of both
countries. If, for the time being, the majority of the governmental func-
tions and the greater part of the administrative legislation remain in
the hands of the Gambian and Senegalese authorities respectively, this
development can be guided by the joint committees on personnel along
gradually converging lines.'6
16. Whatever is decided about the form and scope of the initial co-operation, one
change, particularly affecting The Gambia, appears to be almost inevitable. The rather
wide spread between the lowest and highest salaries in that country will have to be re-
duced, which in practice will lead to an increase of the lower salaries. This will constitute




A. The main problems
94. The influence of century-old French tradition in Senegal is
visible in a foreign trade policy that may be described as protectionist.
In The Gambia, on the other hand, foreign trade policy is inclined to
be liberal, in accordance with a long standing British tradition.
Senegalese import regulations
95. Goods originating in France and in the other countries of the
franc area may be imported without restriction. There are no quotas,
no import licenses and, in general, no restriction. The few exceptions to
this principle of unrestricted imports were agreed upon by mutual con-
sent with the object of protecting industries recently established in Se-
negal. For example, the import of the following goods into Senegal is
prohibited for the time being: matches, lump sugar, certain cotton
yarns and textiles, carpets, certain categories of footwear, etc. Local
industries manufacturing these goods were hard pressed after the col-
lapse of the Federation of Mali in 1960 and the loss of the Guinean
market in consequence of the change in Guinea's monetary system in
the same year.
96. The preferential treatment given to goods from France and
from the countries of the franc area includes exemption from customs
duties, which in fact is a form of reciprocal protection against compet-
ing foreign products. Examples of customs duties to which French
goods imported into Senegal are not liable are: 5 per cent on eggs, spa-
ghetti, macaroni, etc., and medicaments; from 5 to 10 per cent on metal
goods and electrical goods; 15 per cent on textiles other than cotton; 20
per cent on cottons; and 25 per cent on manufactured goods. Accord-
ingly, French goods imported into Senegal are liable only to fiscal
charges, to the flat rate charge, which is in effect a tax on business
transactions (usually 19.24 per cent of the c.i.f. value after the addition
of the other charges) and to the turnover tax, which is generally 9.89
per cent of the value for customs purposes. In addition to being liable
to the charges referred to in the preceding paragraphs, goods imported
from countries other than France or from countries not members of the
Customs Union of West African States, are liable to customs duties as
well.
mies in the higher brackets; see paragraph 86 ff. Even if no co-operation is achieved, an
independent Gambia would be faced by this problem.
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97. Total imports into Senegal amounted to 38,300 million CFA
francs in 1961, and to 38,200 million CFA francs in 1962. Of these
totals, imports from France accounted for 25,500 million CFA francs in
1961 and 24,800 million CFA francs in 1962.'1 France is therefore by
far the most important supplier, and its share in total imports changed
very slightly from 66 per cent to 65 per cent. Foreign trade figures for
the years before 1961 covered Senegal and Mali (French Sudan) to-
gether and have therefore to be left out for the purposes of this report.
98. As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the consequence
of the preference accorded to France is that two-thirds of total imports
into Senegal come from that country. Imports from countries not mem-
bers of the franc area amounted to 12,800 million CFA francs in 1961
and to 13,400 million CFA francs in 1962. To enable Senegal to pay for
these imports, France places the necessary fund at its disposal in freely
convertible foreign exchange. The sums involved were
1961 120 million new French francs = 6,000 million CFA francs;
1962 135 million new French francs = 6,750 million CFA francs.
At first sight, this seems to be insufficient to pay for all imports from
countries not members of the franc area. It should be noted, however,
that payment for petroleum products does not take the form of a fi-
nancial settlement: it takes the form of compensatory transactions as
between French petroleum products exported and foreign petroleum
products imported into Senegal. Licenses issued in this respect repre-
sented a total value of about 1,900 million CFA francs in 1961 and
2,350 million CFA francs in 1962. Furthermore, in the case of imports
of food grains of the 1962-1963 crop special credits amounting to 4,500
million CFA francs were granted.
99. Until May 1963 an annual programme of imports from all
countries outside the franc area was drawn up by a joint French-Sene-
galese committee, as provided in the treaty of economic co-operation
with France. As regards some products imported from outside the
franc area, annual maxima were established that could not be
exceeded.
100. In May 1963, Senegal and France concluded a commercial
arrangement under which the system of maxima was replaced by a sys-
tem of minima. In return for the preferential treatment accorded to
Senegalese products by France (see paras. 109 et seq. below), Senegal
17. Imports from the other countries in the franc area are negligible.
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undertook to import from France, between 15 May 1963 and 14 May
1964, goods to a total c.i.f. value of not less than 24,000 million CFA
francs. Within this total of 24,000 million CFA francs, Senegal is bound
to import from France certain goods up to a minimum percentage,
worked out in respect of each item, of the value of the total imports of
those goods. The following minima were jointly agreed upon:
per cent
Dairy products 55
Drinks other than whisky and gin 70
Air conditioners 50
Refrigerators 50




Private motor-cars, Buses and lorries
(exclusive of spare parts) 70
Wheeled and caterpillar tractors
(exclusive of spare parts) 70
"B Twill" jute bags 33
101. To meet the cost of imports from countries not belonging to
the franc area during the 1963-1964 period, a credit of 198,221,171 new
francs, equivalent to 9,911,058,550 CFA francs, was opened in favour of
Senegal in freely convertible foreign exchange. Apart from the quotas
granted to the European Economic Community (EEC), overall quotas
for the various categories of goods were established. This is a new de-
parture, for these quotas replace what used to be called "Sterling Pro-
gramme", "Dollar Programme", "Total OEEC Programme", etc. As a
consequence, Senegal enjoys greater freedom than in the past to im-
port goods from outside the franc area. The EEC credits amount to
approximately 36.8 million new francs, and those for imports from all
other countries 161.4 million new francs. The last-mentioned amount
can be drawn on for imports from all countries, including those which
are members of the EEC, but may not be used for imports from the
EEC until the quotas granted to the EEC have been exhausted.
102. Some reference should be made to the composition of the
imports according to category (1962 only):
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Food, drink, tobacco
including:







Manufactured capital goods other
than those for agriculture
Manufactured consumer goods
including:
Textiles of all kinds
Ready-made textile goods












It is evident from this short tabulation of imports according to cat-
egories, that Senegal is obliged to import not only most manufactured
articles but also food stuffs such as rice, although it is making consider-
able efforts to increase and intensify rice cultivation.
The Gambia's import regulations
103. Unlike Senegal, The Gambia has a very liberal import pol-
icy. Goods originating in all the countries of the sterling, dollar and
franc areas and in the other countries of western Europe and Asia may
be imported under an open general licence. This system covers all pro-
duce other than rice and wheat flour. In respect of imports from coun-
tries other than those mentioned above, a special licence is required,
which is however granted liberally.
104. Import charges are relatively light and are applied uniformly
irrespective of the origin of the products, except for Commonwealth
preferences. Since December 1962, the general rate of customs duties
has been 171/2 per cent for Commonwealth goods and 20 per cent for
goods of any other origin, whereas for foodstuffs the rates are only 10
and 12.5 per cent. In the case of wheat flour, sugar and rice the specific
non-preferential duty is only 5/- per 100 lbs. Specific or ad valorem
duty (whichever is the higher) is charged on clothing and textile prod-
ucts; this duty varies from 10 to 22.5 per cent (preferential) and from
12.5 to 25 per cent (non-preferential). The customs duty on machinery
is from 12.5 to 15 per cent and from 14.5 to 20 per cent, respectively.
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Only the non-preferential rates on vehicles and bicycles (25 per cent)
and on some luxury goods (up to 42.5 per cent) exceed the maximum
generally applied. A purchase tax fixed at 4 per cent since 1 January
1963 is charged at the time of importation.
105. Accordingly, compared with Senegal, The Gambia can be re-
garded as a low-tariff country. As it has a very liberal import policy, it
is able to obtain its supplies from the cheapest sources. This fact is one
of the reasons accounting for the disparity in the cost of living as be-
tween the two countries and in addition constitutes an incentive to
smuggle goods into Senegal, matters which will be dealt with in greater
detail below.
106. Owing to the liberal regulations concerning foreign trade,
The Gambia covers its import needs from the most advantageous and
varied sources. The following table gives a general idea of the main
suppliers (values in thousands of £):
1960 1961 1962
Total imports 3.222 100.0 4.572 100.0 4.481 100.0
- from the United Kingdom 1.427 44.3 1.795 39.3 1.782 39.8
- from other Commonwealth
countries 532 16.5 784 17.1 565 12.6
- from the EEC and associated
countries 617 19.2 737 16.1 627 14.0
- from the United States of
America 83 2.6 83 1.8 102 2.3
- from Japan 227 7.0 547 12.0 559 12.5
- from other countries 336 10.4 627 13.7 845 18.8
107. These figures show that the United Kingdom is The Gam-
bia's main supplier, but that its deliveries did not reach 40 per cent of
the total imports in 1961 and 1962. Imports from the Commonwealth
as a whole vary between 50 and 60 per cent. Japan is a relatively im-
portant supplier. The following table shows the main imports during
the years 1960 to 1962 (values in thousands of £):
Metal Motor PetroleumTextiles Rice Sugar Machinery products vehicles products
1960 406 300 126 215 181 110 118
1961 1.141 310 174 366 197 127 123
1962 705 470 136 450 214 208 137
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108. As the above table shows, The Gambia has to buy from
abroad virtually all manufactured goods as there are no industries in
the country apart from two oil mills, with a rather small capacity
which supply the internal market only. In addition, the country has to
import rice (209,000 tons in 1962), although it is itself a producer of
rice and is endeavouring to grow more. Imports of textiles are rela-
tively high (in 1961, for instance, they accounted for one-quarter of
total imports). As the country is incapable of consuming the whole of
this quantity, the phenomenon can only be explained by the fact that a
large part crosses the frontier into Senegal in what is described euphe-
mistically as "unrecorded trade."
Senegalese exports
109. We have seen that France has established a privileged posi-
tion for itself on the Senegalese market. This is not confined to exemp-
tion from customs duties but includes also a monopoly in the supply of
wheat for flour and of sugar. In return, France provides Senegal with
preferential markets. Hence the preference is reciprocal.
110. For example, a market for a large part of the groundnut out-
put (shelled groundnuts, groundnut oil and groundnut oilcakes) is
guaranteed. For the 1962-1963 crops the two partners fixed, by com-
mon consent, the garanteed quota at 215,000 tons refined oil
equivalent. On the basis of an oil extraction rate of 35 per cent this
quantity can be taken as representing, in round figures, 615,000 tons of
unshelled groundnuts. The total harvest may be estimated at an aver-
age of 800,000 tons for the 1962-1963 and 1963-1964 crops. The differ-
ence between the 615,000 tons and the 800,000 tons is almost entirely
likewise absorbed by France, as the following figures (in millions of
CFA francs) shows:
1961 1962
Total exports of groundnut products 25.410 24.878
of which France bought
Shelled groundnuts 10.018 11.641
Groundnut oil 10.102 10.246
Groundnut oilcakes 700 1.400
Total groundnut products bought by France 20.820 23.287
As a percentage 82% 92%
111. Apart from guaranteeing a market, France guarantees to Se-
negal a price of 105 old French francs per kilogram of shelled ground-
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nuts, whereas the world market price varies between 80 and 90 old
francs. If one takes an average of 20 old francs as the difference be-
tween the guaranteed price and the world price, with a harvest of
800,000 tons Senegal receives an indirect subsidy of 16 million old
francs or 8,000 million CFA francs.
112. This system makes it possible to pay to the Senegalese pro-
ducers 22 CFA francs per kilogramme unshelled, which yielded, by way
of illustration, in the case of the 1962-1963 harvest, an estimated sur-
plus of 6.66 CFA francs per kilogramme unshelled, after allowance for
the difference between the French price and the world price.
113. Another commodity in respect of which France grants to Se-
negal a preferential market is canned tunny, for which it has a quota of
10,000 tons. This quantity far exceeds actual exports of canned tunny,
which amounted in 1961 to 4,308 tons and in 1962 to 3,339 tons.
114. The total value of Senegalese exports for the years 1961 and
1962 is much the same. The cash crop by itself is by far the most im-
portant export commodity. However, the country exports some other
commodities, as can be seen from the table below (values in millions of
CFA francs):
1961 1962
Total exports 30.657 30.671
Whereof:
Groundnut products 25.410 24.878
Wheat flour 558 617
Canned fish 963 1.095
Calcium phosphate 1.029 1.153
The share accounted for by groundnut products in total exports was 83
per cent in 1961 and 82 per cent in 1962. There are some other less
important commodities, such as gum arabic, bran, titanium ores, hides
and skins, and shoes.
115. Both for imports and even more for exports the principal
market is France. The following table gives an interesting picture of
the principle directions of Senegal's export trade (values in millions of
CFA francs):
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1961 % 1962 %
Total exports 30.657 100.0 30.671 100.0
Whereof to: France 23.242 76.0 26.310 85.8
Other countries in the franc area 2.447 8.0 1.726 5.6
Other EEC countries 1.981 6.4 772 2.5
United Kingdom 816 2.7 231 0.8
Other Commonwealth countries 20 0.1 37 0.1
United States of America 60 0.2 42 0.1
Other countries 2.041 6.6 1.553 5.1
As these data show, France alone took 76 per cent of Senegal's total
exports in 1961 and 85.8 per cent in 1962, while the shares taken by
the franc area as a whole were 84 per cent and 91.4 per cent
respectively.
Gambian exports
116. The Gambia has practically only one export commodity,
shelled groundnuts, as the following table shows (values in thousands
of £):
1960 1961 1962
Total exports 2.516 3.232 3.478
Of which shelled groundnuts 2.218 3.077 3.321
Percentage of exports of groundnuts 88% 95% 95%
Palm kernels 98 80 89
Apart from groundnuts and palm kernels, the other export commodi-
ties, among which beeswax and hides and skins should be mentioned,
account for almost negligible quantities.
117. To give an idea of the direction of The Gambia's export
trade, it is enough to mention the countries purchasing groundnuts, for





Total exports of groundnuts 2.218 3.077 3.321
Whereof to:
- Italy 769 418 1.988
- United Kingdom 1.093 866 1.066
- Switzerland 159 854 131
- The Netherlands - 444 -
- Belgium - 205
- France 152 -
- Norway - 162 -
- Sweden - 135
- Western Germany - 129
- Portugal 45 -
The share accounted for by the United Kingdom in The Gambia's total
export trade varies between 30 per cent and 40 per cent. It follows that
this country does not occupy the dominant position as a purchaser of
Gambian products that France occupies on the Senegalese market.
Predominance of groundnut production
118. As is clear from what has been said earlier, both Senegal and
The Gambia have only one cash crop, groundnuts, almost all of which
is marketed and exported. Both countries accordingly typify the single-
crop economy, with all the risks which this involves, such as poor
crops, fluctuations in the world markets, the dangers of plant parasites,
and the like. The output of the two countries can be said to be propor-
tionate to the size of the population. In round figures, Senegal has 3
million and The Gambia 300,000 inhabitants. At the present time, the
average crop in Senegal is 800,000 tons, whereas in The Gambia it is
80,000 tons.
119. The average yield in Senegal is not quite one ton per hec-
tare. Some statistics taken from a publication of the Ministry of Fi-
nance and Economic Affairs entitled "Situation 6conomique du S6n6-
gal" (1962) are given below. The figures relate to thousands of hectares
and to thousands of tons.
1960 1961
Area planted to 975 1,027
groundnuts
Groundnut crop 893 995
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The yield per hectare can thus be estimated at 912 kilos for 1960 and
at 969 kilos for 1961, which represents an increase of 6 per cent. In The
Gambia, the situation is comparable, the crop being less than half a
long ton per acre, or (as in Senegal), under one ton per hectare.
120. This relatively low yield is due to the primitive methods of
cultivation. Farming with draught animals, not to mention mechanized
farming, is still in an experimental stage. The use of fertilizer is not yet
very common. In 1961, the consumption of fertilizer in Senegal
amounted to 11,700 tons, whereas in 1962 it almost doubled, reaching
21,200 tons.
121. The average price paid to producers in Senegal for the 1963-
1964 season is 22,000 CFA francs per ton, whereas in The Gambia the
price for the same period has been set at 27 West African pounds'" per
long ton, equivalent to 18,602 CFA francs" per metric ton (the long
ton contains 1.016 kg). The price of shelled groundnuts per ton, includ-
ing all incidental expenses f.o.b. Dakar, is 47,302 CFA francs, whereas
it is 38,957 CFA francs f.o.b. Bathurst (1961-1962 season).
122. Groundnuts are not of course the only crop grown. In both
Senegal and The Gambia, millet, rice, Indian corn, manioc and other
crops are cultivated, but these are grown for direct consumption, or
else are sold or bartered locally. In fact, insufficient food crops are
grown. For example, although most of its inhabitants are employed in
agriculture, Senegal has to import considerable quantities of foodstuffs
(in 1962, imports of millet, Indian corn and rice cost 3,400 million CFA
francs, of which 2,900 million was accounted for by rice alone). The
explanation is that groundnut cultivation has developed at the expense
of the other crops mentioned above.
123. This rather precarious situation is further aggravated by the
fact that agriculture plays a dominant part in the economy of both
countries. In Senegal 87 per cent of the active population is employed
in agriculture and in The Gambia more than 90 per cent.
Difference in cost of living
124. In the bush the cost of living is probably much the same on
both sides of the frontier, after allowance for the per capita income
18. This price is subsidized from a special fund (Farmer's Fund).
19. For reasons of convenience, we are using an exchange rate of 700 CFA francs to
one West African pound in this study; the official rate fluctuates around 696 CFA francs.
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and for the purchasing power of the two countries. By contrast, in the
cities, i.e. at Bathurst (The Gambia's only town) and Dakar, the cost of
living differs considerably.
125. The principal reasons for this difference in the urban cost of
living are, firstly, the foreign trade policy of the two countries, and es-
pecially the liberal import regulations in The Gambia (see above) and,
secondly, the overvaluation of the CFA franc and the methods of
distribution.
126. It is extremely difficult to determine exactly the true differ-
ence between Bathurst and Dakar. Comparisons of a few prices quoted
in official publications, such as the Gambian Bulletin of the Depart-
ment of Technical Co-operation for November 1963 and the Senegalese
monthly "Bulletin statistique et 6conomique" No. 7 for July 1963,
show that food prices at Dakar are 10 to 100 per cent higher than at
Bathurst. Wages paid to servants are 40 to 80 per cent higher. In a
general way, it may be said that the difference in prices for services
and for the consumer goods (cigarettes, for example) to which Europe-
ans and the urban population are accustomed is much above the
average.
127. In short, it may be said, with all due caution, that the cost
of living at Dakar is at least 30 to 50 per cent higher than at Bathurst.
It is no exaggeration to say that this is the difference at the lowest
limit for a person accustomed to a certain standard of living.2"
The problem of smuggling
128. Smuggling from The Gambia to Senegal is a problem caus-
ing great concern to the Senegalese authorities, who would like this
clandestine traffic to be stopped, for it involves a loss of budget reve-
nue and competes with certain local industries (matches, for example).
Some of the circumstances which constitute an incentive to smuggling
are explained in the preceding section.
129. A further factor is The Gambia's geographical position; it is
entirely surrounded by Senegalese territory and in a way constitutes an
entrepot for certain imported goods which the Senegalese, as the result
of international agreements, particularly with France, cannot obtain on
20. Mr. de Christen, in a study entitled "Les niveaux de vie au S~n6gal et en
Gambie", reached the conclusion that in the urban areas the cost of living is very defi-
nitely lower in The Gambia, probably at least 50 per cent lower. We cannot agree that
the gap is so wide.
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such favourable terms or which they could not otherwise obtain at all
because their importation is prohibited. The goods which are smuggled
are goods liable to lower import duties in The Gambia. The difference
varies on the average from 15 per cent (certain textiles) to 150 per cent
(cigarettes). Yet another factor is the impossibility of any close super-
vision of the artificial frontiers.
130. Estimates of the volume of smuggling vary according to the
sources of the information received. In March 1960, Mr. de Christen,
inspecteur de la France outre-mer, wrote a study on the subject of The
Gambia and smuggling, which is annexed to the report by Mr. Ruffel,
Inspecteur g~n6ral, on the economic relations of Senegal and The
Gambia. At that time, he reached the following conclusions with re-
spect to the values c.i.f. Bathurst of the various critical items which are
smuggled:
(i) Textiles £ 250,000







It should be noted that the smuggling of whisky has ceased since Sene-
gal allocated an import quota for whisky and imposed customs duties
on it that make smuggling unprofitable. "Miscellaneous" includes such
items as radios, transistors and batteries. The sum of £520,000 c.i.f.
Bathurst represents a commercial value (after the addition of customs
duties and profit margins) of £700,000, or roughly 500 million CFA
francs.
131. A study - an unofficial one, as in Senegal - carried out in
The Gambia reaches conclusions which are not appreciably different.
Estimates vary between £300,000 and £600,000 annually, calculated
c.i.f. Bathurst, or £430,000 to £820,000 expressed in terms of wholesale
prices after the addition of customs duties.
132. The mission discussed this matter with the managers of the
eight leading import firms at Bathurst (five of these are French firms).
Our informants said that the contraband traffic is not vital for them,
that they fully realize that closer economic collaboration with Senegal
is necessary, and that they will undoubtedly find some compensatory
activity once this collaboration has been established. The particulars
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they gave us about the extent of the contraband traffic in certain criti-
cal items are reflected in the following table. Values are given in
thousands of pounds, and the highest percentage was taken as the ba-
sis for calculating the volume of the illicit traffic carried on, whether by
small traders established along the frontier in the interior or from
Bathurst directly (figures in thousands of pounds).
1961 1962
Total imports of tobacco 42.0 25.4
Contraband estimated at 80% 33.6 20.3
Total imports of cigarettes 81.3 93.1
Contraband estimated at 60% 48.8 55.9
Total imports of textiles about 800.0 705.0
Contraband estimated at 50% 400.0 353.0
Total imports of shoes 51.4 66.5
Contraband estimated at 60 to 70% 35.9 46.6
Total imports of matches 25.2 34.5
Contraband estimated at 50 to 60% 13.1 20.6
It may be noted that the discrepancies between the different estimates
are not as great as might be believed at first glance.
133. In his study, Mr. de Christen estimates the budgetary impli-
cations for The Gambia of the suppression of smuggling at £138,000,
whereas he calculates the loss to Senegal, i.e. the amount of the duty
evaded, at 250 million CFA francs. Surely, this is a very small loss in
comparison with the total budget.
134. In paragraph 130 we mentioned an estimate of about 500
million CFA francs for the value of goods smuggled into Senegal. This
estimate, as has been explained, is higher than the volume of the con-
traband traffic as calculated on the basis of Gambian data. Even if,
however, the figure should be as high as 500 million CFA francs, this is
a negligible quantity compared with Senegal's total imports in the
years 1961 and 1962, which were valued at 38,300 and 36,200 million
CFA francs in the respective years.
135. Besides the smuggling traffic, there is, of course, a legitimate
trade between the two countries. According to data supplied by the
statistical services of the Senegalese Ministry of Finance, Senegal im-
ported goods to the value of 30,648,000 CFA francs (£43,800 in round
figures) from The Gambia and exported goods to the value of 5,021,000
CFA francs (£7,170) to The Gambia.
19861
NY.L. ScH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
B. Possible solutions of the problems
Integration
136. By analogy with constitutional and legislative integration,
one can only in theory visualize economic integration. Integration
would mean nothing other than the introduction of the Senegalese sys-
tem which is characterized notably by a protectionist tariff and by its
reciprocal preferential arrangements with France. It would involve
straightaway the establishment of a single monetary system, in other
words the exchange of West African pounds for CFA francs. Naturally,
provision would also have to be made for a common development plan.
137. As was explained in chapter II, it is possible to conceive in
theory a constitutional integration guaranteeing to The Gambia, which
would become the eighth region of Senegal, a measure of internal at-
tonomy. Similarly, it is possible to visualize a form of partial economic
integration under which certain fiscal or monetary matters would be
reserved to the competence of the regional government of The Gambia.
138. The advantage of an integration is that it would be the sim-
plest solution, creating an unambiguous and clear position. The Gam-
bia would benefit immediately from the preferential treatment which
France and Senegal have reciprocally granted to each other, particu-
larly as regards guaranteed and preferential markets for groundnut
products. It goes without saying that The Gambia can only be included
in the Senegalese-French agreements if France concurs.
139. Since Senegal has signed (but not yet ratified) a treaty of
association with the EEC, The Gambia would become a partner in this
association given the consent of the other members concerned. As far
as regards imports, the association with the EEC, when it becomes ef-
fective, would offer advantages in that goods imported from the Com-
munity would no longer be discriminated against and would thus be
able to compete with French goods and so would tend to lower the cost
of living. The Gambia, if integrated in the Senegalese economy, would
likewise be able to benefit from the external aid so liberally lavished
upon Senegal.
140. However, there are numerous drawbacks in immediate eco-
nomic integration. The application, as it were overnight, of the protec-
tionist import charges current in Senegal would result in a sudden rise
in the cost of living. In view of the small and not very highly trained
administrative staff it is hard to believe that the Senegalese fiscal and
customs regulations and the system of quotas, licences, etc., can be ad-
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ministered without serious snags.
141. What would be involved is an abrupt change from a liberal
system to a highly regulated system. The Gambia would enter the
somewhat "closed" Senegalese-French economic circuit and so would
become part of this preserve which France enjoys. This sudden change,
which may be described as shock treatment, is not suitable as a means
of combining two systems which have evolved so differently owing to
the century-old French and British traditions.
142. Apart from integration, there is no obvious parallel with the
various solutions to the constitutional and legislative problems, such as
federation or an entente to co-operate between sovereign States. Par-
tial economic integration can take any one of all the possible forms. It
is advisable to proceed cautiously, to choose first the areas in which
agreement is easy, and gradually to build up a more advanced kind of
association. Conversely, progressive advances in economic association
will tend to promote a gradual rapprochement in constitutional and
legislative matters. An attempt is made in the paragraphs which follow
to show in greater detail what direction a gradual economic association,
spread over a transitional period possibly lasting for several years, may
take.
Abolition of the customs frontier
143. One of the first essentials, in our opinion, is the abolition of
the customs frontier, and this proposition is based on a number of con-
siderations. The frontiers of The Gambia, which is entirely surrounded
by Senegal, are artificial and arbitrary. They cut Senegal in two and
separate it from its southern region, Casamance. The resulting compli-
cations and difficulties present serious problems for Senegal, particu-
larly as regards communications with Casamance 1 and its economic
development. Strict surveillance of the frontier is impossible, which
means that smuggling cannot be controlled effectively. To stamp out
the contraband traffic would necessitate a customs apparatus, the cost
of which would be out of proportion to the scale of the smuggling and
to the foreseeable results; besides, there is a chronic shortage of staff.
144. The abolition of the customs frontier does not involve im-
mediately the disappearance of the political frontier. However, as eco-
nomic integration proceeds the political frontier loses its importance.
21. Further complicated by the different highway code for the short journey across
The Gambia, the high ferry charges, etc.
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This fact is likely to make the two Governments intensify their efforts
to achieve a rapprochement in constitutional and legislative matters.
145. One undeniable advantage of the abolition of the customs
frontier would be a considerable decrease in the expenditure on sur-
veillance which would henceforth be concentrated at Bathurst, The
Gambia's only port of entry - and, we might add, a natural port with a
unique position and capable of considerable improvement.
146. Firms established at Bathurst might take advantage of this
situation by sending almost all the "critical" goods to Senegal and so
make easy profits and strip the domestic market of supplies. To fore-
stall this danger, the importers should undertake (for instance by a
gentleman's agreement) to ensure that The Gambian population ob-
tains its normal supplies.2 2 Given the limited number of major import-
ers this should be tried, but if the desired result cannot be achieved by
such a measure, smuggling would have to be made unprofitable by rais-
ing the customs duties to an appropriate level. The quota system sug-
gested in paragraphs 158 if. may help in making such a gentleman's
agreement effective.
Reasons for the gradual establishment of an economic
association
147. There are several arguments in favour of introducing an eco-
nomic association gradually over a comparatively long transition pe-
riod. Firstly, there are the differences based on tradition which have
already been mentioned. Secondly, there is a manifest shortage of ad-
ministrative staff at all levels. The staff should slowly become accus-
tomed to the new situation, and it is necessary to train a sufficient
number of staff, which will take years.
148. Thirdly, the cost of living in The Gambia, and more particu-
larly at Bathurst, must be prevented from rising abruptly to the level
in the Senegalese towns. In this connexion, it should be noted that the
per capita income is, like everywhere in Africa, very low, although in
Senegal it is higher than the average in most countries south of the
Sahara. According to very approximate estimates, the per capita in-
come in the bush, where about 80 per cent of the population lives, is
20,000 CFA francs. If the towns are included, the per capita income
may be estimated at 36,000 CFA francs. No figures were available for




The Gambia. However, the income of the rural population is probably
not much lower, whereas at Bathurst per capita income is definitely a
good deal lower, though in this comparison one must not ignore the
difference in purchasing power between the two currencies.
149. Another major reason in favour of a progressive economic
association is the balance of payments, in which the essential element
is foreign trade. The figures for Senegal are given below (in thousand
millions of CFA francs):
1961 1962 1963
six months
Imports 38.3 38.2 20.3
Exports 30.7 30.7 17.3
Balance -7.6 -7.5 -3.0
The pre-1951 figures are not included as they refer to the Senegal-
Mali-Mauritania group.
150. Foreign trade of The Gambia (in thousands of £):
1960 1961 1962
Imports 3.222 4.572 4.481
Exports (excluding 2.782 3.374 3.323
smuggled goods)
Balance -440 -1.198 -1.158
Owing to the economic structure of the two countries, the balance of
payments position is thus serious. Credit items such as income from
investments abroad, licences and patents, tourism, maritime shipping,
etc., are practically non-existent.
151. On the other hand, the demand for capital for economic de-
velopment is vast. This capital can only come from abroad, a factor
which aggravates the balance of payment deficit, unless the aid is given
free of charge (see chapter VI).
Customs system
152. By reason of the geographic, demographic and economic
conditions, the unification of the customs system will ultimately be in-
dispensable, subject to the adjustments which will prove necessary,
particularly so far as Senegal is concerned, and which will be negoti-
ated between the two countries. It is unthinkable and impracticable
that two different systems should remain in being in one and the same
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customs territory.
153. An important question is whether the unification of the cus-
toms system can be postponed or should be effected at once. The first
of these two courses seems not only simpler but easy to follow, for The
Gambia has virtually only one customs office, that of Bathurst, for the
control of imports. The staff in that office is familiar with the work and
sufficiently numerous, and some of the staff are well trained to run the
office. Under the 1963 budget The Gambia has 73 customs officials,
including 30 inspectors who are employed mainly inland along the Sen-
egalese-Gambian frontier.
154. The second course would give rise to serious difficulties. The
Senegalese system with its numerous import charges, such as customs
duties, fiscal charges, flat rate dues, turnover taxes, etc., is very compli-
cated. The Gambian officials would find it hard to administer it with-
out adequate training. A postponement of the extension of the Senega-
lese customs system to The Gambia would therefore, on balance, be
desirable, the more so as it is to be hoped that it will be possible to
simplify the system when negotiations take place for the harmoniza-
tion of the customs duties.
155. The Senegalese tariff is based on the French model and
hence follows the Brussels nomenclature. The Gambia followed the
British model, before the United Kingdom introduced this nomencla-
ture, and consequently is unacquainted with it. Yet, the Brussels no-
menclature is used by most of the countries of western Europe and also
by the French-speaking countries of Africa which form part of the
franc area. It will be in The Gambia's own interest to introduce that
nomenclature without delay. As an English version of the nomencla-
ture exists, the country would have no difficulty in getting used to it.
The Gambian and Senegalese officials concerned should be made fa-
miliar with the systems at present in force in the two countries so that
they are well prepared when the negotiations start.
Customs tariff
156. If the customs system should be unified, one important
problem will arise: Should the same tariff apply to the entire customs
territory? This would be a logical step, but in the case of The Gambia
it would mean a rise in duties on almost all imported goods, and, con-
sequently, an immediate rise in the cost of living, inasmuch as the dues
charged under the Senegalese tariff are considerably higher than those
charged in The Gambia.
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157. A customs union with import charges levied uniformly
straightaway would constitute a serious ordeal for The Gambia which
should be avoided as far as possible, at least during a specified transi-
tion period. The Gambian authorities and business circles share this
view. Those in charge of affairs in Senegal, and in particular Mr.
Senghor, the President, realize the need to proceed with great caution.
If each of the two parties made some move towards a unified system
and a common tariff, it should not be too difficult to work out a satis-
factory and equitable solution.
158. After careful consideration, we think that the most practical
solution would be first to allocate to Gambia customs quotas at a re-
duced rate of duty which would correspond, at least to begin with, to
the rates applied hitherto. To start a system of this kind should not
present any serious difficulties, for Bathurst is the only port and conse-
quently the only customs office for imports; hence control is easy.
159. The two countries should satisfy themselves that the alloca-
tion of customs quotas to Bathurst does not conflict with existing com-
mitments. The other members of the West African Customs Union or
of the West-African Monetary Union will probably not oppose such a
move, nor will the parties to GATT, of which Senegal is not yet a
member although it applies the GATT principles, or the members of
the EEC. It is moreover to be hoped that the gap which keeps Europe's
two economic communities apart will not extend across Africa. Any ob-
jections which might be raised by one of the organizations mentioned
should not be difficult to overcome through negotiation. Indeed, the
rapprochement between Senegal and The Gambia would constitute
but a modest first step towards that African unity which is so widely
advocated.
160. There are two ways of establishing customs quotas. Conceiv-
ably they may cover only the critical items, i.e. goods in which there is
most contraband traffic such as textiles, cigarettes, tobacco, shoes, and
matches. The range of items is small. However, the future trend of im-
ports through Bathurst and the volume of trade to Senegal once the
customs frontier is abolished cannot be foreseen. Since the purpose of
the customs quotas would be to keep the liberal import system in exis-
tence at least during a transition period, the selection of only a few
items would introduce an element of uncertainty which it is better to
avoid.
161. In our opinion, the right solution would be to fix an aggre-
gate quota allowing for the inclusion of special quotas in respect of the
critical items referred to above. This system would have the advantage
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of avoiding an excessive increase in imports through Bathurst. There
would be a genuine risk if all goods irrespective of origin could enter
without any restriction under the present tariff.
162. Goods which are consumed or used locally and which do not
normally enter the illicit traffic would also be included in the quota.
The following table shows the total amount of imports of products of







This total represents more than a quarter of the total imports which
were valued at £4,481,000. The inclusion of essential goods in the ag-
gregate quota should not present any difficulties.
163. How should this aggregate customs quota be calculated?
There are clearly several ways of doing it; let us take-for purposes of
illustration only-the average of the last three years for which the sta-





Average = aggregate quota 4,092
At the rate of 700 CFA francs to the pound, this quota amounts to
2,864,400,000 CFA francs. The special quota for the critical items in-
cluded in the aggregate quota should be calculated by the same
method.
164. Since, we repeat, Bathurst is the only port of entry and
since there seems to be sufficient administrative staff, the administra-
tion and control of these quotas should not be too difficult. The appor-
tionment among the importers presents some problems, but even these
are not too complicated. There are at Bathurst eight to ten importing
firms among which an equitable sharing arrangement ought to be
worked out. The same base period used for calculating the quotas (in
the above illustrative example, 1960 to 1962) should, in our opinion, be
taken into account in determining the individual shares. The inter-
ested parties will be required to produce documentary evidence (in-
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voices, customs declarations, etc.) of the volume of their imports, par-
ticularly imports of the critical items.
165. The task of allotting the individual quotas might be en-
trusted to the Chamber of Commerce at Bathurst. A joint Senegalese-
Gambian commission might supervise the smooth functioning of this
system of customs quotas.
166. To explain ouy proposal clearly, still by way of illutration,
we might take the item of printed cotton textiles, one of the most criti-
cal since a considerable quantity is imported into The Gambia and a
good deal is normally smuggled into Senegal. This is how the special
customs quota is calculated, still according to the method which we
have used, i.e. on the basis of average imports during the years 1960 to





Average = special annual quota £241,000 or about 168 million CFA
francs.
167. The customs charges to which printed cotton textiles im-
ported into Senegal are liable vary according to their origin. If of
French origin, they are liable to a fiscal duty of 15 per cent, plus a flat
rate charge of 19.24 per cent, plus turnover tax of 9.8 per cent, whereas
if they originate in any other country a customs duty of 20 per cent is
added. In the case of The Gambia, the preferential duty is 22.5 per
cent and the normal duty 25 per cent, to which must be added 4 per
cent purchase tax. Hence, the charges are as tabulated below:
Imports into Senegal from France
Imports into Senegal from other countries
Preferential imports into The Gambia





168. The customs quota of £241,000 or 168 million CFA francs
can therefore be imported through Bathurst at a rate of 27.4 per cent,
for so long as the British preferential duties are retained and at a rate
of 30 per cent for textiles of any other origin. This special status for
The Gambia cannot, of course, last indefinitely. It will be for the two
Governments to select satisfactory solutions when the time comes.
169. Let us now see how this problem appears on the Senegalese
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side in the case of tariff item No. 55-09-34: printed cotton textiles
(value in millions of CFA francs):
Total imports 1962 1745
Imports from France 1480
Hence imports from
other countries 265
According to the minimum applicable to textiles (see paragraph 100) at
least 70 per cent of Senegal's total imports of this item must come
from France, which gives the following result, calculated on the basis of
the above-mentioned figures for 1962:




The 1963-1964 programme of imports involving an outlay of foreign
currency comprises, in its appropriate section, printed cotton textiles
and synthetic printed textiles; the latter can be ignored as they are of
little importance. This section gives the following figures:
Imports from the EEC
countries
(except France) 1,673,750 NF = 83,687,500 CFA fr.
Aggregate quota 5,463,182 NF = 263,159,100 CFA fr.
Total 356,846,600 CFA fr.
This sum is ample to cover imports coming within the special Gambian
customs quota of 168 million CFA francs. It is assumed that Gambian
importers will be able to obtain their supplies, as in the past, from the
sources which seem most advantageous to them, including low-wage
countries.
Financing
170. We have seen that The Gambia has an adverse foreign trade
balance, with a deficit of more than £1,000,000 for each of the years
1961 and 1962. Imports are not therefore paid for by exports, and earn-
ings from invisible exports are practically non-existent. This deficit is
offset partly by unrecorded trade (smuggling) with Senegal and partly
by non-repayable cash payments from the Colonial Development and




171. So long as the West African pound remains the official cur-
rency in The Gambia, there will be hardly any change in the method of
financing imports. The fact that smuggling will be - so to speak - legal-
ized (see preceding section of this chapter) will not have any effect on
the existing situation either. The United Kingdom will in all
probability continue its financial aid to The Gambia, at least during
the transition period.
172. It is hardly possible, however, that in a customs union two
different currencies should co-exist for any length of time; the day will
eventually come when the currency will have to be unified - i.e. the
West African pound will have to be replaced by the CFA franc. The
Gambia will then leave the sterling area and become part of the franc
area. At the same time it will enjoy the same advantages and assume
the same obligations as other members of the West African Monetary
Union.
173. In round figures France is placing at Senegal's disposal
10,000 million CFA francs during the financial year 1963-1964 to pay
for imports that have to be settled in foreign currency. The Gambia,
for its part, will need sufficient funds to pay for goods imported from
countries not belonging to the franc area. Its exports to countries
outside this area will naturally be subject to the provisions of the cur-
rency exchange regulations in force in Senegal. In principle, the pro-
ceeds of these sales have to be repatriated within three months after
they are received. As a consequence the reserves of the Banque (cen-
trale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) will be increased by
The Gambia's exports to countries outside the franc area. On the other
hand, the Bank will have to make at least some contribution to the
payment of imports from these countries, through its current account
with the French Treasury.
174. According to the method we have used for calculating it, the
total customs quota allocated to Bathurst is about 2,800 million CFA
francs. It is to be hoped that, during the transition period at least, the
United Kingdom will offer some assistance with the part paid for in
foreign exchange. Ultimately, the French and British banks of issue
will have to agree how much each country is to contribute to the total
amount of foreign exchange needed for paying for imports from coun-
tries outside the franc area.
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Effect on revenue
175. As was mentioned in paragraph 133, the abolition of smug-
gling would mean that The Gambia would lose about £138,000 in reve-
nue from customs duties and purchase tax. This figure is based on the
statistics for 1958. The effect on the budget varies, of course, in pro-
portion to the volume of foreign trade. Yet the importance of this fac-
tor should not be exaggerated, for the proceeds from customs charges
on imports have increased from about £742,000 in 1958 to £1,020,000
in the budget for 1963. As a liberal import regime based on customs
quotas is to be maintained during the transition period, budget reve-
nue in The Gambia will hardly decline at all. On the contrary, revenue
will increase pari passu with the progressive unification of customs du-
ties. The same remark also applies to the taxes payable by business
firms, for there will be no immediate reduction in their turnover. In-
deed, turnovers may even be larger in future as the economic integra-
tion of the two countries proceeds.
176. Another fact which should not be overlooked is that several
thousands of persons earn their living through trade. They will not lose
their livelihood. If large numbers of them had to be dismissed, the eco-
nomic, and even political, consequences might be unfortunate.
177. In Senegal, too, it is unlikely that the budget and trade will
be affected immediately. Customs duties lost by smuggling are esti-
mated at 250 million CFA francs in 1958. Even if the figure is twice as
high today - which is hardly likely - it would represent only about 1
per cent of the total budget for the financial year 1963-1964, which
amounts to 45,692 million. As a proportion of customs duties alone,
which exceed 20,000 million, it would be about 2 per cent.
178. Further, to provide even a moderately efficient safeguard
against illicit trade, the frontier with The Gambia has to be well
guarded. As the frontier is more than 700 kilometres long with practi-
cally no road communications, except the trans-Gambian highway,
considerable resources are required to patrol it. In the budget for 1963-
1964 total expenditure by the customs administration on staff and
equipment amounts to 390 million CFA francs. One would not be far
wrong in assuming that at least a third of this is used along the Sene-
gal-Gambia frontier; and the abolition of the customs frontier would
thus mean a saving of more than 100 million CFA francs.
179. There is no doubt that smuggling causes some loss both to
exporters in France and to importers in Senegal, as well as to local
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industry, though the importance of this factor should not be exagger-
ated either. The customs quota system which we are proposing will ob-
viously not provide a solution to this difficulty in the near future; but,
as the economic integration of the two countries proceeds, the situation
will improve and the parties concerned will obtain compensatory bene-
fits which will actually enable them to enlarge their commercial and
industrial activities.
180. The same is true of budget revenue. In Senegal, as in The
Gambia, the State, the traders and businessmen will all benefit in the
long run.
181. With regard to the distribution of the budget revenue, it will
be best-in the initial stages at least-to leave each country free to
retain the revenue which it collects in its own territory. At a more ad-
vanced stage of integration, the two partners will perhaps have to agree
on a suitable scale of distribution in the light of their respective finan-
cial needs.
Unification of Customs duties
182. As economic integration progresses, the two countries will
eventually have to unify their customs duties and other import
charges. This is an extremely complex process, particularly for The
Gambia, a low-tariff country where the rates of duty are in most cases
lower than those charged in Senegal and will therefore have to be
raised.
183. In Senegal, the reduction of duties would run into a number
of difficulties. As we have seen, Senegal is a member of the West Afri-
can Customs Union and later, when the Treaty of Association with the
EEC is ratified, it will be bound by the provisions of this Treaty on
customs matters as well. In addition, there are the agreements with
France which have established a somewhat artificial system of recipro-
cal preferences, and this will be extended to other members of EEC
when the Treaty of Association comes into force (see below). In many
senses, this means that the antagonism of the two economic communi-
ties of Europe is being transplanted in Africa.
184. Senegal, like other developing countries, particularly those
in Africa, obtains most of its revenue from indirect taxes; and, of these,
import duties and other customs charges are by far the most impor-
tant. A reduction in import duties would therefore mean a reduction in
revenue. Besides, for the reasons we have just given, it is hardly possi-
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ble to reduce import duties without the agreement of Senegal's other
partners. To this end, it is most desirable that negotiations should be
undertaken with a view to establishing a simpler system and fixing du-
ties - wherever possible - at a level more in keeping with the low
purchasing power of the great majority of the population. We cannot
discuss these possibilities in detail, but we are convinced that this ex-
tremely complex problem will have to be tackled at some stage to bring
order into the tariff situation and strengthen the economic indepen-
dence of the countries in question. Quite apart from the unification of
tariffs, The Gambia will in any case have to raise its relatively low tax-
ation rate in order to deal with its growing budget deficit, which would
swell to inordinate size if it had to bear the costs of independence and
of the inevitable revision of its lower salaries - see paragraph 93 above -
all by itself.
185. With regard to the programme to be carried out in the near
future, the first essential is to consider on which items in the Gambian
tariff duties could be increased without appreciably affecting the cost
of living. Our investigation at Bathurst showed that something can be
done in this direction; and any action taken would - one may note in
passing - have the advantage of increasing budget revenue. But on the
Senegal side, too, the information in our possession suggests that there
are some steps which can be taken straightaway to meet the interests
of The Gambia. For the moment at least, it may be impossible to re-
duce customs duties, particularly fiscal dues; but there are grounds for
believing that other charges, such as the flat rate tax on business trans-
actions and the turnover tax on imports, could be adjusted.
186. Experts from the two Governments should start negotiations
without delay with a view to achieving a complete unification of import
duties and other customs charges. The negotiations will no doubt be
long and arduous and will continue throughout the transition period.
At the moment one cannot say how long this period will last but it will
certainly extend over several years. In Senegal the reduction of cus-
toms duties and the simplification of the customs system will be a diffi-
cult operation. But it would have the advantage of checking the rising
trend in prices, and even of reducing the cost of living. A liberalized
foreign trade policy would help to expand foreign trade and might off-
set the revenue lost by a reduction of customs duties.
Association with EEC
187. We think that certain points should be explained regarding
the association of Senegal and possibly of The Gambia with the EEC.
[Vol. 7
SENEGAMBIAN CONFEDERATION
The Convention of Association between the European Economic Com-
munity and the African and Malagasy States associated with this Com-
munity was signed at Yaound6 (Cameroon) on 20 July 1963. Senegal is
one of the eighteen African signatories. Under the terms of article 57,
paragraph 1, the Convention will enter into force on the first day of the
month which follows the date of the deposit of the instruments of rati-
fication of the States members and of at least fifteen of the associated
States, and of the instrument notifying the conclusion of the Conven-
tion by the Community. As this condition has not so far been fulfilled,
the Convention has not yet come into force.
188. Even after complete economic integration with Senegal, The
Gambia-linked to Senegal by a special agreement-will not be enti-
tled automatically to claim the benefit of the Convention of Associa-
tion, as the United Kingdom is not a signatory to the Treaty of Rome.
Hence The Gambia cannot become a party to the Convention except
with the consent of the States members of the Common Market and
probably of at least fifteen of the associated countries as well. In view
of the limited size of the interests involved no serious difficulties are to
be expected in this respect.
V. MONETARY AND FISCAL PROBLEMS
189. The changes in the monetary and fiscal systems of Senegal
and The Gambia that will be required for the purpose of closer co-
operation or association cannot be very well treated in any detail at
this stage. They will depend in the first place on the character of that
co-operation at its inception and the direction and tempo of its devel-
opment in the transitional years. In both fields the relationships be-
tween the systems and the daily life of each community is so close that
specific measures can only be designed tbrugb direct discassin by
and with their representatives, any theoretical scheme or schedule is
apt to prove insufficiently fitted to the necessities of the moment.
Therefore only a few more general remarks are made here, indicating
the directions in which the more important difficulties are to be ex-
pected and the initial adaptations will have to be made.
A. Monetary problems
The CFA area
190. The West African monetary system has changed somewhat
in recent years. It now rests on the following agreements signed in
Paris on 12 May 1962:
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the treaty establishing a West African Monetary Union (UMOA);
the agreement of co-operation between the UMOA States and
France;
the articles of association of the common bank of issue.
Six countries were originally parties to the agreement: Dahomey, Ivory
Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. Togo at one time
wished to issue its own currency, but realized that it would be too weak
and would hardly be able to keep its place on the international money
markets, and therefore became the seventh member of the UMOA on
27 November 1963. At first, the letters CFA stood for Colonies fran-
caises africaines, then, after the colonies had become independent,
Communaut6 francaise africaine, and later, after the establishment of
the UMOA, Convention financire africaine.
191. The system set up under the agreements of 12 May 1962
cannot be described in detail within the limits of this report. In broad
outline, however, the basic features are as follows. The bank of issue
for the common currency is the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique
de l'Ouest (BCEAO), with its head office in Paris and branches in each
Member State of the UMOA. France guarantees free convertibility into
French francs at the rate of 50 francs CFA for 1 New French franc, and
convertibility is ensured by the Bank's current account with the
French Treasury. The guiding rules of credit policy are laid down by
the Board of Directors, on which each Member of the UMOA is repre-
sented. Each State has a Monetary Committee to manage it currency.
To determine the liabilities of UMOA Members, the bank notes (which
all bear the initials "CFA") are identified by a letter before the serial
number. For example, those issued in Senegal bear the letter K. It is
thus possible to ascertain the fiduciary circulation in each State.
192. The average volume of notes in circulation throughout the
CFA area is equivalent to 50,000 million CFA francs, but varies consid-
erably-between 40,000 and 60,000 million-according to the volume
of business at harvest time. Statistics of the issue of currency in Sene-
gal show that the notes in circulation at 31 October 1962, that is before
the sale of the groundnut crop, amounted to about 13,000 million
francs, whereas it stood at its peak at 31 January 1963, with 26,800
million francs. This very marked seasonal difference is conclusive evi-
dence that the groundnut crop is the mainspring of Senegal's economy.
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System of the West African Currency Board
193. The currency of The Gambia is the West African pound, the
same currency as used in Sierra Leone, which however, will withdraw
from the West African Currency Board in the course of the year 1964.
The West African Currency Board issues West African pounds against
sterling ensuring the continuous exchange ability of every West African
pound against sterling. In the course of its fifty years of existence, it
not only maintained a 100 per cent sterling cover, but also accumu-
lated certain reserves. Via the convertibility into sterling, The Gambia
trade has access to every world market without restrictions in the mon-
etary field. The circulation of notes amounts to nearly 2 million West
African pounds before the marketing of groundnuts, that is before No-
vember. Then the Bank of West Africa, the representative of the West
African Currency Board in The Gambia, hands out about 1.5 million
pounds of which around 70 per cent comes back by the end of May.
Therefore the circulation during the marketing season reaches a top of
around 3.5 million pounds. In The Gambia one can therefore observe
the same seasonal fluctuation in the currency circulation as in Senegal.
Exchange of currencies
194. A preliminary measure towards fiscal co-operation in the
form of the abolition of the customs border as described in Chapter IV
would enable the two countries to maintain for the present their own
monetary system. After the withdrawal of Sierra Leone from the West
African Currency Board, the position of The Gambia as the only re-
maining member will not be wholly clear with regard to its claim on
the excess reserve of this Board, because the Board has not yet arrived
at a full liquidation of the positions of its former participants. It will
be easier, however, to make a reasonable estimate after than before the
withdrawal of Sierra Leone.
195. As long as the degree of economic integration between The
Gambia and Senegal remains uncertain, it will be difficult:
(a) to take a decision about the desirability for The Gambia
to join the monetary system of the franc CFA, and
(b) to come to terms about conditions of exchange of West
African pounds against francs CFA.
For these reasons it is advisable at least temporarily to maintain both
currencies and it is likely that this will succeed if large-scale hoarding
of West African pounds (with their free convertibility) can be pre-
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vented. One can assume that the Senegalese authorities, together with
the Banque Centrale des Pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, will be prepared
to come to an agreement of co-operation on this matter.
196. It is not unlikely that in the years to come both currencies
will follow the general trend towards a more liberal trade and mone-
tary system. This would considerably facilitate the negotiations about
an exchange of the West African pound into francs (CFA). For the mo-
ment it is feared that exchange rates and the destination of the
reserves may put major difficulties in the way of an agreement.
197. The exchange of West African pounds into francs CFA
(which will not present any technical difficulty as a similar transaction
succeeded in the Cameroon), might have to be envisaged at the mo-
ment when the relative position of the two currencies can, for mone-
tary reasons, no longer be maintained. It also has to be considered
when the economic co-operation between the two countries takes a
more definite and integrated form, because in an integrated economic
system two different currencies cannot exist together.
198. The Gambia has under consideration the establishment of
its own currency after Sierra Leone has left the West African Currency
Board at which moment The Gambia would become its only member.
It seems doubtful whether it would be the appropriate moment now to
take this step while this report is being studied and discussed. The
advantages for The Gambia of having its own currency would probably
be outweighed by the considerable costs involved, certainly if those
costs are to be incurred for the establishment and maintenance of a
currency for a limited period of time.
B. Fiscal problems
199. For the fiscal year 1963-1964, the tax revenue of Senegal is
estimated at 30,800 million francs CFA (about 44 million West African
pounds). The tax revenue for the fiscal year 1963 of The Gambia (in-
cluding port dues and licences) will be 1,360,200 West African pounds
(about 952 million francs CFA). Per head of the population the figures
are roughly as follows:
W.A.£ frs. CFA




200. The difference is greater than can be explained by differ-
ences of costs of living, price level or national income per capita. There
is fundamental difference in the social and economic structure of the
two communities, although Senegal may proportionately have slightly
stronger capital foundation and some 30 per cent more foreign trade
(see paragraphs 159 and 160 above). The figures are an indication of
structural differences in the economic and fiscal system of the two
countries and may be a warning for the advocates of an immediate in-
tegration. They also indicate that a tax increase in The Gambia, which
seems unavoidable in view of its budgetary position (see paragraph
235) and its salary system (see paragraph 93) is not impossible.
201. An analysis of the tax revenue of both countries shows that
a large part of it is formed by taxes, in one form or another, on imports
and exports (for Senegal almost 70 per cent, for The Gambia almost 80
per cent), a situation which they share with many other African coun-
tries. For The Gambia this percentage is likely to increase during the
transitional period with the increase of import duties. This high depen-
dence upon import and export duties seems undesirable and should be
remedied if and when the development of the economy of each country
allows it, but the preponderance of indirect taxes in the revenue will
probably remain a feature of their tax system for a long time.
202. The unification of the customs tariffs cannot take place
without a vigorous effort to put them at a moderate level, particularly
for articles of mass consumption. Both countries should try to improve
their direct taxation, by legislative as well as by administrative mea-
sures, even though any considerable increase in revenue cannot as yet
be expected to be the result. There would be an advantage in trying
also to arrive at a unification of direct taxation, even if their rates may
still continue to differ.
203. Special attention must be given to the taxation of compa-
nies. If the economic integration proceeds, companies ought to be
taxed in the same way in The Gambia and Senegal. It would not be
right to let tax considerations play a preponderant role in the question
as to whether a company will establish itself in Senegal or The
Gambia.
204. Certain aspects of the customs have been treated in greater
detail in chapter IV. The observations made there about the desirabil-
ity of simplifying the system of import duties and related taxes in Sen-
egal before unification proceeds, apply with equal force in the wider
field of taxation in general, even if a reduction of the level can but very
gradually be achieved. Any measure that can stabilize or even reduce
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the price-level and the cost of living in that country will enable it to
keep its budget and its salary system within bounds and reduce the
unavoidable increase of those factors in The Gambia. Such a policy
would seem to be a condition for the harmonization of the fiscal struc-
tures of both countries.
VI. POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
AND EXTERNAL AID
205. In this chapter, we do not propose to repeat what has been
said earlier on the subject of the improvement and diversification of
agriculture and on industrial development in Senegal. In this connex-
ion, reference may be made to Act No. 6132, passed by the National
Assembly of Senegal on 8 May 1961, which deals with the first Four-
Year Development Plan (1961-1964), and more particularly to the vari-
ous programmes annexed to it. There is also a publication issued by
the French Ministry of Co-operation in January 1962 entitled
"Economie et plan de d~veloppement de la R6publique du S6n~gal."
One of the fundamental problems of the Senegambian association is
how to incorporate The Gambia into this development plan, or better,
how to take advantage of the far greater possibilities offered by full co-
operation between the two territories.
206. The paragraphs which follow will discuss briefly the areas
where an improvement is feasible, with particular reference to the pos-
sibilities that The Gambia can offer.
The advantages of the Gambia river
207. The Gambia will not come empty-handed if it entered into
an economic association with its neighbour. Its most important asset is
the Gambia River, one of the best navigable waterways in West Africa.
Medium-sized cargo vessels can use it for some 240 km. as far as Kun-
tuar; barges and small vessels can even reach Basse (390 kin).
208. The use of this river as a Senegambian waterway would
transform the whole transport system; at present the river is far from
being utilized to its full capacity. The main purpose to which it is put
at present is to bring down the groundnut crop, which in The Gambia
amounts to 80,000 tons on the average. In the event of an economic
association, this quantity can be doubled by including the crop from
neighbouring areas of Senegal. For this purpose, it would be necessary
to improve the roads leading to the river ports and perhaps even to
build a branch line from the Dakar-Bamako railway either to Kaur or
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to Kuntuar, at both of which places there are shelling plants for
groundnuts, though these are both rather obsolete.2 3 A study, dated 26
September 1961, of the marketing and transport of groundnuts in the
event of a union between Senegal and The Gambia has already been
made by the competent department of the Senegalese Government.
Port installations along the river would also have to be improved and
adapted for handling larger tonnages.
209. It is estimated that a saving of 1 to 3 CFA francs per kg
could be made by bringing the crop down The Gambia river. This is a
very important point, especially if under the Convention of association
with the EEC the premium prices granted by France have to be with-
drawn and groundnuts have to be sold at the world market price.
There is also a report on this question dated March 1960 entitled "In-
cidences sur les transports et la production du Mali de l'insertion du
fleuve Gambie dans le r6seau des transports" (The effect on transport
and production in Mali-i.e. the Federation of Mali, now dissolved-of
the inclusion of the Gambia river in the transport system) which forms
an annex to Mr. Ruffel's report on economic relations between Senegal
and The Gambia and which gives fuller particulars.
210. Supplementing these proposals concerning the prospects
opened up by an economic association between Senegal and The Gam-
bia, a study has been made, by FAO and at its suggestion, of the ad-
vantages to both countries of a hydrological and agricultural develop-
ment of The Gambia river basin. Two experts, Mr. M6redieu and Mr.
Aubrac, undertook to prepare such a study. In the short time available,
the investigation was necessarily a very brief one; its results will
shortly be presented to the two Governments.
Increase of agricultural production
211. Groundnut production amounts to barely one ton per hec-
tare. Brief reference should be made here to the methods recom-
mended for increasing the yield, details of which will be found in the
Four-Year Plan.2 4 The methods include the general introduction of
ploughing with animals and, at a later stage, of mechanization, the
careful selection of seeds, the more intensive use of fertilizer, etc.
23. It is proposed to close the plant at Kuntuar and to modernize and increase the
capacity of the Kaur installation.
24. In 1960, the average yield per hectare was 912 kg. The target for 1964 under the
Plan is 1150 kg - a relatively modest increase.
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212. On the assumption that the area under cultivation in Sene-
gal remains about 1 million hectares (the Gambian area would of
course have to be added to this), the yield per hectare should rise sig-
nificantly by the use of the methods just referred to. The intensified
production would also help to relieve the shortage of seasonal labour.
213. Another means of improving production is to market the
groundnuts through co-operatives, and to develop and increase the
number of co-operatives (at present there are about 1600). The co-op-
eratives might in addition perform a useful service if they were author-
ized to grant small agricultural loans in order to help to tide the peas-
ant over the period between the sale of two crops and to keep him out
of the clutches of the money-lenders.
214. In both countries there are organizations responsible for the
marketing of groundnuts. In Senegal, the body concerned is the Office
de commercialisation agricole; in The Gambia it is the Gambia Oil-
seeds Marketing Board. So far there has been practically no contact
between these two institutions. It seems desirable that there should be
close co-operation between them in order to ensure that the production
and marketing of groundnuts are carried out in an orderly manner.
Other agricultural possibilities
215. Like most other States of Africa south of the Sahara, Sene-
gal is basically an agricultural country and, like them, is exposed to the
hazards of a one-crop economy. Diversification of agricultural produc-
tion is an expression that is often used and as often misunderstood. In
the case of Senegal, for example, groundnuts cannot simply be replaced
by other crops. The peasants have been accustomed to growing this
crop for many years and could be persuaded to take an interest in
some other agricultural product only if it offers the prospect of a
higher income. Diversification should be achieved rather by using, and
if necessary clearing, new land that would be suitable for growing such
crops as rice or cotton.
216. In general, the main objective should be to intensify and in-
crease the cultivation of food crops and vegetables. For this purpose,
one must proceed with great care, since erosion and soil instability are
major obstacles to development.
217. The considerations set out briefly in the preceding para-
graph apply to both countries. In the particular case of The Gambia,
diversification was the subject of a report issued in August 1961 by the
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Gambian Department of Agriculture. This referred to the possibility of
growing cashew nuts and limes, which could provide the basis for a
small local industry. In addition, a species of palm tree which after
about fifteen years produces a hard wood very suitable for building has
been grown experimentally at a forest research centre.
218. The waters off the coast of Senegal and The Gambia are rich
in fish, particularly tunny, and there is considerable scope for the de-
velopment of a maritime fishing industry in both countries. Again,
stock farming could be increased and improved; at present the live-
stock is of poor quality.
219. By diversifying and expanding agricultural production and
by improving stock farming and fishing, three objects would be
achieved: imports would be reduced, the balance of payments would be
improved and foreign exchange would be saved. This is made clear by
the following figures:
Imports into Senegal in 1962 Millions of CFA francs
Meat and poultry (killed) 89,654
Fish and other sea products 20,169








These imports represent a total sum of about 6,700 million CFA francs,
or 17.5 per cent of all imports, which amounted to 38,200 million CFA
francs. By intensifying and diversifying its agricultural production, Se-
negal can undoubtedly make itself independent of a large proportion of
its imports from abroad. In adopting this course, the Senegalese au-
thorities would, of course, encounter opposition from certain private
interests that regard themselves as having an acquired right. Without
examining this problem more closely, one should, however, affirm that
a country's development ought to take precedence over these private
interests which, under healthy economic conditions, will experience no
difficulty in finding compensatory benefits in other directions.
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Prospects for industrialization
220. Senegal has already reached a stage of industrialization
more advanced than that of most of the countries in West Africa. In-
dustry, which is already quite diversified, is concentrated mainly in the
Cap Vert region, i.e. round Dakar. In 1962, there were sixty-four indus-
trial undertakings producing phosphates, tinned goods (tunny), ce-
ment, matches, cigarettes, soap, beer, shoes, textiles and other good,
thermo-electric power, and especially groundnut oil.
221. Senegal has an ambitious programme of industrial develop-
ment and diversification set out in the Four-Year Plan, for which a
sum of 27,000 million CFA francs is allocated. We would mention only
two major obstacles: firstly, the internal market is narrow and its
purchasing power is low-and it will be hard to dispose of finished
products in the markets of the industrialized countries-and, secondly,
there are no energy resources. Electricity generated by thermal plants
is exorbitantly expensive, and as a consequence it is virtually impossi-
ble to set up any industry that is a heavy consumer of electricity.
222. The prospects for industrialization in The Gambia are not
very encouraging at least at present. Apart from the production of lime
juice and thermal electric power, an oil mill could no doubt be installed
with a capacity exceeding domestic consumption and producing a sur-
plus for export. In any planning covering both countries the prospects
for the industrialization of The Gambia should naturally be studied
carefully.
223. In the appropriate development of industry as well as of ag-
riculture very special attention should be paid to the economic infra-
structure. The Senegalese Four-Year Plan gives full particulars in this
respect.
Tourism
224. There are beauty spots and beaches on the Senegal coast,
particularly in the Cap Vert (Dakar) area, which certainly might be-
come an international tourist attraction, as the climate is very pleasant
there for much of the year-from November to May. However, foreign-
ers will hardly be attracted, and consequently tourist trade can hardly
be developed, so long as, owing to the over-valuation of the CFA franc,
the cost of vacationing in Senegal remains much higher than the aver-
age tourist can afford. In The Gambia, on the other hand, there seems
to be little scope for developing a tourist trade, although Bathurst is
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beautifully situated on the estuary. Away from the coast there are no
tourist attractions in either Senegal or The Gambia, except possibly
trips into the bush, where hunters could carry on their favourite sport.
Financing and external aid
225. Senegal's Four-Year Development estimates for its financing
and for the necessary investments a sum of altogether 92,100 million
CFA francs, of which 48,900 million are to come from public sources
and 43,200 million from private sources (banks, business, foreign in-
vestment, etc.). The funds from private sources include foreign aid
amounting to 26,900 million francs. The foreign sources of finance are,
first and foremost, France, followed by the European Development
Fund (EDF) and the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Some
bilateral aid is given by the United States of America and the Federal
Republic of Germany.
226. We have drawn up as complete a table as possible of the
bilateral and multilateral foreign aid granted to Senegal and to The
Gambia. The main figures for 1962 for Senegal are:
(millions of CFA francs)
Contributions from the FAC
(Fonds d'aide et de cooperation) 4,767
Miscellaneous contributions 1,640
Premium prices paid for groundnuts
(estimated at between 7,000 and 9,000) 8,000
Total bilateral aid from France 14,407
Noteworthy among the FAC credits are the funds contributed to the
investment programme (1,300 million) and the technical assistance
staff, estimated to be worth 3,000 million francs, on the basis of 2,500
officials.
227. France does not grant any direct budgetary assistance to
Senegal, but the 8,000 million francs paid in the form of premium
prices for groundnuts represent in effect nothing other than a budget
receipt. The technical assistance staff and the expenses of the Univer-
sity of Dakar, estimated at 1,100 million francs, which are defrayed in
full by France, add over 4,000 million CFA francs.
228. For the sake of completeness, we should mention the mili-
tary aid supplied by France to Senegal in the form of material and of
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military personnel serving in the Senegalese army as part of technical
assistance. These expenses must amount to about 2,000 million francs,
at a conservative estimate.
229. The Federal Republic of Germany has granted to Senegal a
loan of 25 million DM (equivalent to about 1,500 million francs CFA)
at 31/2 per cent to improve the economic infrastructure, in particular
for the construction of a road network radiating from Diourbel. In ad-
dition, the Federal Republic has promised to carry out free of charge
certain projects amounting in all to some 6 million DM, the principal
one being the building of a hospital at Diourbel.
230. Of the bilateral aid from the United States, 50 per cent is
financed from counterpart funds, while the other 50 per cent is used to
defray the expenses of the Embassy and its services. The projects fi-
nanced out of the counterpart funds relate to hydrology, the social in-
frastructure (schools, hospitals and vocational training centres) and
poultry farming. The total under this head may be estimated at US
$1.5 million a year, or 375 million CFA francs.25 Senegal comes under
the United States Food for Peace project, under which it receives
mainly shipments of rice spread over five years and representing an
estimated value of about US $700,000 per year, or 175 million francs.
There are 70 to 80 members of the Peace Corps in Senegal engaged
mainly in community development and training all kinds of personnel.
This kind of aid is hard to express in figures.
231. This is equally true of the bilateral aid given by Israel,
mainly in the form of fellowships.
232. The largest factor in multilateral aid is that from the Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF) under the auspices of the Common
Market. According to the statement by Mr. Andr6 Peytavin, the Minis-
ter of Finance, introducing the budget for 1962-1963, this Fund spends
an estimated 3,600 million CFA francs in Senegal annually.
233. Lastly, contributions by the United Nations (Special Fund,
Expanded Programme) and its specialized agencies amount to about
US $1 million, or 250 million CFA francs.
234. In the following table the total foreign aid from these vari-
ous sources is recapitulated:
25. An exchange rate of 250 CFA francs per US dollar is used for convenience.
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(millions of CFA francs)
France 16,400
EDF 3,600
United Nations, Federal Republic of
Germany, United States, Israel, etc. 1,000
Total foreign aid 21,000
Although this figure of 21,000 million CFA francs seems very large, it is
really a rather conservative estimate; qualified observers estimate the
total foreign aid at between 20,000 and 25,000 million CFA francs. For
a population of 3 million, this foreign aid works out at 7,000 CFA
francs, or £10 per inhabitant.
235. All the external aid received by The Gambia is British. In
1962 it comprised:
Colonial Development and Welfare
Fund - annual maximum £800,000
Expatriation allowances for British
civil servants 75,000
Aid to budget 639,087
Total United Kingdom aid £1,514,087
As the population of The Gambia is about 300,000, aid Per capita is
£5, exactly half the figure estimated for Senegal.
236. It is clear from the foregoing paragraphs that external aid is
a vital factor in the development of both countries. It is probable that
the expenditure will be higher for the financing of the projects briefly
referred to in this chapter, both in The Gambia and in Senegal, partic-
ularly the project for developing The Gambia river as a waterway and
for the hydrological and agricultural development of the river basin. It
should be noted that such projects, which should be eligible for assis-
tance from the United Nations Special Fund, will be feasible only if
the two countries co-operate closely.
237. If it is to cover The Gambia, the Senegalese Four-Year Plan
will have to be adjusted to the changed situation. Accordingly, an over-
all plan ought to be worked out, and the development should be ratio-
nalized in such a way that such existing institutions as research cen-
tres, groundnut marketing boards and financing agencies collaborate
very closely and are placed, eventually, under the authority of a single
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executive body.26
238. It seems right that not only France, but also the United
Kingdom should contribute to the financing of the over-all plan, at
least during the transition period. Since the per capita aid from the
United Kingdom to The Gambia is much lower than that given by
France to Senegal, we may venture to hope that the United Kingdom
might supply rather more aid. The Gambia's reserves with the West
African Currency Board might perhaps be used for this purpose. In the
final analysis, it is for the two countries to reach agreement on this
subject.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
239. It may be useful, at this point, to sum up the main reasons
for The Gambia and Senegal to seek a closer co-operation than that
between two neighbouring states, maintaining friendly relations with
each other, but otherwise conducting wholly separate and independent
policies. Within the wider concept of African unity, their common in-
terest and mutual dependence are of a more specific nature and under-
neath the differences caused by their historical past is the original ho-
mogeneity of their peoples, the similarity of their economies and the
geographic dovetailing of their territories.
240. There appears for them to be no fundamental reason for dif-
ferent international policies, though each of them wishes to continue
special relations with the former metropolitan country. In the last re-
sort, this is even true for commercial policy as the same factors will
ultimately determine their economic development and the composition
of their imports and exports. The sources of their income and their
need of investment capital are of the same nature and the harmoniza-
tion of their fiscal structures, whatever the present differences, ought
not to present insuperable difficulties if the major and more permanent
interest of the two countries are kept in mind. The present customs
26. As yet such technical co-operation has only been tried with the Inter-Ministerial
Committee of Senegal and The Gambia; this experience, however, has not been encour-
aging. In the Committee itself a rather high degree of understanding and goodwill from
both sides existed, but the bureaucracy of neither of the two countries has been able to
follow up in the same spirit of co-operation. This certainly is not an exceptional experi-
ence in international relations; experience teaches that results can only be reached with
acceptable speed if one single body is made responsible for the execution. Therefore, a
permanent secretariat will have to be established, sufficiently provided with funds and
means to promote and stimulate inter alia the economic co-operation and the develop-
ment of the Gambia river basin (see chapters III and VII).
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border is highly artificial and gives rise to a series of obstructions and
conflicting concerns that ought not to endanger their fraternal affinity.
241. Certain very important natural features and resources can-
not be developed and exploited unless it is done as a common under-
taking. Nothing really comprehensive can be done about the utilization
of the Gambia river and the harbour of Bathurst, or about the commu-
nications between the Casamance and the region north of it - including
The Gambia - as long as frontiers create a barrier. International assis-
tance for projects of this kind, which are among the largest imaginable
in this area, requires the action and assent of both countries together
and may not be available unless the obstruction of these frontiers is
removed.
242. As to the French and British elements in their culture and
administration, they can both provide a valuable contribution to the
African institutions and civilization that must be the ultimate goal of
their policy. Instead of maintaining the emphasis on their dissimilari-
ties, the suitable and valuable features of both can be most usefully
embodied in that common civilization. Unless this is done, the coun-
tries will only continue to copy, after a certain time-lag, the develop-
ments that are taking place in the former metropolitan states under
entirely different and to a large extent alien circumstances and
motivations.
243. In considering the various forms of co-operation, it has to be
kept in mind that maintenance of a complete separation between The
Gambia and Senegal as sovereign states would make a heavy demand
on the material and human resources of the former without really
opening the way to a more radical improvement of its economy by bas-
ing it on a broader foundation. At the same time, Senegal would be
hampered in the full development of its southern territories. On the
other hand, the different cultural elements, administrative practices,
economic policies and fiscal and finance structures warrant a prudent
approach of the problem of association between the two countries and
the earliest possible start of concrete discussions and negotiations be-
tween them.
244. Complete political integration as the immediate goal of
those negotiations seems unrealistic and would most probably not ob-
tain the free assent of both peoples now. A process of association in
successive stages, giving time for widespread information about and
understanding of its implications, offers a far better chance of durable
and satisfying results.
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245. A federation with, at least in the beginning, a limitation of
the federal powers to the necessary minimum may be the most logical
and effective goal as a first stage, leaving it to develop as the circum-
stances and the growing habit of co-operation permit and require. It
may, however, be still more practical initially not to go beyond a treaty
relationship creating a common international representation, a com-
mon defence and common organs which can project measures to har-
monize trade and customs policies, to work out combined development
plans and to facilitate the mutual relations and movement of the re-
spective citizens. An abolition of the customs border might be among
the early achievement to be considered. This would imply a first move
towards the harmonization of import and customs policies; a gradual
process to be undertaken from both sides and accompanied by a care-
ful observation of its effects. The inevitable consequence of a conver-
gence of the price-level in The Gambia and the higher one in Senegal
should be made less drastic by appropriate measures from both sides,
and contribute to the much needed increase of government revenue in
The Gambia. Further changes and adaptations, ultimately resulting in
a customs union, can be made the subject of continuous consultation
and bilateral action. They will necessitate certain changes in interna-
tional agreements which, as they will be a matter of common concern,
will emphasize the need for mutual consultation and agreement in in-
ternational policies.
246. A similar though partial harmonization of the fiscal systems
of the two countries should also have early attention, with regard not
only to customs tariffs, but also to corporation taxes and probably to
the income tax. Again this should be seen not as a simple application
of the system of one country to the other, but as a process of mutual
adjustment in the most beneficial way for both.
247. The unification of the monetary systems does not appear as
pressing, but cannot be delayed beyond a certain stage of economic
integration.17 Co-operation of the monetary authorities and institutions
in the franc- and sterling-zones is indispensable for this purpose and
relationships to other African countries will be important in this
respect.
248. The harmonization of administrative patterns will be urgent
as they will require little change in view of the wide internal autonomy
to be retained in The Gambia, about which there seems to be full
27. Identical considerations apply to the unification of the system of weights and
measures (towards the metric one), of the road-traffic rules and of the PTT services.
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agreement. Nevertheless the problem of the rather divergent salary
levels, particularly in the lower ranks of the civil services, cannot fail to
attract attention. Although assimilation is in no way urgent outside the
few common services of the early stages, it must be expected that the
inferior level of payment in The Gambia for those lower civil servants,
which is not merely a result of the lower cost of living, will lead to
pressures for betterment, which a rise in the price-level will undoubt-
edly strengthen. A policy of salary-stabilization in Senegal, as recently
undertaken, can help to prevent this problem from getting out of hand,
but certain improvements in the lower scales for The Gambia seem
unavoidable in any case, although they will obviously aggravate its
budgetary problem.
249. The special ties with the United Kingdom and the Common-
wealth, desired by The Gambia and indispensable in the field of lan-
guage and education, can probably be maintained and developed with-
out an explicit membership of the Commonwealth. The advantages of
bilingualism (French and English) are fully realized by the Senegalese
authorities and obvious in connexion with the striving for African
unity. With mutual goodwill, a proper form for them can certainly be
found.
250. Co-operation with regard to external assistance will bring
such desirable profits that this fact alone would justify the develop-
ment of a common international policy and representation. Even
before the agreement to associate is formalized, the first steps in this
direction might be taken. This would, of course, not exclude certain
types of assistance that would solely concern one of the two countries.
251. Finally it will be necessary from the outset of the negotia-
tions to create a competent and efficient common organ for collective
action. A combined secretariat with United Nations technical assis-
tance for its staffing seems the best solution. It would also help to lay
the foundation for an adequate translation and interpretation service
and might become a pattern for the organization of co-operative ser-
vices and continuous consultation, without which no form of associa-
tion can be achieved.
252. The mission makes the following recommendations:
(a) That the Governments of Senegal and The Gambia enter
into negotiations as soon as possible, concerning their fu-
ture co-operation, to be implemented once The Gambia
has obtained its independence.
(b) That those negotiations be conducted through appropri-
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ate representatives at such place or places as the Govern-
ments may agree upon 28 and be continued until an
agreed conclusion is reached.
(c) That the negotiations be assisted by a common secreta-
riat, under a full-time general secretary, with the neces-
sary experts and an adequate staff of translators, inter-
preters and administrative personnel.
(d) That both Governments request the United Nations to
provide, under its technical assistance programme, to be
continued if necessary as a Special Fund project, the ser-
vices of a general secretary, of up to four experts in the
legal, economic, fiscal and administrative fields, when
and as long as they are needed, and at least two English-
French translators/interpreters.
(e) That both Governments provide Senegalese and Gam-
bian experts and the necessary administrative staff for
the secretariat together with suitable office space and
transport facilities.
(f) That, if an agreement is reached on some form of associa-
tion, the Governments transform the secretariat into a
more permanent office for contact and consultation, if
necessary with such United Nations technical assistance
as they may request and the United Nations may be in a
position to provide.
(g) That, in case of such an agreement, the development of
the Gambia river valley in its widest sense should be un-
dertaken, if appropriate in consultation and agreement
with the Government of Guinea 29 as a project of para-
mount importance for the economy of the two countries,
with the assistance of the Special Fund of the United
Nations or such other international or bilateral aid as
they may find desirable and can be obtained.
253. The mission offers the analyses and observations in this re-
port as initial material for these negotiations.
28. E.g. alternately in Dakar and Bathurst.




JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE SENEGALESE AND
GAMBIAN GOVERNMENTS FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1962
The Government of the Republic of Senegal and the Government
of The Gambia, with the consent of Her Majesty's Government in The
United Kingdom, have recently given consideration to the possibility
that, on the attainment of full sovereign independence by The Gambia,
some form of association might be entered into between The Gambia
and Senegal. During their discussions, the Premier of The Gambia pro-
posed that a joint approach might be made by The Government of
Senegal and The Government of the United Kingdom, acting in re-
spect of The Gambia, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
to appoint, under technical assistance arrangements, a team of consti-
tutional, economic and fiscal experts. This team of experts would lay
before the Governments economic and political data on which deci-
sions can be taken as to the form which their future relationships
should take.
This proposal was accepted by the Senegalese Government and
the Secretary-General of the United Nations has confirmed his willing-
ness to appoint such a team. Subject to the endorsement of this propo-
sal by the Gambian House of Representatives this team will be ap-
pointed in consultation with the two Governments, who hereby affirm
their determination to co-operate fully with the team and to provide
such information as it may require to perform its appointed task.
The conclusions reached by the experts will be studied by the two
Governments and will form the subject of subsequent negotiations,
with a view to achieving a close and friendly association between The
Gambia and Senegal. The two Governments hope thus to make an im-
portant contribution to the stability, development and prosperity of
their two countries and to the cause of African unity.
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ANNEX II
STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GAMBIA
ON THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GAMBIA
This statement is issued by the Government as a supplement to
the Joint Communiqu6 issued by the Governments of The Gambia and
Senegal on the 26 October 1962.
1. The Government of The Gambia, in furtherance of its declared
intention to lead the country to independence, has recently been giving
careful deliberation to the future economic and political development
of The Gambia.
2. In the course of these deliberations The Gambia Government
has been guided by two main principles: firstly, that independence
must provide an effective means of leading The Gambian people to-
wards greater prosperity and well-being, and that, for economic rea-
sons, The Gambia might find it difficult to sustain this objective as an
isolated sovereign independent state; secondly, that independence,
when attained, should contribute to the wider cause of African unity.
In the light of these two principles and in view of the close economic,
geographical and ethnological links which bind the two countries, the
Government decided that steps should be taken, after preliminary dis-
cussion with the Senegalese Government, to acquire the necessary in-
formation which would enable the Government and the peoples of The
Gambia to consider the question of some form of association with Sen-
egal on the attainment of independence. The Gambian Government
has been informed that the United Kingdom Government, for their
part, would be prepared actively to support any such move towards
closer association between the two countries.
3. At the same time the Gambian and Senegalese Governments
have recognized the fact that due to the differing traditions and cul-
ture on which Senegal and The Gambia have developed, and to the
differing political, economic and fiscal systems which obtain in the two
countries, the problems involved in achieving political and economic
association are considerable.
4. With these considerations in mind the Premier of The Gam-
bia, the Hon. D.K. Jawara, informally approached the President and
Prime Minister of the Senegal Republic on 24th September with a pro-
posal that consideration should be given by the two Governments in
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making a joint approach to the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions requesting that a team of constitutional, economic and fiscal ex-
perts should be appointed under technical assistance arrangements, in
consultation with the two Governments. These experts would lay
before the Governments the economic and political data on which the
Governments and peoples of the two countries could decide what form
their future relationship should take. In putting forward this proposal,
the Premier of The Gambia made clear the need for his Government to
await the conclusions of the team of experts before reaching any deci-
sion on the nature of such a future relationship.
5. In addition, the Premier emphasized that in the event of any
form of union between the two countries being agreed The Gambia
Government would wish to see reserved in any such agreement certain
essential safeguards concerning the measure of autonomy which would
be enjoyed by The Gambia after association. These matters would con-
cern those which the Government would wish to retain under its own
control in any association with Senegal and would include responsibil-
ity for internal administration, the police, civil service, and local gov-
ernment; preservation of Gambian civil and criminal law, educational
and professional standards and qualifications; and the maintenance of
the close ties of association between The Gambia, the United Kingdom
and the Commonwealth. They would also concern those matters which
The Gambia would wish to consider sharing with Senegal (defence, for-
eign policy [including joint representation overseas], financial matters
and development). Ancillary to these matters The Gambia Govern-
ment would also wish to see secured conditions ensuring joint repre-
sentation for matters for which responsibility might be apportioned;
conditions which would ensure continuance of Gambia's trading re-
maining liberalized; and provision for some form of constitutional ap-
peal to protect safeguards and conditions secured in any final
agreement.
6. The President and Prime Minister of Senegal have informed
the Premier of The Gambia that they welcome these proposals and
have accepted them in principle subject to detailed negotiation on the
terms of any eventual association in the light of the team of experts'
findings. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has also con-
firmed his willingness to appoint such a team.
7. Subject, therefore, to the endorsement of this proposal by The
Gambia House of Representatives, it is anticipated that the team of
experts will be appointed towards the end of the year and, in the
meantime, consideration will be given by the two Governments to the
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membership of the team and to its terms of reference.
8. The Gambia Government fully endorses the hope expressed in
the joint Communiqu6 that the outcome of the team's enquiry will
form a satisfactory basis for further negotiations between the two Gov-
ernments contributing to the stability, development and prosperity of
the two countries and to the cause of closer African unity.

3 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
U.S. Military Presence In Honduras
1-CUCUYAOUA. Airstrip constructed to 7-PUERTO LEMPIRA: Secret satellite 03-TONCONTI: Intecrational Airport for
accommodate U.S. military C-130 communication center. Airstrip up- Tegucigalpa. Site of U.S. MILGP (Military
transport planes, graded to accommodate C-130 trans. Group) base. MILGP is responsible for
ports all U.S. military training activities in
2-LA MIIES Airport of Honrduran Air Honduras.
Force, used by U.S. military transport
planes during Big Pine II maneuvers. B-AGUACATE: Airstrip extended during
Big Pine maneuvers now has capacity 14-SAN LORENZOi Naval base and air.
S-PUERTO CORTES: Site of projected to handle C-130 transports port. now capable of handling C-130
military portiairport. to be used as an transports.
lternative to Puert Castilla. AMASTRAN: Airport constructed during 15-tIGER ISLAND: Radar station staffed
4-LA CE]Iu Alrbase and advanced am- Big Pine maneuvers: has capacity to by 150 U.S. Marines. Monitors activity
munition depot. Recently upgraded handle C-13D transports, in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Also Used
runway. as base for CIA speed boats.
IC-SALAMAR: Base for advisors from
b-PUERTO CASISU.A: Permanent military U.S. Special Forces Mobile Unit. 18-PALMEROLA: Site of General Head-
por and atase. Site of Regiort quarters for U.S, Honduras Task Force.
Miitary TrainingCenter. where Salvador- with 800 pemanently stationed U.S.
ean and other Central American armed 3LI-CERRO LA HULL Radar station staffed troops. Base for Mohavk and Beechcraft
forces receive training from 120 Green by U.S. Tactical Air Command personnel. surveillance aircraft used over El Sala-
Berets. dor and Nicaragua. Primary forward
6-TRJILLO: Enlarged airport, used as a 12-CHOLUTECOL Radar station staffed b munition and j fuel storage depot for
supply base tor Puerto Castilla. Airstrip U.S. persoel observog and cswtdivat-
improved to handle C-130 military ing "cantra" attacks across Nicaraguan
transport planes, border.
Reprinted from R. CAMARDA. FORCEo TO MOVE 96 41985) with permission of Solidarity Publications.
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